Does Skepticism Presuppose Explanationism?

A common response to radical skeptical challenges to our knowledge of the external world has been that there are explanatory reasons (e.g., simplicity, coherence, explanatory power, conservatism) for favoring commonsense explanations of our sensory experiences over skeptical explanations. Despite the degree of visibility this class of response has enjoyed, it has often been viewed with skepticism [sic] by the epistemological community because of concerns about the epistemic merits of explanatory reasoning. I argue that skeptical challenges that employ skeptical hypotheses presuppose central explanationist tenets and that this fact should raise one’s estimation of the strength of explanationist responses to skepticism

Seasonal north-south asymmetry in solar radiation at the top of Jupiter's atmosphere

A selected set of planetocentric latitudes is used in calculations of the seasonal solar radiation pattern incident on top of the Jovian atmosphere, thereby demonstrating the combined effect of solar distance and declination. Attention is given to hemispheric asymmetries in the Jovian atmosphere's average zonal winds and cloud system morphologies. Marked hemispheric asymmetries are noted in the cloud morphology and in the magnitude and latitudinal position of eastward and westward maxima in the average zonal winds, suggesting seasonal forcing on the order of magnitude presently considered. Supporting observations by Voyagers 1 and 2 are cited

The Empirical Case for Folk Indexical Moral Relativism

Recent empirical work on folk moral objectivism has attempted to examine the extent to which folk morality presumes that moral judgments are objectively true or false. Some researchers report findings that they take to indicate folk commitment to objectivism (Goodwin & Darley, 2008, 2010, 2012; Nichols & Folds-Bennett, 2003; Wainryb et al., 2004), while others report findings that may reveal a more variable commitment to objectivism (Beebe, 2014; Beebe et al., 2015; Beebe & Sackris, 2016; Sarkissian, et al., 2011; Wright, 2018; Wright, Grandjean, & McWhite, 2013; Wright, McWhite, & Grandjean, 2014). However, the various probes that have been used to examine folk moral objectivism almost always fail to be good direct measures of objectivism. Some critics (Beebe, 2015; Pölzler, 2017, 2018) have suggested that the problems with existing probes are serious enough that they should be viewed as largely incapable of shedding any light on folk metaethical commitments. Building upon the work of Justin Khoo and Joshua Knobe (2018), I argue that many of the existing probes can be seen as good measures of the extent to which people think that the truth of one moral judgment excludes the possibility that a judgment made by a disagreeing party is also true and that the best explanation of the findings obtained using these measures is significant folk support for indexical moral relativism—the view that the content of moral judgments is context-sensitive. If my thesis is correct, many contemporary moral philosophers are deeply mistaken about the metaethical contours of folk morality in one very important respect

Epistemic Closure in Folk Epistemology

We report the results of four empirical studies designed to investigate the extent to which an epistemic closure principle for knowledge is reflected in folk epistemology. Previous work by Turri (2015a) suggested that our shared epistemic practices may only include a source-relative closure principle—one that applies to perceptual beliefs but not to inferential beliefs. We argue that the results of our studies provide reason for thinking that individuals are making a performance error when their knowledge attributions and denials conflict with the closure principle. When we used research materials that overcome what we think are difficulties with Turri’s original materials, we found that participants did not reject closure. Furthermore, when we presented Turri’s original materials to non-philosophers with expertise in deductive reasoning (viz., professional mathematicians), they endorsed closure for both perceptual and inferential beliefs. Our results suggest that an unrestricted closure principle—one that applies to all beliefs, regardless of their source—provides a better model of folk patterns of knowledge attribution than a source-relative closure principle

Is Justification Necessary for Knowledge?

Justification has long been considered a necessary condition for knowledge, and theories that deny the necessity of justification have been dismissed as nonstarters. In this chapter, we challenge this long-standing view by showing that many of the arguments offered in support of it fall short and by providing empirical evidence that individuals are often willing to attribute knowledge when epistemic justification is lacking

Velocity variations of an Equatorial plume throughout a Jovian year

Features in the equatorial zone of Jupiter show that the equatorial plume reported by Pioneer 10 has existed for an 11-year interval. During this interval the plume has shown an acceleration which can be interpreted as a constant component of 3 x 10 to minus 8th power m/sq cm and a sinusoidal component which anticorrelates with the planetocentric declination of the sun, D sub s, and has an amplitude of -0.96 meters per second per degree change of D sub s. The sinusoidal component has been interpreted in terms of solar heating. Throughout this interval of time the equatorial zone has appeared abnormally dark and has contained many dark projections along the northern edge. When the plume approaches to within 25 to 30 deg of these features they are deflected in the direction of motion of the plume and then dissipate or become obscured as the plume passes. After passage of the plume normal features are again observed

The Memorability of Supernatural Concepts: Effects of Minimal Counterintuitiveness, Moral Valence, and Existential Anxiety on Recall

Within the cognitive science of religion, some scholars hypothesize (1) that minimally counterintuitive (MCI) concepts enjoy a transmission advantage over both intuitive and highly counterintuitive concepts, (2) that religions concern counterintuitive agents, objects, or events, and (3) that the transmission advantage of MCI concepts makes them more likely to be found in the world’s religions than other kinds of concepts. We hypothesized that the memorability of many MCI supernatural concepts was due in large part to other characteristics they possess, such as their frequent and salient association with moral concerns and the alleviation of existential anxieties, and that without such characteristics they would fail to be memorable. We report the results of three experiments designed to test the relative contributions of minimal counterintuitiveness, moral valence, and existential anxiety to the memorability of supernatural ideas. We observed no main effects for minimal counterintuitiveness but did observe main effects for both moral valence and existential anxiety. We also found that these effects did not seem to stem from the greater visualizability of morally valenced concepts or concepts that concerned existential anxieties. These findings challenge important claims made by leading researchers regarding MCI concepts within the cognitive science of religion

Interpretation of surface features of Europa obtained from occultations by Io

Light curves of occultations of Europa by Io were used to generate a crude map of albedo features on Europa. Impact parameters and magnitude ratios for each event were imposed on a model. Residuals between the observed and computed light curves were interpreted as albedo features on Europa. In order to improve the fit between the observations and the model a general polar brightening was employed. The effects of additional albedo features and alternate models are discussed