Options to Reform the European Union Legislation on GMOs: Scope and Definitions

We discuss options to reform the EU genetically modified organisms (GMO) regulatory framework, make risk assessment and decision-making more consistent with scientific principles, and lay the groundwork for international coherence. The first in a three-part series, this article focuses on reform options related to the scope of the legislation and the GMO definition

The Essential Elements of a Risk Governance Framework for Current and Future Nanotechnologies

Societies worldwide are investing considerable resources into the safe development and use of nanomaterials. Although each of these protective efforts is crucial for governing the risks of nanomaterials, they are insufficient in isolation. What is missing is a more integrative governance approach that goes beyond legislation. Development of this approach must b

Voluntary 'New Approach' Technical Standards are Subject to Judicial Scrutiny by the CJEU!

The potential of the case on EU private law cannot be underestimated. Despite of the fact that with its answer the Court did not really get to the heart of question two, it took a remarkable stance on quite a number of heavily discussed issues in EU private law. I will first provide a short introduction to the underlying “new approach” regulation to make the reader familiar with this very special area of EU law. Subsequently, I will comment on the broader implications of the judgment. I will treat the answer of the Court not only as an answer to the special underlying Directive, but rather as a general guideline to the treatment of the underlying legal problems

Who Recognises Technical Standards in TTIP?

Current political discussions on the relationship of technical standards to the Transatlantic, Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) concern the question whether TTIP can provide a transatlantic level playing field for technical standards, and whether this will negatively affect technical standards in the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). This piece will instead take a different view on technical standards in TTIP. It will switch the perspective to an individual one, namely to the question who decides on standards. It follows the hypothesis that steering principles on mutual recognition and harmonization of technical standards largely depend on who will be given the power to decide on conformity and level of technical standards in the TTIP. As a basis for such an institutional analysis, this piece will evaluate the leaked documents from the TTIP negotiations. The analysis follows the framework for legal institutional analysis identified in the introduction to this book. The introduction highlights that, as legal applications of regime theory and organisation theory, the acts of autonomy and power by institutions are the real subjects of legal investigation of institutionalisation. This largely reflects an approach to institutionalism voiced by Neil Komesar in the 1990ies. As a result, I will identify and map the respective decision-makers and will illustrate the potential impact of these choices on technical standard-setting

Regulatory Validity

Behavioural forms of regulation, e.g. nudging and debiasing, increasingly take centre stage in regulatory agendas and are making their way into consumer law. In order to warrant for an effective implementation from a legal point of view, findings from behavioural sciences need to confirm with the regulatory context conditions of the underlying legal system and need to be fit for purpose to answer questions the law requires. Behavioural studies hence need to pass a regulatory validity test before they can be operationalised in the law. Subsequently I will explain how such a regulatory validity check can work in consumer law. I will first illustrate the different context conditions of behavioural sciences and law (I.). Subsequently, I will illustrate these differences on the example of a comparison of the recently commissioned behavioural science study on the “vulnerable consumer” and the legal requirements of the “average consumer” benchmark (II.). To overcome the so illustrated shortfalls I will introduce a regulatory validity test which can be applied by behavioural and legal scientist, courts, regulators (III.). I will conclude then conclude the findings (IV.)

Is WTO Law Fit for Energy Transition?

Supply of energy in a more sustainable and yet secure, affordable, and clean way is one of the major global challenges. The decline of fossil fuels, climate change, the energy "hunger" of an increasing population and a likewise improving economy in less advantaged regions in the world makes this task more and more difficult. Policy makers and scientists alike hence call for the need to establish a global coordination of energy supply. This paper investigates whether WTO law as the most effective de-facto global regulator provides also the most effective forum for such a global energy regulation. I will disclose that WTO law in its current form is not fit to cover the regulatory challenges that arise at global level. I will call for a new chapter on energy to be applied to be included into the WTO setting. I will proceed in four steps. In section 1 I will map the global societal challenges that WTO law has to respond to and its potential role in global energy coordination. In section 2 I will take stock of the existing WTO laws that relate to energy. In section 3 I will highlight some of the challenges where the current form is not fit to cover the regulatory challenges that arises at global level. In section 4 I will call for a new chapter on energy to be included into the WTO legal framework

Regulatory Validity

Behavioural forms of regulation, e.g. nudging and debiasing, increasingly take centre stage in regulatory agendas and are making their way into consumer law. In order to warrant for an effective implementation from a legal point of view, findings from behavioural sciences need to confirm with the regulatory context conditions of the underlying legal system and need to be fit for purpose to answer questions the law requires. Behavioural studies hence need to pass a regulatory validity test before they can be operationalised in the law. Subsequently I will explain how such a regulatory validity check can work in consumer law. I will first illustrate the different context conditions of behavioural sciences and law (I.). Subsequently, I will illustrate these differences on the example of a comparison of the recently commissioned behavioural science study on the “vulnerable consumer” and the legal requirements of the “average consumer” benchmark (II.). To overcome the so illustrated shortfalls I will introduce a regulatory validity test which can be applied by behavioural and legal scientist, courts, regulators (III.). I will conclude then conclude the findings (IV.)