Perceiving Intentions

This paper defends the view that knowledge about one's own intentions can be gained in part through perception, although not through introspection. The various kinds of misperception of one's intentions are discussed. The latter distinction is applied to the analysis of schizophrenic patients' delusion of control

Examining implicit metacognition in 3.5-year-old children: an eye-tracking and pupillometric study

The current study examined early signs of implicit metacognitive monitoring in 3.5-year-old children. During a learning phase children had to learn paired associates. In the test phase, children performed a recognition task and choose the correct associate for a given target among four possible answers. Subsequently, children's explicit confidence judgments (CA) and their fixation time allocation at the confidence scale were assessed. Analyses showed that explicit CJs did not differ for remembered compared to non-remembered items. In contrast, children's fixation patterns on the confidence scale were affected by the correctness of their memory, as children looked longer to high confidence ratings when they correctly remembered the associated item. Moreover, analyses of pupil size revealed pupil dilations for correctly remembered, but not incorrectly remembered items. The results converge with recent behavioral findings that reported evidence for implicit metacognitive memory monitoring processes in 3.5-year-old children. The study suggests that implicit metacognitive abilities might precede the development of explicit metacognitive knowledge

Metacognitive variety, from Inner Mongolian Buddhism to Post-Truth

In this chapter I present a case study based on ethnographic research carried out in Inner Mongolia, northern China. A Buddhist teacher and his students have subtly different metacognitive relationships to Buddhism and their practice and knowledge are dramatically different as a result. I offer this case study as an example of metacognitive variety, and argue that a similar approach is required to understand other cases in which people reflect, and attempt to act, on their own cognition and cognitive experience, including the transformations that have been described as 'post-truth'. In conclusion I make some methodological remarks about the study of metacognition through ethnography

12-and 24-Month-Old Infants' Search Behavior Under Informational Uncertainty

Infants register and react to informational uncertainty in the environment. They also form expectations about the probability of future events as well as update the expectation according to changes in the environment. A novel line of research has started to investigate infants' and toddlers' behavior under uncertainty. By combining these research areas, the present research investigated 12- and 24-month-old infants' searching behaviors under varying degree of informational uncertainty. An object was hidden in one of three possible locations and probabilistic information about the hiding location was manipulated across trials. Infants' time delay in search initiation for a hidden object linearly increased across the level of informational uncertainty. Infants' successful searching also varied according to probabilistic information. The findings suggest that infants modulate their behaviors based on probabilistic information. We discuss the possibility that infants' behavioral reaction to the environmental uncertainty constitutes the basis for the development of subjective uncertainty

Young Children's Sensitivity to Their Own Ignorance in Informing Others

Prior research suggests that young children selectively inform others depending on others' knowledge states. Yet, little is known whether children selectively inform others depending on their own knowledge states. To explore this issue, we manipulated 3-to 4-year-old children's knowledge about the content of a box and assessed the impact on their decisions to inform another person. Moreover, we assessed the presence of uncertainty gestures while they inform another person in light of the suggestions that children's gestures reflect early developing, perhaps transient, epistemic sensitivity. Finally, we compared children's performance in the informing context to their explicit verbal judgment of their knowledge states to further confirm the existence of a performance gap between the two tasks. In their decisions to inform, children tend to accurately assess their ignorance, whereas they tend to overestimate their own knowledge states when asked to explicitly report them. Moreover, children display different levels of uncertainty gestures depending on the varying degrees of their informational access. These findings suggest that children's implicit awareness of their own ignorance may be facilitated in a social, communicative context

The medium helps the message: Early sensitivity to auditory fluency in children's endorsement of statements

Recently, a growing number of studies have investigated the cues used by children to selectively accept testimony. In parallel, several studies with adults have shown that the fluency with which information is provided influences message evaluation: adults evaluate fluent information as more credible than dysfluent information. It is therefore plausible that the fluency of a message could also influence children's endorsement of statements. Three experiments were designed to test this hypothesis with 3- to 5-year-olds where the auditory fluency of a message was manipulated by adding different levels of noise to recorded statements. The results show that 4 and 5-year-old children, but not 3-year-olds, are more likely to endorse a fluent statement than a dysfluent one. The present study constitutes a first attempt to show that fluency, i.e., ease of processing, is recruited as a cue to guide epistemic decision in children. An interpretation of the age difference based on the way cues are processed by younger children is suggested

Uncertainty gestures.

<p>The mean proportion of trials in which children’s uncertainty gestures were present as a function of Age (3-year-olds: upper panel; 4-year-olds: lower panel), Condition and Task type. Error bars indicate standard error.</p

Informing decisions.

<p>The mean proportion of trials in which children chose to inform (as opposed to declining to inform). Error bars indicate standard error.</p

A photo of toys.

<p>Toys used in the experiment.</p

Informing and explicit tasks.

<p>The mean number of trials in which children provided accurate responses as a function of Age (3-year-olds: upper panel; 4-year-olds: lower panel), Condition and Task type. Error bars indicate standard error.</p