Собрания россики и украиники как условие межкультурной коммуникации

В статье доказывается, что инонациональная рецепция страны является важным фактором процесса межкультурной коммуникации и это выражается в целенаправленном сборе информации, которая характеризует отражение своего национального облика в культуре народа-собеседника.У статті доказується, що інонаціональна рецепція країни є важливим фактором процесу міжкультурної комунікації і це виражається у цілеспрямованому зборі інформації, що характеризує відображення свого національного вигляду у культурі народу-співбесідника.This article proves that the perception of one country by a foreign culture is an important factor in the process of intercultural communication. This finds its expression in a meaningful collection of information characterized by the projection of one’s “own” national image into the image of the culture of the other party in this intercultural dialogue

"Women's rights, the European Court and Supranational Constitutionalism"

This analysis examines supranational constitutionalism in the European Union. In particular, the study focuses on the role of the European Court of Justice in the creation of women’s rights. I examine the interaction between the Court and member state governments in legal integration, and also the integral role that women’s advocates – both individual activists and groups – have played in the development of EU social provisions. The findings suggest that this litigation dynamic can have the effect of fueling the integration process by creating new rights that may empower social actors and EU organizations, with the ultimate effect of diminishing member state government control over the scope and direction of EU law. This study focuses specifically on gender equality law, yet provides a general framework for examining the case law in subsequent legal domains, with the purpose of providing a more nuanced understanding of supranational governance and constitutionalism

Implementatie van EU-handhavingsvoorschriften.

The politics and administration of institutional chang

Mutual Trust before the Court of Justice of the European Union

The principle of mutual trust is not mentioned in the Treaties, but nonetheless, it has be-come a structural principle of EU law. The present contribution, written from the perspective of ‘everyday judicial practice’, explores how this principle has been given shape in the case law of the Court of Justice. It addresses the scope of application of this principle, its meaning and the way in which this principle is applied in the context of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. The con-tribution argues that the principle of mutual trust is an essential point of departure for the sound operation of this Area. However, the principle of mutual trust is not ‘blind trust’; it is a presumption and like most presumptions, is not conclusive. There are a number of safety valves in the system of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice which are closely related to the protection of fundamen-tal rights. The framing of these safety valves in a way that it will do justice to the principle of mutu-al trust is a matter of a delicate balance. The contribution concludes with a broader reflection on the potential significance of the principle of mutual trust as a structural principle of EU law which extends beyond the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice

Mutual Trust before the Court of Justice of the European Union

The principle of mutual trust is not mentioned in the Treaties, but nonetheless, it has be-come a structural principle of EU law. The present contribution, written from the perspective of ‘everyday judicial practice’, explores how this principle has been given shape in the case law of the Court of Justice. It addresses the scope of application of this principle, its meaning and the way in which this principle is applied in the context of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. The con-tribution argues that the principle of mutual trust is an essential point of departure for the sound operation of this Area. However, the principle of mutual trust is not ‘blind trust’; it is a presumption and like most presumptions, is not conclusive. There are a number of safety valves in the system of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice which are closely related to the protection of fundamen-tal rights. The framing of these safety valves in a way that it will do justice to the principle of mutu-al trust is a matter of a delicate balance. The contribution concludes with a broader reflection on the potential significance of the principle of mutual trust as a structural principle of EU law which extends beyond the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice

The Court of Justice and Effective Judicial Protection: What Has the Charter Changed?

Since the coming into force of the Charter as primary law of the EU, Article 47 CFR is ‘the reference standard’ when the Court deals with issues of ffective judicial protection. However, the general principle of effective judicial protection existed already for some 25 years, developed in the case law of the Union courts. While the interpretation and application of Article 47 build upon this case law, a number of changes can be pointed out. What was formerly under the loose umbrella of effective judicial protection and related principles is now split over three different articles of the Charter. On the one hand, these provisions are partly overlapping; on the other hand, their configuration also leads to a lacuna. This gap is bridged by the unwritten general principles such as the rights of defence. When compared to the pre-Charter era, Article 52(1) CFR structures the review of limitations of fundamental rights in a more compelling fashion. Specifically for Article 47 CFR, which has to be interpreted in harmony with Article 6 ECHR, the implicit limitations of Article 6 ECHR constitute a potential trap of ‘double limitation’. Article 47 may be relied upon by individuals alleging a violation of rights and freedoms conferred upon them by EU law. However, the principle of effective judicial protection is broader in application, providing protection against acts that adversely affect an individual’s interests. In so far as the interpretation of Article 47 would not reach the same scope and level of protection as the general principle of effective judicial protection, this principle should continue to apply