392 research outputs found
Lâintuition est-elle un concept univoque ?
Lâarticle sâinterroge sur lâunitĂ© intrinsĂšque des concepts dâintuition, dâĂ©vidence et de remplissement dans la pensĂ©e de Husserl : existe-t-il un concept formel dâintuition qui soit valable pour toutes les sphĂšres dâobjets possibles ? Peut-on transposer aux diffĂ©rents types dâessences ou de catĂ©gories dâobjets le paradigme de lâintuition Ă©laborĂ© dans la sphĂšre de la perception sensible ? Cette question nous conduit Ă analyser, chez Husserl, la structure et les modalitĂ©s du remplissement et de lâintuition pour les singularitĂ©s sensibles, les essences matĂ©riales et les essences mĂȘlant sensibilitĂ© et forme catĂ©goriale.In our paper, we ask whether or not the concepts of intuition, insight and fulfillment have an intrinsic unity in Husserlâs thought. Does a formal concept of intuition exist, which would have a validity in all possible spheres of objects ? Is it possible to transfer to the different kinds of essences (i.e. to the different categories of objects) the model of intuition, which has been elaborated in the sphere of sensory perception ? That problem leads us to analyze in Husserlâs thought the structure and modalities of fulfillment and intuition for sensory singularities, for material essences and for essences that are a mix of sensibility and categorical form
Fenomenolojik akıl öÄretisi: yeti olarak aklın yokluÄunda akıl tĂŒrleri
Cet article sâattache Ă dĂ©gager le sens de la doctrine phĂ©nomĂ©nologique husserlienne de la raison en l'opposant Ă la thĂ©orie kantienne. Pour Kant, la raison et les IdĂ©es rationnelles sont constitutives de la nature du sujet fini en gĂ©nĂ©ral, de sorte qu'il n'est pas possible de fournir une dĂ©duction transcendantale ou une lĂ©gitimation des IdĂ©es rationnelles, mais seulement d'en opĂ©rer une dĂ©rivation Ă partir de la nature du sujet fini. A contrario, dans le cadre de la phĂ©nomĂ©nologie transcendantale, les facultĂ©s ne doivent plus ĂȘtre comprises comme des composantes de la nature subjective, mais doivent ĂȘtre dĂ©chiffrĂ©es au fil conducteur des types dâobjets constituables par la conscience pure. Nous tĂąchosn donc d'Ă©lucider ce que peut ĂȘtre une telle thĂ©orie de la raison orientĂ©e sur un tel principe anticopernicien
Minimizing Energy Consumption of MPI Programs in Realistic Environment
Dynamic voltage and frequency scaling proves to be an efficient way of
reducing energy consumption of servers. Energy savings are typically achieved
by setting a well-chosen frequency during some program phases. However,
determining suitable program phases and their associated optimal frequencies is
a complex problem. Moreover, hardware is constrained by non negligible
frequency transition latencies. Thus, various heuristics were proposed to
determine and apply frequencies, but evaluating their efficiency remains an
issue. In this paper, we translate the energy minimization problem into a mixed
integer program that specifically models most current hardware limitations. The
problem solution then estimates the minimal energy consumption and the
associated frequency schedule. The paper provides two different formulations
and a discussion on the feasibility of each of them on realistic applications
Vers une genÚse a-subjective des idéalités mathématiques. CavaillÚs critique de Husserl
In this paper our purpose is to explane and discuss the essential objections CavaillĂšs raised to Husserlian phenomenology in his last text âOn Logic and Theory of Scienceâ. In this text CavaillĂšs questioned the foundational status of cogito and the capacity of consciousness to produce new ideal objects.; and he replaced this capacity with an anonymous generating necessity that would be dialectical and would take place intin the ideal domains of objects. We have to determine if such objections question every philosophy philosophy of consciousness in general, or if they only question a particular interpretation of Husserlian transcendental subject; and if they necessarily lead us toward a Spinozist or Hegelian position in philosophy of mathematics
A non commutative sewing lemma
In a preceding paper [E.J.ofProb.34,860-892,(2006)], we proved a sewing lemma
which was a key result for the study of Holder continuous functions. In this
paper we give a non-commutative version of this lemma with some applications.Comment: 11 page
Fondements phénoménologiques de la structure prédicative
Lâobjet de cet article est de dĂ©gager, sur lâexemple de la prĂ©dication, ce quâest le propre dâune logique phĂ©nomĂ©nologique. On montre quâelle se caractĂ©rise par plusieurs dĂ©marches essentielles : rĂ©gression du domaine de la signification idĂ©ale vers les modes de visĂ©e, de comportement et dâeÌvidence subjectifs propres Ă lâĂ©tant qui, par son discours, vise les formes syntaxiques, donc depuis les articulations syntaxiques de la signification vers celles de la pensĂ©e ; et surtout, un dĂ©placement de lâorientation thĂ©matique depuis le domaine de la signification idĂ©ale vers un champ infralinguistique et prĂ©-idĂ©al oĂč ce dernier a sa source, afin de rechercher lâorigine ultime du logos dans des structures prĂ©logiques (formes noĂ©tiques de lâexpĂ©rience perceptive, structures ontologiques de lâĂ©tant percu, modalitĂ©s de la comprĂ©hension ontologique. Ne se limitant pas Ă la pensĂ©e logique au sens strict, on opĂšre un Ă©largissement considĂ©rable de la notion de logique, pour restituer les Ă©chafaudages qui mĂšnent Ă lâĂ©laboration de la syntaxe et replacer la pensĂ©e logifiante dans le mode dâĂȘtre, de comprendre et de faire-expĂ©rience du sujet ou du Dasein
Husserls Kritik an Kants Transzendentalem Idealismus: Erörterung des Phanomenologischen Idealismus
This study focuses on the essential difference between Kantâs and Husserlâs transcendental Idealism. In fact, Husserl describes in the «Cartesian Meditations» his own ontological thesis as a «transcendental idealism», in which all sorts of entities have to be constituted by an activity of the transcendental subjectivity, so that we have to regard pure consciousness as the ontological origin of all entities in the world. But this study is interested in the two opposite signications of the Kantian copernican inversion. On the one hand, the Copernican inversion has the same sense as the phenomenological reduction, which implies that Husserl canât agree with Kantâs presupposition of absolute things in themselves; on the second hand, it involves a relativistic and anthropologistic orientation, so that the aprioristic structures of given objects are founded on the universal structures of finite subjectivity, on pure forms and faculties of human consciousness. At the opposite, Husserl enounces a methodological prescription for any phenomenological elucidation: it is not allowed to presuppose in phenomenology any given faculty or given nature of transcendental subjectivity. This prescription has important consequences on which this study focuses. First the ontological difference between intuitus originarius and intuitus derivatus, in nite and nite type of intuition, doesnât have any validity: the difference between factual and rational truths only depends on the essence of the truth itself, and doesnât have its foundation on the ontological difference between creative and receptive sort of intuition. Secondly, this first thesis admits an immediate application on the level of subjective constitution of objects: the modality in which an object appears to the subjectivity doesnât depend on the universal structure of finite subject, but is exclusively founded on the essence of the object itself, so that it is impossible to consider the aprioristic constitutive structure as a merely subjective structure. Thirdly, in this transcendental phenomenology everything has to be constituted by subjectivity: the aprioristic character of the pure forms of sensibility is not founded on the structure of finite subjectivity, but rather on the essential connection between sensual material and form; so that it is not allowed to presuppose any facticity of time and space; the pure forms of sensibility have to be constituted by a special type of synthesis that we have to elucidate in opposition to other types of higher levels. The profound signication of Husserlâs anticopernican inversion is that the field of transcendental phenomenology consists of the essential form of an eidos ego, which is «more objective than any objectivity», as Levinas said; and that transcendental phenomenology is completely dominated by the principium reddendae rationis
Sur lâinfini mathĂ©matique. GenĂšse des concepts et hĂ©tĂ©ronomie des mathĂ©matiques
RESUMEÌ â Situe historiquement au confluent de lâarithmĂ©tisation de lâanalyse et de lâĂ©laboration de la thĂ©orie des nombres transfinis, âDe lâinfini mathĂ©matiqueâ sâattache aÌ reconnaĂźtre Ă lâinfini le statut de vĂ©ritable objet mathĂ©matique ; mais le problĂšme vĂ©ritable, une fois mise en Ă©vidence lâinsuffisance de la genĂšse arithmĂ©tique et algĂ©brique des concepts et principes mathĂ©matiques, rĂ©side dans la possibiliteÌ de leur fondation philosophique sur des notions et principes rationnels et extramathĂ©matiques
De Husserl à Heidegger : intentionnalité, monde et sens
In this paper we focuse on how the first Heidegger changed the essential idea of phenomenology: if the terms of intentionality, pure consciousness, transcendental subject, noema and noesis radically disappear from Heideggerâs conceptuality, what does it mean exactly? Does Heidegger preserve anything from the idea of intentionality, from Husserlâs task of clarifying the aprioristic correlation between consciousness and object, and from Husserlâs relation of foundation of intentional modalities of higher level on modalities of lower level? We want here to emphasize some essential changes concerning the idea of phenomenology: the holistic structure of experience, the task of clarifying the structure of transcendance as a foundation of intentionality, and the inversion of Husserlâs relation of foundation. On the contrary, we show how Husserlâs concept of sense is essentially different from that of ideal signification
Test 1779: Challenger MT 425 Diesel
MichĂšle de La Pradelle, directrice dâĂ©tudes 1. Anthropologie des mondes urbains Jâai poursuivi en 2002-2003 la rĂ©flexion engagĂ©e depuis plusieurs annĂ©es sur lâanthropologie et le monde urbain. FidĂšle Ă sa tradition disciplinaire, lâethnologie, quand elle est confrontĂ©e au monde urbain, semble souvent obĂ©ir Ă un double impĂ©ratif : le choix dâunitĂ©s sociales nettement dĂ©limitĂ©es, supposĂ©es stables et homogĂšnes, oĂč prĂ©dominent les relations dâinter-connaissance â une rue, un quartier, un Ăźlot rĂ©..
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