18 research outputs found
Projetivismo dos valores em Nietzsche
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to claim Nietzsche’s place
within the philosophical tradition of projectivism. Indeed, as will
be shown, although Nietzsche is almost unanimously ignored by
scholars working on projectivism, during the whole development
of his philosophical thought, he holds a position which can be
reasonably defined as “projectivist”.
Resumo: Este artigo tem por objetivo reivindicar o lugar da
filosofia nietzschiana na tradição filosófica do projetivismo. Com
efeito, como mostrarei, mesmo se Nietzsche é quase unanimemente
ignorado nas obras dos especialistas nessa tradição, ele mantém,
ao longo de seu desenvolvimento filosófico, uma posição que se
pode com razão definir como “projetivista”
The Mind’s Presence to Itself: In Search of Non‐intentional Awareness
According to some philosophers, the mind enjoys a form of presence to itself. That is to say, in addition to being aware of whatever objects it is aware of, it is also (co-presently) aware of itself. This paper explores the proposal that we should think about this kind of experiential-presence in terms of a form of non-intentional awareness. Various candidates for the relevant form of awareness, as constituting supposed non-intentional experiential-presence, are considered and are shown to encounter significant problems. The fact that a plausible account of the non-intentional awareness which experience putatively has of itself cannot be framed with reference to such forms of awareness is grounds for scepticism concerning the cogency of non-intentional experiential presence
Nietzsche’s Epistemic Perspectivism
Nietzsche offers a positive epistemology, and those who interpret him as a skeptic or a mere pragmatist are mistaken. Instead he supports what he calls per- spectivism. This is a familiar take on Nietzsche, as perspectivism has been analyzed by many previous interpreters. The present paper presents a sketch of the textually best supported and logically most consistent treatment of perspectivism as a first- order epistemic theory. What’s original in the present paper is an argument that Nietzsche also offers a second-order methodological perspectivism aimed at enhancing understanding, an epistemic state distinct from knowledge. Just as Descartes considers and rejects radical skepticism while at the same time adopting methodological skepticism, one could consistently reject perspectivism as a theory of knowledge while accepting it as contributing to our understanding. It is argued that Nietzsche’s perspectivism is in fact two-tiered: knowledge is perspectival because truth itself is, and in addition there is a methodological perspectivism in which distinct ways of knowing are utilized to produce understanding. A review of the manner in which understanding is conceptualized in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science serves to illuminate how Nietzsche was tackling these ideas
The Foundations of Agency - and Ethics?
In this article, I take off from some central issues in Paul Katsafanas' recent book Agency and the Foundations of Ethics. I argue that Katsafanas' alleged aims of action fail to do the work he requires them to do. First, his approach to activity or control is deeply problematic in the light of counterexamples, but as the related issues are substantially under-theorized, we do not at present know what agential activity or control may imply. More importantly, the view of activity or control he needs to get his argument going is most likely false, as it requires our values to do work that they are too fickle to do. Second, I take issue with the Nietzschean drive psychology underlying the second agential aim, viz. power. I argue that ordinary desires better describe a number of phenomena that Katsafanas uses drives to explain, and that some actions can aim in the opposite direction. As only drive-motivated actions aim at power, action does not, therefore, constitutively aim at power. Finally, I sketch a Humean approach to constitutivism, and argue that it both explains the desiderata that Katsafanas posits as well as solves the problems for his view. Constitutivists should prefer it to his view and develop it further
Sartre's Theory of Motivation
The aim of this paper is to offer a novel reconstruction of Sartre's theory of motivation. I argue for four related claims: (a) Sartre's theory of motivation revolves around the Schelerian-inspired notion of affectivity and the peculiar way affectivity provides us access to evaluative properties of the objects in our environment; (b) according to Sartre, the structure of intentional action, and in particular the act of choice and commitment to projects, is inextricably linked with “affectivity”; (c) the inextricable link between intentional action and affectivity is to be analysed in terms of the fundamental structure of consciousness as being self-present thus making the agent non-positionally aware of her choices and commitments; (d) an agent is motivated to act when her affective disclosure of value is in part constituted by the awareness of her commitments to relevant projects