679 research outputs found

    Stereoscopic computer graphics display system

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    Handbook was published on study which describes relative merits of two general-purpose, steroscopic display systems. Both systems are adaptable to most small data processing facilities and, with minimal hardware development, greatly enhance user ability to interact with computer and to interpret data output. Section also describes digital-to-analog converters designed for use with system

    An Experimental Analysis of the Structure of Legal Fees: American Rule vs. English Rule

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    The expanding volume of lawsuits and the ballooning of legal expenditures in recent years has attracted the interest, concern, and even anger of the American public and politicians. These developments have led law makers to consider alternative legal fee allocation rules as methods for administering justice more efficiently. Under the traditional American rule, parties to a lawsuit must each pay their own legal expenses. One reform proposal is the English rule, under which the losing party must pay the prevailing party's attorney fees in addition to her own expenses. To evaluate the different effects of these two rules on litigant behavior and legal outcomes, we conduct a theoretical and experimental analysis of environments which can be interpreted as legal disputes in which the probability of winning a lawsuit is partially determined by the legal expenditures of the litigants and partially determined by the inherent merits of the case. We investigate decisions regarding trial expenditure and examine the effects of the two allocation rules on pretrial issues of suit and settlement. The data demonstrate that game theoretic equilibrium models produce good qualitative predictions of the relative institutional response to changes in the allocation rule and to differences in such parameters as case merit and lawyer productivity. In our most significant result, we find that the English rule produces significantly higher expenditure at trial than the American rule. On the other hand, the frequency of trial is significantly lower under the English rule. Combining these two effects, we find that average expenditure per legal dispute is higher under the English rule than under the American rule

    A Smart Market Solution to a Class of Back-Haul Transportation Problems: Concept and Experimental Testbeds

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    Abstract: Back-haul problems occur in many areas of transportation. One way rental of equipment often takes it from an area of high demand to an area of low demand. Examples include container rentals, car rentals and other cases of mobile equipment. The problem is to return the equipment to the location of need. Typically this is viewed as an administrative and scheduling problem. The approach taken here is "decentralized" in which a specially designed market organizes competition and information to minimize the cost of back-hauls without the direct intervention of administrative negotiations or command-and-control types of scheduling. Laboratory experimental methods are employed to test the concept and explore its limitations

    A Parimutuel-like Mechanism from Information Aggregation: A Field Test Inside Intel

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    Field tests of a new Information Aggregation Mechanism (IAM) developed via laboratory experimental methods were implemented inside Intel Corporation for sales forecasting. The IAM, which incorporates selected features of parimutuel betting, is uniquely designed to collect and quantize as probability distributions any dispersed, subjectively held information that might exist. The tests demonstrate the robustness of experimental results and the practical usefulness of the IAM. The IAM yields predicted distributions of future sales that are very accurate at short horizons; indeed, more accurate than Intel's official in-house forecast 59% of the time. A symmetric game model suggests why the IAM works

    On the Behavioral Foundations of the Law of Supply and Demand: Human Convergence and Robot Randomness

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    This research builds on the work of D.K. Gode and Shyam Sunder who demonstrated the existence of a strong relationship between market institutions and the ability of markets to seek equilibrium - even when the agents themselves have limited intelligence and behave with substantial randomness. The question posed is whether or not market institutions account for the operation of the law of supply and demand in markets population by humans and no role required of human rationality. Are institutions responsible for the operations of the law of supply and demand or are behavioral principles also at work? Experiments with humans and simulations with robots both conducted in conditions in which major institutional and structural aids to convergence were removed, produced clear answers. Human markets converge, while robot markets do not. The structural and institutional features certainly facilitated convergence under conditions of substantial irrationality, but they are not necessary for convergence in markets in which agents have the rationality of humans

    Two Information Aggregation Mechanisms for Predicting the Opening Weekend Box Office Revenues of Films: Boxoffice Prophecy and Guess of Guesses

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    Successful field tests were conducted on two new Information Aggregation Mechanisms (IAMs). The mechanisms collected information held as intuitions about opening weekend box office revenues for movies in Australia. Participants were film school students. One mechanism is similar to parimutuel betting that produces a probability distribution over box office amounts. Except for “art house films”, the predicted distribution is indistinguishable from the actual revenues. The second mechanism is based on guesses of the guesses of others and applied when incentives for accuracy could not be used. It tested well against data and contains information not encompassed by the first mechanism

    Auctioning the Right to Play Ultimatum Games and the Impact on Equilibrium Selection

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    We auction scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in ultimatum games. As a control treatment, we randomly allocate these rights and charge exogenous participation fees. These participation fee sequences match the auction price sequence from a session of the original treatment. With endogenous selection via auctions, we find that play converges to a session-specific Nash equilibrium, and auction prices emerge supporting this equilibrium by the principle of forward induction. With random assignment, we find play also converges to a session-specific Nash equilibrium as predicted by the principle of loss avoidance. While Nash equilibria with low offers are observed, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium never is

    Design Improved Parimutuel-type Information Aggregation Mechanisms: Inaccuracies and the Long-Shot Bias as Disequilibrium Phenomena

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    Information Aggregation Mechanisms (IAMs) based on parimutuel-type betting systems can aggregate information from complex environments. However, the performance of previously studied systems leaves something to be desired due to possible bluffing, strategic timing of decisions and a so called long shot bias. This paper demonstrates that two modifications of parimutuel systems improve information aggregation performance by removing disinformation due to strategic behavior and by removing misleading disequilibrium behavior. The experiments also demonstrate that the so called long shot bias results from disequilibrium behavior as opposed to having roots in the psychology of the individuals
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