Characterizing Compromise Stability of Games Using Larginal Vectors

The core cover of a TU-game is a superset of the core and equals the convex hull of its larginal vectors. A larginal vector corresponds to an order of the players and describes the efficient payoff vector giving the first players in the order their utopia demand as long as it is still possible to assign the remaining players at least their minimum right. A game is called compromise stable if the core is equal to the core cover, i.e. the core is the convex hull of the larginal vectors. In this paper we describe two ways of characterizing sets of larginal vectors that satisfy the condition that if every larginal vector of the set is a core element, then the game is compromise stable. The first characterization of these sets is based on a neighbor argument on orders of the players. The second one uses combinatorial and matching arguments and leads to a complete characterization of these sets. We find characterizing sets of minimum cardinality, a closed formula for the minimum number of orders in these sets, and a partition of the set of all orders in which each element of the partition is a minimum characterizing set.Core;core cover;larginal vectors;matchings

On Games Arising From Multi-Depot Chinese Postman Problems

This paper introduces cooperative games arising from multi-depot Chinese postman problems and explores the properties of these games. A multi-depot Chinese postman problem (MDCP) is represented by a connected (di)graph G, a set of k depots that is a subset of the vertices of G, and a non-negative weight function on the edges of G. A solution to the MDCP is a minimum weight tour of the (di)graph that visits all edges (arcs) of the graph and that consists of a collection of subtours such that the subtours originate from dierent depots, and each subtour starts and ends at the same depot. A cooperative Chinese postman (CP) game is induced by a MDCP by associating every edge of the graph with a dierent player. This paper characterizes globally and locally k-CP balanced and submodular (di)graphs. A (di)graph G is called globally (locally) k-CP balanced (respectively submodular), if the induced CP game of the corresponding MDCP problem on G is balanced (respectively submodular) for any (some) choice of the locations of the k depots and every non-negative weight function

Characterizing Compromise Stability of Games Using Larginal Vectors

The core cover of a TU-game is a superset of the core and equals the convex hull of its larginal vectors. A larginal vector corresponds to an order of the players and describes the efficient payoff vector giving the first players in the order their utopia demand as long as it is still possible to assign the remaining players at least their minimum right. A game is called compromise stable if the core is equal to the core cover, i.e. the core is the convex hull of the larginal vectors. In this paper we describe two ways of characterizing sets of larginal vectors that satisfy the condition that if every larginal vector of the set is a core element, then the game is compromise stable. The first characterization of these sets is based on a neighbor argument on orders of the players. The second one uses combinatorial and matching arguments and leads to a complete characterization of these sets. We find characterizing sets of minimum cardinality, a closed formula for the minimum number of orders in these sets, and a partition of the set of all orders in which each element of the partition is a minimum characterizing set.

On games arising from multi-depot Chinese postman problems

A multi-depot Chinese postman problem (MDCP) arises from a network (e.g. cityplan) inwhich several depots are located wherefrom edges (e.g. streets) have to be served. Since costs are involved with each visit to an edge, the objective is to find a minimum cost tour in the network that visits all edges of the network. Such a minimum cost tour consists of a collection of subtours such that the subtours originate from different depots, and each subtour starts and ends at the same depot. This typical OR problem turns into a multi decision maker problem if agents are assigned to the streets. In this new setting the cost of a inimum cost tour that visits all edges have to be paid by the agents. However, now each group of agents (coalition) has the opportunity to find its own minimum cost tour, i.e. a minimum cost tour that only visits the edges owned by the group of agents. Therefore, the main objective is to find allocations of the cost of a minimum tour that visits all agents in such a way that no coalition has higher costs than the costs incurred by its own minimum tour. We will use cooperative game theory to investigate whether these so-called core allocations exist. Therefore, we consider a cooperative Chinese postman (CP) game that is induced by an MDCP by associating every edge of the network with a different agent. In this paper, we characterize classes of networks that ensure the existence of core allocations, the so-called CP balanced graphs, and the existence of specific core allocations, the so-called CP submodular graphs

Characterizing Compromise Stability of Games Using Larginal Vectors

The core cover of a TU-game is a superset of the core and equals the convex hull of its larginal vectors. A larginal vector corresponds to an order of the players and describes the efficient payoff vector giving the first players in the order their utopia demand as long as it is still possible to assign the remaining players at least their minimum right. A game is called compromise stable if the core is equal to the core cover, i.e. the core is the convex hull of the larginal vectors. In this paper we describe two ways of characterizing sets of larginal vectors that satisfy the condition that if every larginal vector of the set is a core element, then the game is compromise stable. The first characterization of these sets is based on a neighbor argument on orders of the players. The second one uses combinatorial and matching arguments and leads to a complete characterization of these sets. We find characterizing sets of minimum cardinality, a closed formula for the minimum number of orders in these sets, and a partition of the set of all orders in which each element of the partition is a minimum characterizing set

A comprehensive study of the effect of in situ annealing at high growth temperature on the morphological and optical properties of self-assembled InAs/GaAs QDs

We investigate the effect of in situ annealing during growth pause on the morphological and optical properties of self-assembled InAs/GaAs quantum dots (QDs). The islands were grown at different growth rates and having different monolayer coverage. The results were explained on the basis of atomic force microscopy (AFM) and photo-luminescence (PL) measurements. The studies show the occurrence of ripening-like phenomenon, observed in strained semiconductor system. Agglomeration of the self-assembled QDs takes place during dot pause leading to an equilibrium size distribution. The PL properties of the QDs are affected by the Indium desorption from the surface of the QDs during dot pause annealing at high growth temperature (520A degrees C) subsiding the effect of the narrowing of the dot size distribution with growth pause. The samples having high monolayer coverage (3.4 ML) and grown at a slower growth rate (0.032 ML s(-1)) manifested two different QD families. Among the islands the smaller are coherent defect-free in nature, whereas the larger dots are plastically relaxed and hence optically inactive. Indium desorption from the island surface during the in situ annealing and inhomogeneous morphology as the dots agglomerate during the growth pause, also affects the PL emission from these dot assemblie