Questionable Patent-Eligibility of IoT Technology

This article explores whether a claim for Internet of Things ( IoT ) technology is patent-eligible. the analysis is based on five Federal Circuit decisions that follow the Alice standard. These cases were chosen because the patented technology they discuss is similar to IoT technology. The key issue is whether an IoT claim can pass the step two analysis of the Alice standard. The Federal Circuit case law suggests that recitation of an unconventional system may make an IoT claim more likely to be patent-eligible. Even a system composed of existing devices may be unconventional in terms of patent-eligibility. It is very important to describe a technical problem intended to be fixed in the specification. Explaining how those devices actually work to achieve the purpose of the invention is also helpful

PATENT ELIGIBILITY STANDARD FOR NETWORK ARCHITECTURE PATENTS UNDER THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S JURISPRUDENCE

PATENT ELIGIBILITY STANDARD FOR NETWORK ARCHITECTURE PATENTS UNDER THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S JURISPRUDENC

A Brand-Name Drug Company May Violate Section Two of the Sherman Act by Mislabeling a Submitted Patent in the Orange Book: An Implication from In Re Actos End-Payor Antitrust Litigation, 848 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2017)

The Hatch-Waxman Act encourages generic drug companies to submit an abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”) for a generic version of a drug approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”). Nevertheless, a mechanism exists for a brand-name drug company to adjudicate a patent infringement dispute before the FDA approves an ANDA. The mechanism includes the regulatory scheme of patent information submission implemented by the FDA. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) requires that patent information be correct. False patent information destroys the objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Act. In re Actos End-Payor Antitrust Litigation, 848 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2017), may demonstrate a new form of false patent information, because the defendant there mislabeled the disputed patents as drug product patents rather than method-of-use patents. The mislabeling caused one generic drug company not to use a Section viii statement to speed up approval of its ANDA. As a result of the mislabeling, the marketing of generic drugs was delayed, and patients were forced to pay monopoly prices for their drugs. This Article argues that such mislabeling violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which criminalizes monopolization achieved through anticompetitive conduct

Analysis of the Proposed TPP-Related Patent Linkage System in Taiwan

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement mandates member states to implement a patent linkage system vested in Article 18.53. To successfully join the TPP Agreement, Taiwan has begun the legislation of a patent linkage system by proposing an amendment for the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act. Article 18.53 requires a member either to adopt a notification mechanism under Paragraph 1 or to stay the issuance of marketing approval under Paragraph 2. But, Taiwan’s proposal includes both measures. Taiwan’s patent linkage system allows a pioneer drug company to register patents claiming (a) a material, (b) a combination or formula, or (c) pharmaceutical use. The scope of patentees who may benefit from the mechanism is larger than what is required. In addition, the system requires a generic drug company to notify the patentee at the time of filing the drug application if the generic drug company asserts invalidity or non-infringement which the generic drug company must prove. Furthermore, the health authority is allowed to stay the issuance of a generic drug permit while the patentee is suing the generic drug company in the court

Analysis of the Proposed TPP-Related Patent Linkage System in Taiwan

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement mandates member states to implement a patent linkage system vested in Article 18.53. To successfully join the TPP Agreement, Taiwan has begun the legislation of a patent linkage system by proposing an amendment for the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act. Article 18.53 requires a member either to adopt a notification mechanism under Paragraph 1 or to stay the issuance of marketing approval under Paragraph 2. But, Taiwan’s proposal includes both measures. Taiwan’s patent linkage system allows a pioneer drug company to register patents claiming (a) a material, (b) a combination or formula, or (c) pharmaceutical use. The scope of patentees who may benefit from the mechanism is larger than what is required. In addition, the system requires a generic drug company to notify the patentee at the time of filing the drug application if the generic drug company asserts invalidity or non-infringement which the generic drug company must prove. Furthermore, the health authority is allowed to stay the issuance of a generic drug permit while the patentee is suing the generic drug company in the court

Definite Indefiniteness of Molecular Weight as a Claim Term for Polymer-Related Patents

The molecular weight of a polymer is not just a number for a single molecule. In fact, molecular weight measurement is based on a large volume of molecules of the same polymer. Due to the non-uniformity of molecular weights, there are several methods to measure an “average molecular weight” of a polymer. Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit in Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015), held that the term “molecular weight” in several polymer claims was indefinite, because the term could mean either peak average molecular weight, number average molecular weight, or weight average molecular weight. This paper analyzes the claim construction and indefiniteness determination in Teva to illustrate the flaws of the patentee’s specification. This paper also proposes practical solutions for patent drafting to avoid indefiniteness issues

Obtener o no obtener una opinión de no infringir patentes. ¡Esa es la cuestión!

This paper aims at analyzing the risk of whether to acquire a patent non-infringement opinion. After Seagate, there have been many decisions of either district courts or Federal Circuit involving willful infringement. This paper discusses some observations from those decisions. The observations give a basis for thinking of whether to acquire a patent non-infringement opinion. The analysis is presented in view of a potential or accused infringer, Company T. Company T could be accused of direct or indirect infringement. By discussing either Federal Circuit’s or district courts’ cases after Seagate, this paper suggests that though there is no duty to get a patent non-infringement opinion, the best strategy for an accused infringer would still be to have such opinion letter.Este trabajo pretende analizar el riesgo al adquirir una opinión de no infringir patentes. Después del caso Seagate, han aparecido muchas decisiones de los tribunales distritales o del Tribunal de Circuito Federal que han implicado infracciones intencionales. Este documento articula algunas observaciones de esas decisiones que dan una base para pensar en si se debería adquirir una opinión de no infringir patentes. El análisis está presentado para analizar a un infractor, sea potencial o ya acusado: la compañía T que podría ser acusada de violación directa o indirecta. Al analizar y discutir los casos federales de circuito o de juzgados de distrito después del caso Seagate, este texto sugiere que no hay ninguna obligación de obtener una opinión de no infringir patentes y que la mejor estrategia para un infractor, sea potencial o ya acusado, sería obtener tal carta de opinión