Of Trailers and Jet Skis: Is the Case Law on Article 34 TFEU Hurtling in a New Direction?

The provision which is the focus of this Article is article 34 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ( TFEU or Treaty ) (formerly article 28 EC). This Article focuses on an analysis of two recent judgments on this important issue delivered by the European Court of Justice ( Court ) in 2009, namely the Trailers decision and the Mickelsson decision. Before reaching these judgments, the Article discusses very briefly the relationship between the four freedoms (free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital) and then, as to the scope of article 34, reminds the reader of what is the story so far. This story falls neatly into three parts, each beginning with a seminal judgment: Dassonville, Cassie de Dijon, and Keck. For good measure, this Article will also consider the principles governing justification under article 36 TFEU (article 30 EC)

Of Trailers and Jet Skis: Is the Case Law on Article 34 TFEU Hurtling in a New Direction?

The provision which is the focus of this Article is article 34 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ( TFEU or Treaty ) (formerly article 28 EC). This Article focuses on an analysis of two recent judgments on this important issue delivered by the European Court of Justice ( Court ) in 2009, namely the Trailers decision and the Mickelsson decision. Before reaching these judgments, the Article discusses very briefly the relationship between the four freedoms (free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital) and then, as to the scope of article 34, reminds the reader of what is the story so far. This story falls neatly into three parts, each beginning with a seminal judgment: Dassonville, Cassie de Dijon, and Keck. For good measure, this Article will also consider the principles governing justification under article 36 TFEU (article 30 EC)

Detecting Good Public Policy Rationales for the American Rule: A Response to the Ill-Conceived Calls for “Loser Pays” Rules

Several critiques have been leveled at the American Rule—that is, the rule that each party to a lawsuit should pay for its attorneys. Some claim that there were no principled justifications offered by the nineteenth-century jurists who authored the opinions marking the rule’s origins. Instead, these jurists only cited their states’ “taxable costs” statutes. Others claim that the American Rule—as well as its close relative, the contingency-fee contract—contributed to a “liability explosion” in that century. This Article offers a comprehensive examination of the origins of, rationales given for, and impact of the American Rule; then it evaluates instances in which the rule has faced legislative, judicial, and academic opposition

The Fascinator: A lightweight, modular contribution to the Fedora-commons world

4th International Conference on Open RepositoriesThis presentation was part of the session : Fedora User Group PresentationsDate: 2009-05-20 01:30 PM – 03:00 PMThe Australian government has supported the development of repository infrastructure for several years now. One product of this support was the ARROW project (Australian Research Repositories Online to the World). The ARROW project sponsored a hybrid commercial/open-source approach to building vendor-supported repository infrastructure with open-source underpinnings. One of the open-source contributions, which complements the vendor-sourced product adopted by many of the ARROW partners is a simple to install and configure front-end web service for Fedora repositories known as "The Fascinator". The Fascinator was conceived initially as a way to prove a point in an ongoing dialogue within the ARROW project about repository architecture. The goal was to test the hypothesis that it would be possible to build a useful, fast, flexible web front end for a repository using a single fast indexing system to handle browsing via facets, full-text search, multiple 'portal' views of subsets of a large corpus, and most importantly, easy-to administer security that could handle the most common uses cases seen in the ARROW community. This contrasted with the approach taken by ARROW's commercial partner, which used several different indices to achieve only some of the same functionality in an environment which was much more complex to manage and configure. We will give an overview of the product in both functional and technical terms. Functionally, The Fascinator offers: Click-to-create portals. Easy to configure security based on a query-based filter system, the repository owner can express security in terms of saved-searches that define what a user or group is allowed to see. Highly flexible indexing of a Fedora repository for administrators (and by extension anything the harvesting module can scrape-up). Technically, The Fascinator is a modular system, written in Java so it is easy to deploy with Fedora and Solr, consisting of: An indexing system for Fedora which builds on the standard G-Search supplied with the software, and some work done by the Muradora team. A configurable harvesting application which can ingest data from OAI-PMH, ORE, and local file systems. A web portal application which can be used to build flexible front end websites or act as a service to other sites via an HTTP API. An OAI-PMH (and ATOM archive) system which can create sub-feeds from a repository very easily without complexities like OAI-PMH sets. An easy to use installer for Unix based platforms allowing a systems administrator to install the application along with Fedora and Solr with a few keystrokes. While The Fascinator's goals were modest it has been met with some enthusiasm by repository managers in Australia and beyond, and is being trialled and/or piloted in a small number of sites across the world.ARROW project, Monash Universit

Entropy and the Law of Small Numbers

Two new information-theoretic methods are introduced for establishing Poisson approximation inequalities. First, using only elementary information-theoretic techniques it is shown that, when $S_n=\sum_{i=1}^nX_i$ is the sum of the (possibly dependent) binary random variables $X_1,X_2,...,X_n$, with $E(X_i)=p_i$ and E(S_n)=\la, then \ben D(P_{S_n}\|\Pol)\leq \sum_{i=1}^n p_i^2 + \Big[\sum_{i=1}^nH(X_i) - H(X_1,X_2,..., X_n)\Big], \een where D(P_{S_n}\|{Po}(\la)) is the relative entropy between the distribution of $S_n$ and the Poisson(\la) distribution. The first term in this bound measures the individual smallness of the $X_i$ and the second term measures their dependence. A general method is outlined for obtaining corresponding bounds when approximating the distribution of a sum of general discrete random variables by an infinitely divisible distribution. Second, in the particular case when the $X_i$ are independent, the following sharper bound is established, \ben D(P_{S_n}\|\Pol)\leq \frac{1}{\lambda} \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{p_i^3}{1-p_i}, % \label{eq:abs2} \een and it is also generalized to the case when the $X_i$ are general integer-valued random variables. Its proof is based on the derivation of a subadditivity property for a new discrete version of the Fisher information, and uses a recent logarithmic Sobolev inequality for the Poisson distribution.Comment: 15 pages. To appear, IEEE Trans Inform Theor

Horizontal Mergers, Involuntary Unemployment, and Welfare

Standard welfare analysis of horizontal mergers usually refers to two effects: the anticompetitive market power effect reduces welfare by enabling firms to charge prices above marginal costs, whereas the procompetitive efficiency ef-fect increases welfare by reducing the costs of production (synergies). How-ever, demand-side effects of synergies are usually neglected. We introduce them into a standard oligopoly model of horizontal merger by assuming an (empirically supported) decrease in labour demand due to merger-specific synergies and derive welfare effects. We find that efficiency benefits from horizontal mergers are substantially decreased, if involuntary unemployment exists. However, in full employment economies, demand-side effects remain negligible. Eventually, policy conclusions for merger control are discussed.Horizontal mergers, involuntary unemployment, efficiency defense, oligopoly, competition

Implications of Unprofitable Horizontal Mergers: A Positive External Effect does not Suffice to Clear a Merger!

We demonstrate that the popular Farrell-Shapiro-framework (FSF) for the analysis of mergers in oligopolies relies regarding its policy conclusions sensitively on the assumption that rational agents will only propose privately profitable mergers. If this assumption held, a positive external effect of a proposed merger would represent a sufficient condition to allow the merger. However, the empirical picture on mergers and acquisitions reveals a significant share of unprofitable mergers and economic theory, moreover, demonstrates that privately unprofitable mergers can be the result of rational action. Therefore, we extend the FSF by explicitly allowing for unprofitable mergers to occur with some frequency. This exerts a considerable impact on merger policy conclusions: while several insights of the original FSF are corroborated (f.i. efficiency defence), a positive external effect does not represent a sufficient condition for the allowance of a merger anymore. Applying such a rule would cause a considerable amount of false positives. We thank all participants of the 29th HOS Conference (Marburg, November 2007), the 35th EARIE Conference (Toulouse, September 2008) and the Annual Meeting of the Verein für Socialpolitik (Graz, September 2008) for a valuable and helpful discussion of this paper. Furthermore, we thank Barbara Güldenring for editorial assistance.Oligopoly theory, horizontal merger policy, profitability of mergers, antitrust