Building Bridges: Heterogeneous Jurisdictions, Endogenous Spillovers, and the Benefits of Decentralization

We model two heterogeneous districts of unequal size that may enjoy each other's local public good if a costly national infrastructure (the bridge) is provided. We compare a decentralized regime where local public goods are decided locally and the bridge centrally, with a centralized regime where all decisions are taken centrally, under both benevolent planner and median voter decision making. In both cases, it may happen that either both regimes build the bridge, none, or only one does. We provide a full-edged welfare comparison of all the possibilities. When the bridge is built in both regimes, centralization dominates if the spillovers allowed by the bridge are sufficiently high. When the bridge is not built in the centralized regime, decentralization is always preferred. We also show that, under some circumstances, it may happen that decentralization dominates even if it does not build the bridge, while the centralized regime does. Finally, we suggest a simple mechanism to avoid the costs imposed by the centralized regime upon minorities: allocating decision power over the local public goods and the bridge to different local constituents.Local public goods; Endogenous Spillovers; Fiscal (de)centralization.

Fiscal competition, revenue sharing, and policy-induced agglomeration

Revenue sharing can be used to discourage low tax regions from competing for capital and firms with high tax regions. However, with heterogeneous regions, revenue sharing involves net transfers across regions and creates a “moral-hazard” problem - that is, regions may want to invest less in market fostering public good when the benefits are shared across nations. This paper analyzes these costs and benefits of revenue sharing. When asymmetric regions compete in capital income taxes only, we show that revenue sharing can be desirable for the high tax region if it is pushed far enough (i.e., J-curve effect), while tax harmonization is always harmful for the low tax region. When regions also compete through public investments, we find that tax competition distorts (downards) public investments. While revenue sharing discourages public investments due to moral-hazard effect, it remains beneficial in most cases. Moreover, there are new agglomeration forces resulting from public investments because the inflow of capital raises the incentive for public investments which in turn attract more capital. This leads to the possibility of policy-induced agglomeration (which is different from the classical agglomeration forces in the New Economic geography).Heterogeneous Regions; Fiscal Federalism; Revenue Sharing; Moral Hazard; Agglomeration

THE RACE FOR POLLUTING PERMITS

International markets for tradable emission permits (TEP) co-exist with national energy taxation. A firm trading emission permits in the international market also pays energy taxes in its host country, thus creating an interaction between the international TEP-market and national energy taxes. In this paper we model that interaction in a framework of a perfectly competitive international TEP-market, where heterogeneous firms trade their TEP endowments. National governments set energy taxes non-cooperatively so as to maximize fiscal revenue from energy and profit taxes. We identify the driving forces behind Nash equilibrium taxes. We show how they depend on the total amount of TEPs in the market, on firms ’ TEP-endowment and on the number of participating countries. We also show how energy taxation varies with the introduction of the market on a previously unregulated world. Finally, we highlight the fact that the TEP-market does not achieve abatement cost efficiency, despite its being perfectly competitive. JEL Classification: Q48; Q52; H23; H73

Transfer Pricing Rules, OECD Guidelines, and Market Distortions

We study the impact of transfer pricing rules on sales prices, firms’ organizational structure, and consumers’ utility within a two-country monopolistic competition model featuring source-based profit taxes that differ across countries. Firms can either become multinationals, i.e., they serve the foreign market through a fully controlled affiliate; or they can become exporters, i.e., they serve the foreign market by contracting with an independent distributor. Compared to the benchmark cases, where tax authorities are either unable to audit firms or where they are able to audit them perfectly, the use of the OECD’s Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) or Cost-Plus (CP) rule distorts firms’ output and pricing decisions. The reason is that the comparable arm’s length transactions between exporters and distributors, which serve as benchmarks, are not efficient. We show that implementing the CUP or CP rules is detrimental to consumers in the low tax country, yet benefits consumers in the high tax country.Transfer pricing, OECD guidelines, multinationals and exporters, organizational choice, arm's length principle

Exports Versus Horizontal Foreign Direct Investment with Profit Shifting

We study a firm which serves two unequally-sized markets and must choose where to locate its first production plant, and whether to open a second plant to serve the other market through local sales rather than exports. An exporter pays taxes only to the country where it locates its single production plant. A double- plant multinational pays taxes in both countries, but may shift taxable profits across countries, at a cost. We show that the usual proximity-concentration trade- off between fixed and trade costs is modified, depending on both the average tax of, and the tax difference between, the two countries. Moreover, in contrast to a standard result of the FDI literature, we find that increased market size asymmetry may make it more likely that the firm engages in horizontal FDI. From a global welfare viewpoint, it is always desirable to control the firm's profit shifting when the multinational structure is taken as given. However, the fact that the firm may react by changing its production structure may be a reason not to control profit shifting activities

Endogenous spillovers in the trade-off between centralization and decentralization

In this paper, we revisit the classical trade-off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods, in a setting where interregional spillovers depend on the level of a national public good. We compare the standard benevolent planner approach with a political economy in which decisions, in a centralized system, are undertaken by a non-cooperative legislature with no separation of powers. We observe that the policy-maker in a centralized system is able to play both with local public goods and spillovers, a mechanism that is not available under a decentralized system. When compared to the traditional exogenous spillovers assumption, this improves the case for centralization under the standard benevolent planner approach. However, the same is not necessarily true in the non-cooperative legislature, as in this case the interests of the legislator do not need to be aligned with those of the society. Finally, we extend the traditional political economy analysis by considering a legislature in which decisions are undertaken by different committees (separation of powers), and show that it performs better than the original non-cooperative legislature, greatly improving the case for centralization.Funda cão para a Ciência e Tecnologia (BD/36542/2007

El Viaje Habitado. La tienda de campaña como arquitectura pasajera.

"Recopilando recuerdos y fotografías familiares a la vez que deiniendo la tienda como estructura móvil es como se ha ido desarrollando este trabajo. La primera pregunta que me surgió fue: ¿De dónde vienen las tiendas de campaña? Y este fue el punto de partida desde el cual se han desarrollado cuatro bloques con un concepto global en cada uno de ellos. El primero trata de una introducción a modo de desarrollo histórico respondiendo a la pregunta anteriormente planteada. Se inicia relacionando el concepto actual de tienda de campaña con dos ideas que la caracterizan: viajar y vivir de manera nómada y con hitos de arquitecturas mínimas y pasajeras, tales como el proyecto de las Muchachas nómadas de Toyo Ito. Seguidamente, se muestran ejemplos de cómo la tienda forma parte de la familia de las «arquitecturas tensadas» y como estas han tenido siempre una estrecha relación con los arquitectos. Las claras innovaciones en este campo me han llevado a crear un recorrido histórico que inicia deiniendo el concepto de «refugio» con La Cabaña primitiva de Vitruvio hasta los años de la verdadera revolución para la tienda actual: el modelo creado por The North Face y el arquitecto Buckminster Fuller basado en la ingeniería de las cúpulas geodésicas. En el segundo bloque, observando los grandes avances tecnológicos en este campo, se deine la tienda actual, se expone la normativa que la regula y se crea un catálogo con dieciséis tipologías de carpa. Estas se clasiican según su supericie de apoyo (tierra irme, lotantes y suspendida en el aire). Catálogos de las diferentes marcas que comercializan este tipo de estructuras, documentales sobre el senderismo y el alpinismo y artículos de periódicos y revistas deportivas han sido mayormente la fuente de información para la realización de dicho capítulo. La planimetría de todos los modelos del catálogo se realiza en base a fotografías y medidas de cada uno de dichos diseños. Pero no solo la sección de investigación y estudio ha sido la que le ha dado forma a este trabajo: para entender la experiencia de ser un campista y lo que signiica habitar una tienda de campaña es necesario vivirla, realizar esos viajes y experimentar lo que es ser un turista errante. Todas las acampadas realizadas a lo largo de los años desde que soy pequeña me han ayudado a estructurar el penúltimo capítulo* desglosando nociones básicas (y a las cuales me he ido enfrentando) para cualquier persona que quiera iniciarse en esta práctica: en qué consiste la acampada libre y la normativa que la regula, explicando que permite y prohíbe (ahondando en la legislación andaluza). El último bloque consiste en un diario de viaje. Este está basado en las aventuras vividas por mis padres desde el verano de 1987 hasta el de 1993. Recopilación de fotografías y recuerdos, al igual que la rememoración de un trabajo de campo realizado por ellos son las bases para argumentar esta última sección con la que se cierra el trabajo, relexionando sobre algunos conceptos desde la visión personal de mi padre.

Papel de la endocitosis mediada por clatrina en el desarrollo y viabilidad celular en la retina de Drosophila melanogaster

Tesis doctoral inédita leída en la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Facultad de Medicina. Departamento de Bioquímica. Fecha de lectura: 27 de febrero de 200