The Psychology of Supranationalism: Its Ideological Correlates and Implications for EU Attitudes and post-Brexit Preferences

Existing research highlights the roles of group identities and concerns about mass migration in explaining attitudes towards the European Union (EU). However, studies have been largely silent on whether EU attitudes are also shaped by people’s attitudes towards the principles and practices of supranational governance. This research provides a first test of the nature and role of supranational attitudes. We introduce a new measure of supranationalism and, in two studies using samples drawn from the British population, test the psychometric properties of the supranationalism scale. We then identify the socio-ideological correlates (right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation) of supranationalism, along with its effects in predicting EU attitudes and post-Brexit preferences. Our core finding is that supranationalism predicts attitudes towards the EU over and above established factors such as national identity and immigrant threat. Our study thus shows the existence of supranational attitudes among individuals, and the relevance of such attitudes to people’s opinions about international organisations like the EU

COVID-19 conspiracy theories and compliance with governmental restrictions: The mediating roles of anger, anxiety, and hope

The COVID-19 pandemic has been an ideal breeding ground for conspiracy theories. Yet, different beliefs could have different implications for individuals’ emotional responses, which in turn could relate to different behaviours and specifically to either a greater or lesser compliance with social distancing and health protective measures. In the present research, we investigated the links between COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs, emotions (anger, anxiety, and hope), attitudes towards government restrictions, and self-reported compliant behaviour. Results of a cross-sectional survey amongst a large UK sample (N = 1,579) provided support for the hypothesis that COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs showed a polarising relationship with compliant behaviour through opposing emotional pathways. The relation was mediated by higher levels of anger, itself related to a lesser perceived importance of government restrictions, and simultaneous higher levels of anxiety, related to a greater perceived importance. Hope was also related to conspiracy beliefs and to greater perceived importance but played a weaker role in the mediational model. Results suggest that the behavioural correlates of conspiracy beliefs might not be straightforward, and highlight the importance of considering the emotional states such beliefs might elicit, when investigating their potential impact

Distrustful Complacency and the COVID ‐19 Vaccine: How Concern and Political Trust Interact to Affect Vaccine Hesitancy

We test the hypothesis that COVID‐19 vaccine hesitancy is attributable to distrustful complacency—an interactive combination of low concern and low trust. Across two studies, 9,695 respondents from different parts of Britain reported their level of concern about COVID‐19, trust in the UK government, and intention to accept or refuse the vaccine. Multilevel regression analysis, controlling for geographic area and relevant demographics, confirmed the predicted interactive effect of concern and trust. Across studies, respondents with both low trust and low concern were 10%–22% more vaccine hesitant than respondents with either high trust or high concern, and 26%–29% more hesitant than respondents with both high trust and high concern. Results hold equally among White, Black, and Muslim respondents, consistent with the view that regardless of mean‐level differences, a common process underlies vaccine hesitancy, underlining the importance of tackling distrustful complacency both generally and specifically among unvaccinated individuals and populations

The Psychology of Euroscepticism and Brexit Preferences: The Role of Social Attitudes and Implications for National Identification

Discussions about supporting vs. rejecting European supranational governance (i.e., Euroscepticism) have been dominating national conversations for several years in Europe. Although political scientists have written extensively about Euroscepticism, surprisingly little is known about citizens' attitudes towards the general political principles of supranational governance (i.e., supranationalism) that underpin institutions such as the European Union (EU). Addressing this gap, this thesis focusses on the psychology of supranationalism and the psychological implications of events such as Brexit. Specifically, this thesis investigated the psychological factors that relate to opposition to supranational governance, and how it contributes to Euroscepticism and Brexit preferences. Furthermore, this thesis investigated how the unprecedented rejection of European supranational governance (i.e., Brexit) related to British voters' national identities. Chapter 2 reports two cross-sectional studies conducted in the UK that introduced a novel measure of supranationalism and established its psychometric properties and ideological correlates (right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation). Furthermore, supranationalism significantly predicted voters' EU attitudes and Brexit preferences, while controlling for established factors such as national identification and immigration concerns. A third study, reported in chapter 3, replicated these results with samples from the UK, Germany, and Belgium, and showed that supranationalism is relevant to Euroscepticism in- and outside of the UK. Chapter 4 turns attention to the implications of Euroscepticism in the UK and investigated the impact of two anti-EU elections on voters' national identities in three longitudinal studies. Specifically, Studies 4 and 5 showed that electoral losers dis-identified and became more estranged from their country after Brexit in 2016. Study 6 replicated these findings during the Brexit-election in 2019, and further showed that the looming threat of Brexit and voters' inability to influence the political course, were key factors explaining dis-identification and estrangement effects which were stronger among political liberals across all three studies. Overall, this thesis illustrates how Euroscepticism draws on right-wing social attitudes and represents a particular challenge to people on the political left

Social cohesion may be antidote to global prison crisis

As incarceration rates continue to rise globally, the need to reduce rates of reoffending grows ever more urgent. We consider whether positive group bonds can improve behaviours among prisoners via a unique soccer-based prison intervention, the Twinning Project. We analyse effects of participation compared to a control group (S1, N = 676, N = 1874 control cases), longitudinal patterns of social cohesion underlying these effects (S2, N = 388), and explore desistance from crime after release (S3, N = 249). As law-abiding behaviour also requires a supportive receiving community, we investigated the factors influencing willingness to employ formerly incarcerated people in online samples (S4-9, N = 1,797). Results indicate that the ability to bond with stigmatised groups (e.g., formerly incarcerated people) is crucial to willingness to support reintegration efforts. To help address the global prison crisis, interventions must focus on improved behaviour plus both employment and positive group alignments on release, thus reducing costs of incarceration, while improving opportunities to integrate

‘We need community’: bridging the path to desistance from crime with community football

Recidivism costs society, communities, families, and individuals. Sport is heralded as an accessible way to engage and incentivise people convicted of crime to change their lifestyles. One high-profile intervention designed to reduce reoffending rates is the Twinning Project, which invites people serving custodial and community sentences to participate in a football-based programme to gain accredited qualifications with a major football club in their local region. Our primary objective was to investigate how football, which uses some of the biggest brands and regional allegiances in the UK, might help to bridge the gap between community and paths to desistance. Using a realist approach, we present interview data from people serving sentences in the community and the coaches and probation officers facilitating intervention programmes at two major British football clubs. Specifically, we conducted interviews with staff and service users serving community sentences in a large British city. Based on social identity perspectives on social exclusion/inclusion, we carried out thematic analysis with the focus on social support, social bonding, and resulting future orientation. Thematic analysis revealed four themes: (1) gaps in social support; (2) coach as a role model; (3) increased future orientation; and (4) new ways forward. These themes evidenced the struggles people often face before entering the justice system as well as the capacity of high level coaching around a meaningful shared social identity to reduce the salience of these hurdles and elicit a sense of optimism toward the future. Please refer to the Supplementary Material section to find this article’s Community and Social Impact Statement

COVID-19 conspiracy theories and compliance with governmental restrictions: The mediating roles of anger, anxiety, and hope

Data presented in the article "COVID-19 conspiracy theories and compliance with governmental restrictions: The mediating roles of anger, anxiety, and hope" published in the Journal of Pacific Rim Psycholog

Distrustful complacency and the COVID-19 vaccine: How concern and political trust interact to affect vaccine hesitancy

We test the hypothesis that COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy is attributable to ‘distrustful complacency’ – an interactive and not just additive combination of concern and distrust. Across two studies, 9695 respondents across 13 different parts of Britain reported their level of concern about COVID-19, trust in the UK government, and intention to accept or refuse the vaccine. Multilevel regression analysis, controlling for geographic area and relevant demographics, confirmed the predicted interactive effect of concern and trust. Respondents with both low trust and low concern were 10%-22% more vaccine hesitant than respondents with either high trust or high concern, and 20%-29% more hesitant than respondents with both high trust and high concern. Results hold equally among White, Black, and Muslim respondents, consistent with the view that, regardless of mean level differences, a common process underlies vaccine hesitancy, underlining the importance of tackling distrustful complacency both generally and specifically amongst unvaccinated individuals and populations

Changes in political trust in Britain during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020: integrated public opinion evidence and implications

In this paper, we document changes in political trust in the UK throughout 2020 so as to consider wider implications for the ongoing handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. We analysed data from 18 survey organisations with measures on political trust (general, leadership, and COVID-19-related) spanning the period December 2019-October 2020. We examined the percentage of trust and distrust across time, identifying where significant changes coincide with national events. Levels of political trust were low following the 2019 UK General Election. They rose at the onset of UK lockdown imposed in March 2020 but showed persistent gradual decline throughout the remainder of the year, falling to pre-COVID levels by October 2020. Inability to sustain the elevated political trust achieved at the onset of the pandemic is likely to have made the management of public confidence and behaviour increasingly challenging, pointing to the need for strategies to sustain trust levels when handling future crises