Soft believers and hard unbelievers in the Xhosa cattle-killing

A substantial minority, perhaps 15 per cent of all Xhosa, refused to obey the prophetess Nongqawuse's orders to kill their cattle and destroy their corn. This divided Xhosaland into two parties, the amathamba (‘soft’ ones, or believers) and the amagogotya (‘hard’ ones, or unbelievers). The affiliation of individuals was partly determined by a number of factors – lungsickness in cattle, political attitude towards the Cape Colony, religious beliefs, kinship, age and gender – but a systematic analysis of each of these factors in turn suggests that none of them was sufficiently important to constitute the basis of either party. The key to understanding the division lies in an analysis of the indigenous Xhosa terms ‘soft’ and ‘hard’. ‘Softness’ in Xhosa denotes the submissiveness of the individual to the common will of the community, whereas ‘hardness’ denotes the determination of the individual to pursue his own ends, even at communal expense. Translated into social terms, the ‘soft’ believers were those who remained committed to the mutual aid ethic of the declining precolonial society, whereas the ‘hard’ unbelievers were those who sought to seize advantage of the new opportunities offered by the colonial presence to increase their wealth and social prominence. The conflict between the social and personal imperatives was well expressed by Chief Smith Mhala, the unbelieving son of a believing father, when he said, ‘They say I am killing my father – so I would kill him before I would kill my cattle.’ Certainly, the division between amathamba and amagogotya ran much deeper than the division between belief and unbelief, and the Xhosa, in conferring these names, seem to have recognized the fact

A history of the Xhosa, c1700-1835

The boundaries of the territory occupied by the Xhosa fluctuated considerably, but in the period 1700-1835 they did not often extend west of the Sundays River, or east of the Mbashe River, along the coastal strip which separates the escarpment of South Africa's inland plateau from the Indian Ocean. It is an area of temperate grassland, permitting the cultivation of cereals and light crops, such as maize, millet, tobacco and pumpkins but better suited to stock-farming than intensive agriculture

The central beliefs of the Xhosa cattle-killing

The Xhosa cattle-killing movement of 1856–7 cannot be explained as a superstitious ‘pagan reaction’ to the intrusion of colonial rule and Christian civilization. It owes its peculiar form to the lungsickness epidemic of 1854, which carried off over 100,000 Xhosa cattle. The Xhosa theory of disease indicated that the sick cattle had been contaminated by the witchcraft practices of the people, and that these tainted cattle would have to be slaughtered lest they infect the pure new cattle which were about to rise. The idea of the resurrection of the dead was partly due to the Xhosa belief that the dead do not really die or depart from the world of the living, and partly to the Xhosa myth of creation, which held that all life originated in a certain cavern in the ground which might yet again pour forth its blessings on the earth. Christian doctrines, transmitted through the prophets Nxele and Mhlakaza, supplemented and elaborated these indigenous Xhosa beliefs. The Xhosa and the Christian elements united together in the person of the expected redeemer Sifuba-sibanzi (the broad-chested one). The central beliefs of the Xhosa cattle-killing were neither irrational nor atavistic. Ironically, it was probably because they were so rational and so appropriate that they ultimately proved to be so deadly

Nxele, Ntsikana and the origins of the Xhosa religious reaction

The sudden expulsion of the Xhosa across the Fish River in 1811–12 created a practical and conceptual crisis which the traditional political authorities were unable to resolve. Two commoners, Nxele and Ntsikana, emerged in this vacuum, each proposing his own solution to the problems posed by the white irruption. Although these responses were religious responses, they were neither irrational nor incomprehensible. Xhosa religion had long functioned as an instrument for the control of the material world. By incorporating selected Christian concepts with the Xhosa world-view, Nxele and Ntsikana were able to provide the Xhosa with acceptable explanations of past events and prescriptions for future action. Nxele urged resistance and Ntsikana preached submission, but an examination of their personal histories shows that these final conclusions were more the product of exterior pressure than interior revelation. It may be suggested that the future reputations of the two men, like their past actions, will be determined more by the popular mood than by anything they themselves did or said

The Bantustan State and the South African Transition: Militarisation, Patrimonialism and the Collapse of the Ciskei Regime, 1986-1994

This article examines the Ciskei bantustan and processes of state formation during the transition to democracy. In the Ciskei, the rule of Brigadier Gqozo rested on the continued support of the South African state: identified as the weakest link in the National Party’s conservative alliance, the Ciskei became the first target for the African National Congress’ mass action campaign of 1992. The struggle in the Ciskei thus had some significance for the shape of the transition. While at a constitutional level the National Party eventually conceded to the re-incorporation of the bantustans in late 1992, it continued to stall change and to bolster the bantustans through covert military operations and land transfers to bantustan elites. These dynamics of state formation are critical aspects of the history of the transition and were at the heart of the emerging political conflict in the Ciskei, which by mid-1992 was escalating into civil war. This article examines mass mobilisation, political repression and the consequences of the patrimonial militarisation of the Ciskei state in the Ciskei/ Border region. By focusing on processes of state formation and struggles over the fabric of the state, this article provides a corrective to the prevailing academic focus on the elite negotiations and argues for the value of social histories of the bantustan states for understanding the enduring legacies of these regimes

Institutions and governance of communal rangelands in South Africa

The creation of local institutions with a mandate over land access and control is seen as a prerequisite for successful decentralisation of land tenure and effective local resource management in sub-Saharan Africa. However, with land tenure reform in South Africa currently at a state of legislative impasse, real uncertainty now exists over land rights and governance of rangeland in many communal areas. This paper draws on case study material from Eastern Cape province to illustrate how this ongoing uncertainty has resulted in the operation of a range of traditional authority and civil society institutions in different communal areas with varying degrees of legitimate authority over land administration and highly variable performance in managing rangeland resources. Collective management of rangeland resources seems most difficult in environments where land rights are contested because of the coexistence of traditional leaders and civil society institutions. On this basis an approach to tenure reform is advocated, which vests all powers over local land administration in democratically elected and accountable civil society institutions. Some successful examples of this already exist and might serve to guide policy formation, which must be flexible enough to accommodate collective management approaches that emphasise cooperation both within and between communities.Keywords: common property, land tenure, natural resource management, traditional leadersAfrican Journal of Range & Forage Science 2013, 30(1&2): 77–8

“Ndiyindoda” [I am a man]: theorising Xhosa masculinity

Masculinity studies in South Africa depend on Western gender theories to frame research questions and fieldwork. This article argues that such theories offer a limited understanding of Xhosa constructions of masculinity. Xhosa notions of masculinity are embodied in the concept of indoda, meaning a traditionally circumcised person. This article explores the nuanced meanings of indoda and its relationship to other masculinities, like uncircumcised boys [inkwenkwe] and medically circumcised men. The discussion reveals that indoda is the most “honoured” form of masculinity. A traditionally circumcised individual is regarded as indoda, a real man, irrespective of his sexual orientation or class, and this affords him certain rights and privileges. Inkwenkwe and medically circumcised men embody “subordinate” forms of masculinity and are victims of stigma and discrimination by indoda. This requires us to revisit some Western theories of masculinity which place heterosexual men at the top of a masculine hierarchy and gay men at the bottom. It furthermore requires us to pay attention to the body when theorising Xhosa masculinity, since it is a principal way of “proving” and “defending” Xhosa manhood.IBS

Contextualising Apartheid at the End of Empire: Repression, ‘Development’ and the Bantustans

This article examines the global dynamics of late colonialism and how these informed South African apartheid. More specifically, it locates the programmes of mass relocation and bantustan ‘self-government’ that characterised apartheid after 1959 in relation to three key dimensions. Firstly, the article explores the global circulation of idioms of ‘development’ and trusteeship in the first half of the twentieth century and its significance in shaping segregationist policy; secondly, it situates bantustan ‘selfgovernment’ in relation to the history of decolonisation and the partitions and federations that emerged as late colonial solutions; and, thirdly, it locates the tightening of rural village planning in the bantustans after 1960 in relation to the elaboration of anti-colonial liberation struggles, repressive southern African settler politics and the Cold War. It argues that, far from developing policies that were at odds with the global ‘wind of change’, South African apartheid during the 1960s and 1970s reflected much that was characteristic about late colonial strategy