48 research outputs found
Violent Deaths of Iraqi Civilians, 2003–2008: Analysis by Perpetrator, Weapon, Time, and Location
Madelyn Hsiao-Rei Hicks and colleagues provide a detailed analysis of Iraqi civilian violent deaths during 2003-2008 of the Iraq war and show that of 92,614 deaths, unknown perpetrators caused 74% of deaths, Coalition forces 12%, and Anti-Coalition forces 11%
Are luminescent bacteria suitable for online detection and monitoring of toxic compounds in drinking water and its sources?
Biosensors based on luminescent bacteria may be valuable tools to monitor the chemical quality and safety of surface and drinking water. In this review, an overview is presented of the recombinant strains available that harbour the bacterial luciferase genes luxCDABE, and which may be used in an online biosensor for water quality monitoring. Many bacterial strains have been described for the detection of a broad range of toxicity parameters, including DNA damage, protein damage, membrane damage, oxidative stress, organic pollutants, and heavy metals. Most lux strains have sensitivities with detection limits ranging from milligrams per litre to micrograms per litre, usually with higher sensitivities in compound-specific strains. Although the sensitivity of lux strains can be enhanced by various molecular manipulations, most reported detection thresholds are still too high to detect levels of individual contaminants as they occur nowadays in European drinking waters. However, lux strains sensing specific toxic effects have the advantage of being able to respond to mixtures of contaminants inducing the same effect, and thus could be used as a sensor for the sum effect, including the effect of compounds that are as yet not identified by chemical analysis. An evaluation of the suitability of lux strains for monitoring surface and drinking water is therefore provided
Monitoring and Disrupting Dark Networks A Bias toward the Center and What It Costs Us
The goal of this article is to explore this analytic bias--how it is manifested, why it appears so extensive, and what unwitting limitations it imposes on our strategic options to counter terrorism.
We use data from a study of the Syrian opposition network that was conducted in the CORE Lab
at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey California (Lucente and Wilson 2013). The
original study sought to provide a window into the armed opposition units against the regime of
Syrian President Bashar Assad. This article proceeds as follows: We begin by reviewing the
various strategies that can be used for disrupting dark networks. These can be broken down into
two broad categories -- kinetic and non-kinetic. The former uses coercive means for disruption while the latter seeks to undermine dark networks using with subtler applications of power. Drawing on a previous analysis, we illustrate how some of these strategies can be implemented,
while at the same time highlighting our own bias in that study toward central actors. We then turn to an analysis of the Syrian opposition network, highlighting how a central focus can blind
analysts to other important aspects of a network; in this case, elements that ultimately aligned
themselves with the Islamic State of Syria (ISIS). We conclude with some implications for the
future use of SNA to monitor and disrupt dark networks