The Role of Motor Affordances in Visual Working Memory

Motor affordances are important for object knowledge. Semantic tasks on visual objects often show interactions with motor actions. Prior neuro-imaging studies suggested that motor affordances also play a role in visual working memory for objects. When participants remembered manipulable objects (e.g., hammer) greater premotor cortex activation was observed than when they remembered non-manipulable objects (e.g., polar bear). In the present study participants held object pictures in working memory while performing concurrent tasks such as articulation of nonsense syllables and performing hand movements. Although concurrent tasks did interfere with working memory performance, in none of the experiments did we find any evidence that concurrent motor tasks affected memory differently for manipulable and non-manipulable objects. I conclude that motor affordances are not used for visual working memory

Numbers in Space: Differences between Concrete and Abstract Situations

Numbers might be understood by grounding in spatial orientation, where small numbers are represented as low or to the left and large numbers are represented as high or to the right. We presented numbers in concrete (seven shoes in a shoe shop) or abstract (29 – 7) contexts and asked participants to make relative magnitude judgments. Following the judgment a target letter was presented at the top or bottom (Experiments 1–3) or left or right (Experiment 4) of the visual field. Participants were better at identifying letters at congruent than incongruent locations, but this effect was obtained only when numbers were presented in concrete contexts. We conclude that spatial grounding might have a smaller role for numbers in abstract than in concrete context

Introduction to the Special Topic Embodied and Grounded Cognition

Introduction: In the last 10–15 years, the embodied and grounded (E and G) cognition approach has become widespread in all fields related to cognitive (neuro) science, and a lot of evidence has been collected. The approach proposes that cognitive activity is grounded in sensory–motor processes and situated in specific contexts and situations. This special topic had two aims: first, give an idea of the field in its broadness. Second, focus on some challenges for E and G theories. The first important challenge is to account for understanding abstract concepts and words. Evidence on the representation of concrete concepts is compelling, whereas evidence on abstract concepts is still scarce and limited to restricted domains. A second important challenge concerns the role of computational models. E and G theories of cognition need to formulate more precise hypotheses, and models help to constrain and specify in more detail the predictions and the claims advanced

Spatial Attention is Driven by Mental Simulations

Introduction: Many studies have shown that task performance is affected by the relation between the spatial location and the meaning of a target word. These effects have been obtained for object names that have typical positions in the physical world (Zwaan and Yaxley, 2003; Bergen et al., 2007; Šeticˇ and Domijan, 2007; Estes et al., 2008) and for concepts that are metaphorically related to spatial position (Richardson et al., 2003; Meier and Robinson, 2004; Schnall and Clore, 2004; Schubert, 2005; Giessner and Schubert, 2007; Casasanto, 2009; Van Dantzig, 2009). Although these findings are consistent with a mental simulation account, at least some of the interactions between meaning and spatial location might be explained by polarity alignment. In our study (Pecher et al., 2010) we tested whether spatial congruency effects are best explained by mental simulations or by polarity alignment. ..

False memories and lexical decision: even twelve primes do not cause long-term semantic priming

Semantic priming effects are usually obtained only if the prime is presented shortly before the target stimulus. Recent evidence obtained with the so-called false memory paradigm suggests, however, that in both explicit and implicit memory tasks semantic relations between words can result in long-lasting effects when multiple 'primes' are presented. The aim of the present study was to investigate whether these effects would generalize to lexical decision. In four experiments we showed that even as many as twelve primes do not cause long-term semantic priming. In all experiments, however, a repetition priming effect was obtained. The present results are consistent with a number of other results showing that semantic information plays a minimal role in long-term priming in visual word recognition

Automatic Priming Effects for New Associations in Lexical Decision and Perceptual Identification

Information storage in semantic memory was investigated by looking at automatic priming effects for new associations in two experiments. In the study phase word pairs were presented in a paired-associate learning task. Lexical decision and perceptual identification were used t

Number-induced shifts in spatial attention: A replication study

In a spatial attention paradigm, Fischer, Castel, Dodd, & Pratt (2003) showed that merely perceiving a number shifted attention according to the magnitude of the number. Low numbers shifted attention to the left and high numbers shifted attention to the right. This suggests that numbers are represented by the mental number line - a spatial image schema that is ordered from left to right with increasing magnitude. In six experiments, we used the spatial attention paradigm of Fischer et al. to investigate if and when such mental representations are activated. Participants detected visual targets that were preceded by low and high numbers. Between experiments we manipulated how participants processed the number. Participants either merely perceived the number, as in the experiments by Fisher et al., processed the number's parity, or processed the number's magnitude. Our results provide little support for the idea that numbers shift spatial attention. Only in one of the two experiments in which participants processed number magnitude did participants respond faster to targets in congruent locations (left for low magnitudes and right for high magnitudes) than in incongruent locations. In the other five experiments number magnitude did not affect spatial attention. This shows, in contrast to Fischer et al.'s results, that the mental number line is not activated automatically but at best only when it is contextually relevant. Furthermore, these results suggest that image schemas in general may be context dependent rather than fundamental to mental concepts

Evidence for long-term cross-language repetition priming in conceptual implicit memory tasks

Previous studies have failed to find evidence for long-term cross-language repetition priming (e.g., presentation of the English word frog does not facilitate responding to its Dutch translation equivalent kikker on a later presentation). The present study tested the hypothesis that failure to find cross-language repetition priming in previous studies was due to the use of tasks that rely primarily on lexical or orthographic processing of the stimuli instead of conceptual processing. Consistent with this hypothesis we obtained reliable cross-language repetition priming when conceptual implicit memory tasks were used. The present results support theories of bilingual memory that assume shared conceptual representations for translation equivalents

Unconstraining theories of embodied cognition

The approach/avoidance effect refers to the finding that valenced stimuli trigger approach and avoidance actions. Markman and Brendl (2005) argued that this effect is not a truly embodied phenomenon, but depends on participants’ symbolic representation of the self. In their study, participants moved valenced words toward or away from their own name on the computer screen. This would induce participants to form a ‘disembodied’ selfrepresentation at the location of their name, outside of the body. Approach/avoidance effects occurred with respect to the participant’s name, rather than with respect to the body. In three experiments, we demonstrate that similar effects are found when the name is replaced by a positive word, a negative word or even when no word is resented at all. This suggests that the ‘disembodied self’ explanation of Markman and Brendl is incorrect, and that their findings do not necessarily constrain embodied theories of cognition