Moral Requirements are still not Rational Requirements

Non

Moral Requirements are still not Rational Requirements

Non

In pain

When I feel a pain in my leg, how should we understand the ‘in ’ in ‘in the leg’? Michael Tye has suggested in a number of places that the Representationalist has a neat explanation of what the ‘in ’ means (Tye 1995b: 226–28 or 331–32; Tye 1995c: 111–16; Tye 1996: 296–97). Peter Carruthers has agreed (Carruthers 2000, ch. 5). Tye’s Representationalist holds pains are states which represent damage to, or disorder in, the body. When pain represents damage in the leg, then the ‘in ’ is simply that of spatial location. Pains representing disorder in phantom limbs, and cases of referred pain, merely involve misrepresentation of spatial location. The merit of Tye’s proposal, as he sees it, is that no special sense of ‘in ’ needs to be introduced. I shall argue that Tye is wrong. I have sympathy with the Representationalist position in general, although I would not develop it in the way that Tye suggests. However, I am concerned that we are clear about what supports the position and what does not. Tye’s point offers no support at all. 1 Tye invites us to consider the following invalid argument taken from Ned Block. (1) The pain is in my fingertip. (2) The fingertip is in my mouth. Therefore, (3) The pain is in my mouth. Block notes that the argument is valid if the ‘in ’ is taken to be that of spatial location. However, he claims that the argument is not valid when the statements are understood in their ordinary sense. So the ‘in ’ must be used in a different systematic way for the location of pains (Block 1983: 517). Tye claims that this is not so. The ‘in ’ is just that of spatial location. The inference is invalid because pain creates an intensional context. He compares the argument above with the following. (4) I want to be in City Hall. (5) City Hall is in the ghetto. 1 Tye has also run arguments appealing to the intentionality of representational states for what-it’s-like contexts (Tye 1995a: 125–26). I think that they have been answere

Revisiting Maher’s One-Factor Theory of Delusion, Again

Chenwei Nie ([22]) argues against a Maherian one-factor approach to explaining delusion. We argue that his objections fail. They are largely based on a mistaken understanding of the approach (as committed to the claim that anomalous experience is sufficient for delusion). Where they are not so based, they instead rest on misinterpretation of recent defences of the position, and an underestimation of the resources available to the one-factor theory.<br/

Explaining impossible and possible imaginings of pain

Abstract: Jennifer Radden argues that it is impossible to imagine sensuously pain and explains this by noting that pains are sensory qualities for which there is no distinction between appearance and reality. By contrast, I argue that only basic sensuous imaginings of pain from the first person perspective are, with some qualifications, impossible. Non-basic sensuous imaginings of pain from the first person perspective are possible. I explain the extent to which imagining pain is impossible in terms of the conditions required for representing the painfulness of pain. I outline some difficulties with Radden’s favoured explanation and note how imagining pains may have a role in depression and, to that extent, keep open the option that it may have a partly delusional character.Keywords: Imagination; Pain; Depression; Action; Delusion Spiegare l'impossibilità e la possibilità di immaginare il doloreRiassunto: Jennifer Radden sostiene come l’immaginazione sensoriale del dolore non sia possibile e lo motiva facendo notare come i dolori siano qualità sensoriali per cui non c’è distinzione tra apparenza e realtà. Per converso io sostengo come sia impossibile solo l’immaginazione sensibile di base del dolore dalla prospettiva della prima persona, con alcune specificazioni. L’immaginazione sensibile non di base del dolore dalla prospettiva della prima persona è possibile. Illustro fino a che punto l’immaginare il dolore è impossibile in termini di condizioni richieste per rappresentare la dolorosità del dolore. Sottolineo alcune difficoltà della spiegazione proposta da Radden e faccio notare come l’immaginare il dolore può aver un ruolo nella depressione e come, per questo, resti aperta l’opzione che il dolore possa avere in parte carattere illusorio.Parole chiave: Immaginazione; Dolore; Depressione; Azione; Illusion

Explaining impossible and possible imaginings of pain

Jennifer Radden argues that it is impossible to imagine sensuously pain and explains this by 10 noting that pains are sensory qualities for which there is no distinction between appearance and reality. By 11 contrast, I argue that only basic sensuous imaginings of pain from the first person perspective are, with 12 some qualifications, impossible. Non-basic sensuous imaginings of pain from the first person perspective 13 are possible. I explain the extent to which imagining pain is impossible in terms of the conditions required 14 for representing the painfulness of pain. I outline some difficulties with Radden’s favoured explanation 15 and note how imagining pains may have a role in depression and, to that extent, keep open the option that 16 it may have a partly delusional character