The Dynamics of International Market Withdrawal

This study focuses on the decision-making process of international market withdrawal within the scope of international market portfolio management. A comparative study of eight withdrawal cases in four multinational firms results in a six-phased decision-making model that is driven by threat-rigidity behavior, failure-induced learning and political dynamics. Two types of international market withdrawal are identified. On the one hand, a tactical withdrawal is the outcome of threat-rigidity and exploitative learning at the level of executive management. A strategic withdrawal, on the other hand, is characterized by a process of failure-induced exploratory learning initiated by middle level challengers. In contrast to a tactical withdrawal, which remains an isolated decision and does not interfere with other international ventures of the business unit, a strategic withdrawal turns out to be a germ of strategic (re)orientation of the business unit’s entire international market portfolio. Whether a market withdrawal turns out to be tactical or strategic ultimately depends on the autonomy, the amount and the relevance of challengers’ market and business knowledge.Economics ;

Beslissingsondersteunende systemen en besluitvorming in marketing management

Nadat eerst kort de complexiteit van de marketing-beslissingssituatie is geschetst, wordt in dit artikel een omschrijving gegeven van zogenaamde beslissingsondersteuningssystemen die een belangrijk hulpmiddel kunnen zijn bij een analytische benadering van marketingbeslissingen. Het artikel laat zien hoe in deze systemen marketingmodellen en marketinginformatiesystemen met elkaar worden geintegreerd, en gaat in op diverse aspecten, zoals het onderscheid in systemen voor strategische versus operationele beslissingen, kwantificering van modellen etc., en geeft een indeling van bestaande modellen. Er worden een aantal concrete ervaringen met deze beslissingsondersteuningssystemen vermeld en het artikel eindigt met een beschouwing over implementatie en de rol die de marktonderzoeker daarin kan spelen

Social norms, social cohesion, and corporate governance

Research Question/Issue: We study the relationship between informal rules (represented by social norms and social cohesion in a community) and corporate governance. A community is a large social unit characterized by a distinct set of informal rules. Specifically, three hypotheses are tested: (1) Communities with stronger social norms will have more open firm-level corporate governance, (2) More socially cohesive communities will have more open firm-level corporate governance, and (3) The relationship between social norms and corporate governance will be mediated by social cohesion. Research Findings/Insights: Unlike previous studies, we use data from a single, culturally diverse country, Ukraine, in order to isolate the effect of informal rules. The country’s provinces are used as proxies for communities. We develop our measures of social norms and social cohesion by performing a factor analysis on the measures commonly used in previous research (social capital, religiosity, total fertility, ethnic homogeneity, linguistic homogeneity, and homicide rate). All three hypotheses are supported, whether using composite or individual measures of social norms and cohesion. The mediation is partial, suggesting that the hypothesized effect of social norms on corporate governance may (i) partly come through cohesion and (ii) partly be direct. The results are highly significant and robust, and they hold very well when controlled for economic development, firm characteristics, and industry. Theoretical/Academic Implications: We contribute to the large literature on institutional determinants of corporate governance by proposing that informal rules may have a substantial impact on firm-level corporate governance. We also identify specific sources of informal rules: social norms and cohesion. Testing our insights in other countries and in cross-country settings would help to further understand what rules matter for corporate governance and whether informal rules may substitute for formal rules. Another research opportunity, perhaps best exploited through case-based research, is the deeper enquiry into the very mechanism by which informal rules may affect firm-level corporate governance. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Manipulating informal rules, such as norms and cohesion, is an unlikely option for corporate governance reform. If that is the case, the policy should consist in adjusting the governance system to fit them. As this fit will differ across communities and countries, international convergence of corporate governance appears unlikely