A note on Craig on Miller; Cherry

Responds to an article by Paul Craig, "The Supreme Court, prorogation and constitutional principle", P.L. 2020, Apr, supporting the ruling in R. (on the application of Miller) v Prime Minister (SC). Argues the article overlooks elements of the author's critique of the decision, including those concerning reviewability of the prorogation, the court's reasoning on justiciability, the status of precedents and discrepancies in the judges' positions

Judicial Review, Irrationality, and the Legitimacy of Merits-Review

The definition of the irrationality ground of judicial review recognises the constitutional principle of the separation of powers, in allowing for judicial control of the executive only very rarely. The author in a previous article in this study found that the courts, on occasions, had intervened in circumstances where administrative decisions arguably were not irrational. To this end, the purpose of this article is to assess the constitutionality of these seemingly low standards of irrationality. The author does so by reference either to the manner of review employed—the use of the proportionality principle, for example—or the context of the administrative decision under scrutiny, such as the infringement of the applicant’s fundamental rights. The author finds that the cases from the previous article where low standards of irrationality were arguably adopted were, in fact, legitimate according to these chosen methods of evaluation. However, this is an interim conclusion because, for reasons of word length, the author is unable to complete a full assessment here. It is therefore proposed that a subsequent article will continue to examine the constitutionality of these cases. Furthermore, the author will also try and establish a zone of executive decision-making, for reasons of democracy, where the courts are excluded from irrationality review. If the author is unsuccessful in this regard, the final conclusion of this study will inevitably be that low standards of judicial intervention exist without limit—a clear assault on the constitutional principle stated above

Early Prerogative and Administrative Power: A Response to Paul Craig

What does English experience imply about American constitutional law? My book, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, argues that federal administrative power generally is unconstitutional. In supporting this conclusion, the book observes that eighteenth-century Americans adopted their constitutions not only with their eyes on the future, but also looking over their shoulder at the past – especially the English past. This much should not be controversial. There remain, however, all sorts of questions about how to understand the English history and its relevance for early Americans. In opposition to my claims about American law, Paul Craig lobs three critiques from across the pond. His two main arguments concern the English history of prerogative and administrative power – though in addition, he makes a conceptual point about the distinction between legislative and judicial power. It will be seen that Craig\u27s account repeatedly misunderstands the history and even the conceptual framework. Nonetheless, his article usefully draws attention to some important issues. This is therefore a good occasion not simply to respond, but more broadly to explore three important questions about early prerogative and administrative power. First, how can one distinguish absolute prerogative power and administrative power in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England? Second, how did the English resolve the tensions between their inherited types of administrative power and their constitutional principles? Third, how did Americans resolve the tensions between their inherited types of administrative power and their constitutional principles

Early Prerogative and Administrative Power: A Response to Paul Craig

This Article is organized around Craig’s three criticisms. (I) In challenging my thesis that federal administrative power revives a version of prerogative power, he argues that these types of power are crucially different because the prerogative was independent of statute. But his statute-free vision of prerogative power is grossly incorrect, and it therefore cannot distinguish prerogative and administrative power. His argument also is unresponsive. My thesis is that administrative power revives the extralegal character of the absolute prerogative – in other words, that both sorts of power have bound subjects through extralegal edicts – and this extralegal power remains a problem regardless of statutory authorization and limits

The European Union act 2011: a failed statute

If there was one area in which the two coalition parties needed to produce a workable agreement as a matter of priority after the May 2010 election, it was the European Union. The European Union Act (EUA) 2011 builds on a political guarantee in the coalition agreement that there will be no transfers of sovereign powers until the next election (in 2015). That undertaking was intended to pacify the Europhobic wing of the Conservative party that had demanded but failed to get a national referendum on the hated Lisbon Treaty. As a result, the EUA contains all sorts of compromises: it delivers a referendum requirement, but not on the Lisbon Treaty; it affirms that the source of the validity of EU law is a domestic statute, but without mentioning the sovereignty of Parliament; it introduces constitutional safeguards, but without entrenching them against repeal by a future Parliament. Unfortunately, the EUA does not reflect the politics of compromise in a consensus democracy: it reflects dissent between the governing parties and within the Conservative party and, in most respects, is a compromised and failed statute

Supranational? Federal? Intergovernmental? The Governmental Structure of the European Union After the Treaty of Lisbon

The goal of this article is to provide an overview of the progressive augmentation of the supranational character of the governmental structure of the initial EEC, gradually evolving into the present European Union, particularly as a consequence of revisions to the constituent Treaties. Part I of this article presents the European Commission, the initial institution whose structure and operations have always been markedly supranational in character and which has always been dedicated to the promotion of supranational goals. Part II examines the Council of Ministers, the political institution that is intrinsically intergovernmental in character, but whose operational role in the adoption of legislation and policies took on significant supranational features in the late 1980s. Part Ill then describes the European Parliament, which can be properly characterized as a supranational, or indeed federal, institution after it began to be directly elected in 1979, and which strongly promotes a supranational agenda. Part IV presents the intrinsically intergovernmental nature of the European Council, and then examines the impact of the Lisbon Treaty, which marks the start of a shift to a partially supranational operational role for that highest political body

The European Union: A Comparative Perspective

This chapter, to be included in the Oxford Principles of EU Law volume, compares the federalisms of Europe and the United States. It argues that Europe can be sensibly viewed from both federal and intergovernmental perspectives, and that particular aspects of the European Union’s structure fit each model. In particular, the EU is federal—that is, integrated to a comparable degree to the U.S.—with respect to its distribution of competences and the sovereignty attributed to EU law and institutions. But it is intergovernmental—that is, it preserves a center of gravity within the individual member states—with respect to the allocation of governmental capacity to enforce the law as well as to tax and spend, and also because Europeans continue to identify primarily with their member states. The chapter also addresses two sets of questions about the EU’s future. One concerns the possibility of “creeping centralization” that one observes in the United States, and which one might also detect in the EU’s slogan of “ever closer union.” I argue that any such tendency will be limited by the fact that the modern regulatory and welfare bureaucracies that have spurred centralization in the America instead developed at the member state level in Europe, prior to the advent of the EU. I also consider the impact of exogenous shocks, especially the euro crisis but also parallel crises over migration and terrorism. The response to these crises so far seems to have strengthened the EU’s intergovernmental tendencies. Comparing Europe and the United States can provide helpful insights about both systems-and federal systems in general. As is often true, the primary value of comparative law here is in the questions it raises, not the answers it may provide. Many aspects of federalism taken for granted in one system are considered nonobvious or even controversial in the other, and an appreciation of this fact can enrich federalism debates on both sides of the Atlantic

What’s left of the political constitution?

This paper argues that we should move on from what has become a rather outdated contrast between the political constitution and the legal constitution. Taking as its focus the constitution of the United Kingdom, the paper analyzes the contemporary constitutional order as a mixed system of politics and law combined. It argues that such a mix may be a more compelling and attractive system than either the model of the political constitution or that of the legal constitution

Evaluating the Impact of a Quiz Question within an Educational Video

Educational videos are becoming more prevalent within a higher education context and the use of videos is now taken for granted. However, the full impact videos have on learning is under researched and not fully known. This study was conducted to investigate the effectiveness of quiz questions embedded throughout a video. Students from different modules (n1 = 102, n2 = 23) watched three different formats of videos and subsequent results of a multiple choice test were recorded and compared. In addition, viewing behaviour was recorded and explored to evaluate if this also impacted upon results. Results highlighted, that the performance on tests significantly improved after watching the video with embedded quiz questions throughout. Contrary to the test scores, students’ perceptions did not identify any differences, however students’ qualitative comments showed overwhelming support for quizzes embedded throughout a video. Implications on professional practice and further research to build upon this study are discussed