Cooperative game theory and its application to natural, environmental, and water resource issues : 2. application to natural and environmental resources

This paper provides a review of various applications of cooperative game theory (CGT) to issues of natural and environmental resources. With an increase in the level of competition over environmental and natural resources, the incidents of disputes have been at the center of allocation agreements. The paper reviews the cases of common pool resources such as fisheries and forests, and cases of environmental pollution such as acid rain, flow, and stock pollution. In addition to providing examples of cooperative solutions to allocation problems, the conclusion from this review suggests that cooperation over scarce environmental and natural resources is possible under a variety of physical conditions and institutional arrangements. CGT applications to international fishery disputes are especially useful in that they have been making headway in policy-related agreements among states and regions of the world. Forest applications are more local in nature, but of great relevance in solving disputes among communities and various levels of governments.Environmental Economics&Policies,Fisheries&Aquaculture,Common Property Resource Development,Economic Theory&Research,Ecosystems and Natural Habitats

Cooperative game theory and its application to natural, environmental, and water resource issues : 3. application to water resources

This paper reviews various applications of cooperative game theory (CGT) to issues of water resources. With an increase in the competition over various water resources, the incidents of disputes have been in the center of allocation agreements. The paper reviews the cases of various water uses, such as multi-objective water projects, irrigation, groundwater, hydropower, urban water supply, wastewater, and transboundary water disputes. In addition to providing examples of cooperative solutions to allocation problems, the conclusion from this review suggests that cooperation over scarce water resources is possible under a variety of physical conditions and institutional arrangements. In particular, the various approaches for cost sharing and for allocation of physical water infrastructure and flow can serve as a basis for stable and efficient agreement, such that long-term investments in water projects are profitable and sustainable. The latter point is especially important, given recent developments in water policy in various countries and regional institutions such as the European Union (Water Framework Directive), calling for full cost recovery of investments and operation and maintenance in water projects. The CGT approaches discussed and demonstrated in this paper can provide a solid basis for finding possible and stable cost-sharing arrangements.Town Water Supply and Sanitation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions,Water Supply and Systems,Water and Industry

Electronic mechanism of ion expulsion under UV nanosecond laser excitation of silicon: Experiment and modeling

We present experimental and modeling studies of UV nanosecond pulsed laser desorption and ablation of (111) bulk silicon. The results involve a new approach to the analysis of plume formation dynamics under high-energy photon irradiation of the semiconductor surface. Non-thermal, photo-induced desorption has been observed at low laser fluence, well below the melting threshold. Under ablation conditions, the non-thermal ions have also a high concentration. The origin of these ions is discussed on the basis of electronic excitation of Si surface states associated with the Coulomb explosion mechanism. We present a model describing dynamics of silicon target excitation, heating and harge-carrier transport

TO NEGOTIATE OR TO GAME THEORIZE: Negotiation vs. Game Theory Outcomes for Water Allocation Problems in the Kat Basin, South Africa

The 6th MEETING ON GAME THEORY AND PRACTICE Zaragoza, Spain 10-12 July 2006Negotiation, Role-playing game, Core, Nucleolus, Shapley value, Water allocation, Economic efficiency, Planning models, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy, C61, C71, C78, Q25, Q56, R14,