From a guaranteed Labour Makret to the « Flexible Worker » Model? The Transformation of Italian Unemployment Policy in the ‘90s

The Italian welfare state has often been described as a clear example of the Continentalwelfare state regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990 and 1999 and Pierson, 2001) and also, adoptingother conceptual lenses, an important member of the Southern European welfare state family(Ferrera, 1996). From the end of World War II, the institutions and policies adopted in Italyhave been clearly marked on the one hand by the predominance of a male bread-winnerlabour market model and on the other by the strong protection of workers (insiders) and weak(if existent) protection of the so called ‘outsiders’. The article is particularly focused on labour market regulation in Italy, trying to emphasise some key quantitative elements regarding the employment and unemployment dataover the years (§ 1), then the basic traits of the evolution of Italian labour market will bepresented (§ 2), the endogenous and exogenous pressures for change and the dynamics ofinstitutional change (§ 3) will be explored, whereas a discussion on the possible newinstitutional configuration with particular reference to a new Law (the so called Biagi2 Law,that might introduce further elements of change) will follow (§ 4). Some final remarks (§ 5)regarding the current debates in Italy will conclude the presentation of the Italian case.Italy; Europeanization; unemployment; employment policy; social policy

The end of social Europe? Understanding EU social policy change

The financial and economic crisis has increased attention on EU social policy, yet little policy change has been realized. Drawing on Easton’s political system approach, we differentiate demand emanating from the difficult situation following the crisis and support in form of the 2004, 2009 and 2014 European elections. On the output side, we show how social policy has been substantially removed from the priorities of the EU political agenda already prior to the crisis. We argue that it is the contrast between crisis-generated demand and a more long-term lack of policy support that empowered actors interested in deepening economic integration and austerity policies. We present new empirical data that shows how partisan and governmental preferences are channelled through the EU institutions and how thus, changing ideological composition of the Commission as agenda-setter and an asymmetrical intergovenmentalist turn, have been a key driver for the substantial decline of EU social policy provision

Voting in Corporate Boards with Heterogeneous Preferences

We analyze the voting behavior of a board of directors that has to approve (or reject) an investment proposal with uncertain return. We consider three types of directors: insiders, who are biased toward acceptance of the project, independent outsiders who want to maximize the firm's profit and independent outsiders who care about their reputation. We show that the presence of members with heterogeneous preferences can be beneficial and that the partisan behavior of insiders can be used as a sort of coordinating device by uninformed outsiders. Provided that the size of the board is optimal, there is no gain from increasing the number of outsiders above the strict majority despite the fact that each outsider is informed with positive probability. Substituting profit-maximizing directors with directors concerned about their reputation is not an obstacle to profit maximization provided that an appropriate sequential voting protocol is followed. We also show that a proper board composition makes communication between directors irrelevant in the sense that the same outcome is obtained with and without communication. Finally, as information is costly, our model provides some suggestions on the optimal size of boards.Board of directors, Voting, Corporate Governance

Voting in Small Committees

A small committee has to approve/reject a project with uncertain return. Members have different preferences: some are value-maximizers, others are biased towards approval. We focus on the efficient use of scarce information when communication is not guaranteed, and we provide insights on the optimal committee composition. We show that the presence of biased members can improve the voting outcome by simplifying the strategies of unbiased members. Thus, heterogeneous committees perform at least as well as homogeneous committees. In particular, when value-maximizers outnumber biased members by one vote, the optimal equilibrium becomes unique. Finally, allowing members to communicate brings no improvement.voting, small committees, committees composition, communication in committees

Voting in Small Committees

We analyze the voting behavior of a small committee that has to approve or reject a proposal whose return is uncertain. Members have heterogenous preferences: some members want to maximize the expected value while other members have a bias toward project approval and ignore their private information. We analyze different voting games when information is costless and communication is not possible, and we provide insights on the optimal composition of these committees. Our main result is that the presence of biased members can improve the voting outcome by simplifying the strategies of unbiased members. Thus, committees with heterogeneous members can function at least as well as homogeneous committees and in some cases they perform better. In particular, when value-maximizing members hold 51% of votes, the socially optimal equilibrium becomes unique.Voting, Small committees.

Mapping Different Worlds of Eco-Welfare States

Attention towards topics such as environmental pollution, climate change, or biodiversity has strongly increased in the last years. The struggles to balance market powers and ecological sustainability somehow evoke memories of the early days of European welfare states, when social protection emerged as a means to prevent industrial capitalism from disruptive social tensions due to excessive social inequalities. In fact, social and environmental crises are inseparably intertwined, as ecological destruction is likely to be followed by social deprivation, and a lack of social security can be a crucial barrier for ecologically sustainable action. Our paper seeks to provide a step towards such an integrated perspective by studying problem pressure and public interventions in the area of green welfare, that is, in social and environmental protection. By using available data from Eurostat and Environmental Performance Index (EPI) databases, we contrast environmental and social performances to detect links between the social and the ecological dimension in these areas and unearth different configurations of green welfare among European countries. Our findings suggest that there are different "worlds of eco-welfare states" which only partially overlap with the more conventional "world of welfare states" but show how the Nordic countries are in the relatively-better performing cluster