



UNIVERSITÀ
DEGLI STUDI
DI PADOVA

Università degli Studi di Padova

Padua Research Archive - Institutional Repository

Europeanization and Social Movements: The Case of the Stop-TTIP Campaign

Original Citation:

Availability:

This version is available at: 11577/3258688 since: 2018-02-20T14:04:45Z

Publisher:

Published version:

DOI:

Terms of use:

Open Access

This article is made available under terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Guidelines, as described at <http://www.unipd.it/download/file/fid/55401> (Italian only)

(Article begins on next page)

Europeanisation and Social Movements: The Case of the Stop TTIP Campaign

Manuela Caiani & Paolo Graziano

“(...) We want to prevent employment, social, environmental, privacy and consumer standards from being lowered and public services (such as water) and cultural assets from being deregulated in non-transparent negotiations. The ECI supports an alternative trade and investment policy in the EU”.

(lawsuit of the Stop TTIP coalition, <https://stop-ttip.org/lawsuit-ecj/>)

Introduction

Since 2013, the TTIP (Transatlantic Trade Investment Partnership) agreement has been one of the most controversial policies discussed at the EU level (Morin et al. 2015). Formally, the negotiations-aimed at facilitating trade between the US and the EU started in July 2013 after a two-year period when a “the EU Trade Commissioner and the US Trade Representative looked into the various initiatives that could benefit job creation, economic growth, international competitiveness and the development of high international standards in various areas” (European Commission 2016: 1). Since 2014, the Stop TTIP coalition – a movement of more than 500 European organisations– has become increasingly vocal and has organised a petition aimed at blocking the negotiations conducted by the European Commission and the EU member states via the European Council. Over 3, 2 million signatures have been collected for a European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI)¹. Although the petition was rejected by the Commission (in Sept. 2014) as falling outside the scope of the ECI Regulation, the Stop TTIP coalition continued to collect signatures and initiated a lawsuit submitted to the European Court of Justice. The TTIP agreement is considered by the Stop TTIP coalition to “pose a threat to democracy, the rule of law, the environment, health, public services as well as consumer and labour rights” (<https://stop-ttip.org/>). Furthermore, between 2014-2016, together with the Stop TTIP coalition several other organisations have mobilised against the TTIP conducting a number of initiatives both at the national and EU level in order to influence European institutions (e.g. the EP). For example, in May 2016 Greenpeace Netherlands unveiled a number of documents connected to TTIP (www.ttip-leaks.org), generating a strong reaction also on the side of EU governments. Currently, the TTIP has come to a dead end (the ECJ ruling was issued on May 2017, with a verdict favourable to the protesters), mostly due to the multilevel campaign orchestrated by the Stop TTIP campaigning, as we shall illustrate in this contribution.

We consider TTIP as a very promising case study to analyse *social movements’ Europeanisation* - that is, their capacity to mobilise referring to European issues, targets, and identities. From a research standpoint, although since the mid of 1990s valuable contributions on the Europeanisation of social

movements have already been produced (e.g. among others della Porta & Caiani 2009; Imig & Tarrow 2000; Marks and McAdam 1996; Koopmans & Statham 2010; Rucht 2002; Tarrow 1994), finding moderate numbers of europeanised protests and actors, however, they are quite outdated. More recent works – on global waves of contention (e.g. della Porta & Mattoni 2014; Kousis 2014) - tend to overlook specific processes of Europeanisation. Recent studies have been limited to austerity measures (Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015), whereas the TTIP has been studied more from a trade unions’ (Dierckx 2015; Leiren & Parks 2014) or an international relations perspective (Morin et al. 2015). However, over the past few years, the economic crisis has presumably increased the significance of the EU as one of the ‘key crisis actors’ for contention (Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015: 35). The TTIP, similarly to other recent European civil society campaigns such as ACTA and Bolkestein (della Porta & Parks 2015, 2016), allows us to provide an additional piece of empirical research to the question of the participation of citizens in European politics.

In this article we test the Europeanisation hypothesis according to which, due to increasing competencies at EU level, there should be an ‘upscaling’ of protest and that the EU should become a central target of collective action, as well as a significant level for mobilisation and focus for the creation of actors’ identities. TTIP seems to be a crucial test case since it concerns a policy area (foreign trade) which falls under the exclusive competence of the EU, and where – however – political opportunities for civil society actors are ‘closed’ (negotiations kept ‘secret’, discussed mainly within the European Council, and on a very technical issue, difficult to mobilise a large public, etc.; see Dierckx 2015). So *why* and *how* has this movement ‘Europeanised’?

Our analysis builds on an original comparative dataset that includes supranational actors (i.e. anti TTIP organisations at the EU level) and national actors from six EU countries (Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain, Great Britain and France). We use various sources to investigate the degree and forms of social movements’ Europeanisation (section 3). A protest event analysis and semi-structured interviews in Brussels with key representatives of the movements and policy makers have allowed us to observe the evolution of various indicators of the Europeanisation of social movement organisations against TTIP, linking them to opportunities (sec. 4) and resources (sec. 5). This, as stated in the conclusion (sec. 6) will not only disconfirm the traditional low representation of these types of actors in the current European politics, but will indicate instead strong signs of (differentiated) paths of Europeanisation from below. Not only the paths of Europeanisation vary from country to country, but they are also influenced by the interplay between the political opportunities at the EU and the domestic level.

Europeanisation and Social Movements: The Analytical Framework

In this study we investigate the *degree* and *forms* of *social movements Europeanisation*. We argue that Europeanisation occurs when movements *i.* develop European organisations and/or transnational contacts with groups in other countries (i.e. ‘European actors’); *ii.* contest authorities beyond the state (i.e. ‘European targets’); *iii.* mobilise around European issues and/or organise their protest with a European ‘scope’ (namely they give birth to ‘European events’, staged in Bruxelles or in more European countries simultaneously) (see also Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015). We adopt the concept of Europeanisation to refer not only to ‘the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance’ (Risse et al. 2001: 3), but also to the impacts of these structures at the domestic level in influencing the ways in which collective actors make their demands visible in the public spheres. With this regard, we address the ‘processual’ aspects of Europeanisation by analysing the reciprocal influences between European and national structures to indicate a research design that develops from “an analysis of the system of interactions (actors, resources, problems, etc.) at the domestic level”, and raises the question of “whether the EU affects this system of interaction and if so in what way” (Radaelli & Franchino 2004: 948; Saurugger 2006). We therefore study whether “Europeanisation from below” (e.g. della Porta & Caiani 2009) is taking place in response to top-down Europeanisation, as in the case of the TTIP.

Starting from the above cited scholarship (helpfully distinguishing between ‘non-Europeanised’ grass-roots collective action, which does not address EU issues at all, and various forms of Europeanised social movement actions), in this study in order to empirically investigate the *degree* of (anti TTIP) movements Europeanisation, we will look at ‘*how much*’ the following dimensions of SMOs’ collective action (actors, target, level of mobilisation), vary in terms of ‘scope’ (national vs. European)ⁱⁱ.

However, as it has been suggested (Ladrech 1994), while the reorientation of domestic organisational logics is a feature of Europeanisation, the homogenisation or harmonisation of domestic practices across Europe is not a realistic expectation. Instead, pre-existing domestic structures and internal developments are likely to have an important mediating effect. With this regard, in our study we also look at the ways through which this is done, notably by lookingⁱⁱⁱ at the *forms* of Europeanisation and their *repertoire of action* (i.e. consensual vs. conflictual). More specifically, if Europeanisation produces multi-level governance (Marks et al. 1996: 2014), then collective actions should adapt to intervening in and influencing the multiple territorial layers of decision-making (Mazey & Richardson 2002; Tilly 1978), by adapting their strategies in order not only to communicate with the various territorial levels of government but also to develop strategies of ‘crossed influence’. A typology of the different forms of Europeanisation of social movements mobilisation (Balme & Chabanet 2002; della Porta & Caiani 2009; Imig & Tarrow 2000, 2001) can be built by combining

the *territorial scope* of the protester with the *target*. In a fully *supranational polity*, all important claims should be made by European political parties, interest groups, social movements and other collective actors targeting the European institutions (*'supranationalisation'*). National mobilisations may, however, Europeanise as well. This could, for instance, occur when European actors exercise *transnational pressure* by intervening in national context, criticising national policies or propagating European integration. A third path to the Europeanisation of the collective action is *domestication*, where the EU or its policies are either the source or the indirect target of the protest by domestic actors but the direct target remains the nation state. *Domestication* can be considered as proof of the dominant position of the nation state, but also as a stimulus for innovations in the organisational structure and the frames of the protests. Finally, a form of *externalisation* is present if and when the mobilisations of national actors target the EU directly. We will analyse *'how'* Europeanisation of social movements develop using this typology.

Turning to the explanatory level, to analyse the *degree and forms* of Europeanisation of social movement organisations and NGOs against the TTIP, we refer to classical categories of social movement studies (e.g. Kitschelt 1986; Tarrow 1998). European integration has raised concerns about its effect on the distribution of power among different actors, and in particular the role of the civil society. Some scholars are optimistic, stressing the capacity of the traditional actors of democracies such as political parties, interest groups, etc., to adapt to the EU, organising at this level and taking advantage of it. On the other hand, scholars looking in particular at social movements and protest, have been more skeptical that actors equipped with scarce material resources (finance, professionalisation, etc.) may be able to build transnational organisations or stage mobilisations at the EU level, stressing that protest directly targeting the EU is scant (Giugni & Passy 2002; Imig 2004; Rucht 2002). Similar results also emerged from studies focusing on the European claim-making of civil society (Koopmans & Statham 2010). Moreover, works analysing more in depth the activities of social movement organisations around European institutions have emphasised that the structure of the EU interest groups is dominated by business organisations (Beyers 2002; Greenwood 2007; Saurugger 2006). Also, more recent analyses on the anti-austerity waves of protest in Europe have stressed the lack of transnational coordination, as well as the difficulty by the challengers in framing the mobilisation in European terms (e.g. Mathers 2016). Nevertheless, it has been observed that the degree of involvement of social movements in European politics varies by different dimensions of Europeanisation and by country (della Porta & Caiani 2009; for the cognitive dimension of social movements' Europeanisation and the role played in it by the mobilisation of expertise by strategic actors at the EU level, see Geddes & Guiraudon 2004; Monforte 2014); it has been particularly strong during European Council summits; and that they are willing to cooperate with, not dismantle, EU

institutions (della Porta & Parks 2015). Finally, it has been noted that above all organisations that adapt to the rules of the game toward the European institutions (namely to a consensual style, not protest) obtain some routine access to supranational organisations (see Rootes 2002).

Against this background, this article investigates more specific hypotheses regarding the interaction between the EU and social movements. Research on social movements, first of all, has related strategic choices to the available political opportunities (i.e. POS), namely the set of opportunities and constraints that are offered by the institutional structure of the political systems in which these groups operate (Kriesi 2004; Tarrow 1994). The concept refers to the degree of ‘closure/openness’ of a political system to the claims raised by the protesters (either in terms of long-lasting institutional features of a regime e.g. electoral system, degree of centralisation, and in terms of more ‘dynamics’ political opportunities, as the configuration of power between allies and opponents, etc.). To a certain extent, movement organisations adapt to the public decision-making structure, mobilising when and where access channels open up (Tarrow 1989; Tilly 1978). While ‘open’ opportunities encourage mobilisation, the lack (or the closing) of these opportunities often translates in scarce mobilisation or even the escalation of more disruptive actions (i.e. ‘curvilinear relation’). Beyond political opportunities, some scholars suggest to integrate the notion of ‘cultural and discursive opportunities’ (i.e. COS and DOS) which determine, in a country, what kind of ideas become visible for the public, resonate with public opinion and are held to be “legitimate” by the audience’ (Kriesi 2004: 72). In this respect, the opportunities for movements mobilisation can be characterised also in terms of more inclusive or exclusive cultural and discursive contexts vis-à-vis the challengers (e.g. the political culture and discourses on a specific topic of the elites, the way authorities manage collective action, etc.)^{iv}.

From this perspective, and referring to mobilisation against the TTIP, we can observe that the political and cultural/discursive opportunities available for the challengers are not so favourable (i.e. ‘open’) at the EU level (see table A in Appendix) and this may have a negative impact on their *degree of Europeanisation (Hyp. 1)*. In addition, focusing on action strategies (*i.e. forms of Europeanisation*), it has been observed that the policy style influences collective action form: European governance is more open to conventional lobbying than to contentious actions (Marks & McAdam 1999: 103-104; see also Tilly 1978; Saurugger 2006). With this regard, at the EU level we expect to find a more frequent use of insider strategies by (anti TTIP) social movements, conforming to the institutional preferences for dealing with ‘polite’ lobbyists rather than protest (*Hyp. 2*)^v. At the same time closed POS might lead to a radicalisation of protest.

Strategic choices, however, must also take into account the available resources (McCarthy & Zald 1996). The capacity to organise at the European level is linked to the characteristics of specific actors

and their capacity to mobilise material and symbolic resources (della Porta and Caiani 2009). The availability of material resources (e.g. size, degree of professionalisation, etc.) has been cited to explain the larger capacity of business interest groups to intervene at the EU level, whereas their absence has been considered as responsible for the weakness of public interest groups and social movements (such as environmentalists, etc.) in European politics (Balme & Chabanet 2002; Giugni & Passy 2002; Rootes 2002). If this holds true, we should expect (*Hyp. 3*) that those actors more equipped with organisational resources, as well as lobby-oriented (for example interest groups) will ‘Europeanise’ more (i.e. in terms of development of European organisations, target and actions) than informal, fragmented, and protest-oriented movement organisations. In this line, and according to what suggested by recent research on the Europeanisation of SMOs (e.g. see Geddes & Guiraudon 2004; Lahusen 2004; Monforte 2014), we could also assume to find differences in the (levels of) Europeanisation of different types of SMOs.

Beyond the above mentioned hypotheses, other considerations however would lead us to expect a more significant degree of Europeanisation of movements and contention. First, since the political opportunity approach stresses the need for social movements to address the territorial levels where decisions are taken (Tarrow 1989), we should expect attempts to develop multilevel strategies in order to reduce the costs of European protest campaigns (della Porta & Tarrow 2005). Referring to the concept of ‘multilevel opportunity structures’, which underlines the effectiveness for social movements of exploiting political opportunities at multiple territorial levels (della Porta, Kriesi & Rucht 2009, della Porta & Parks 2016; Parks 2015), we argue that although the EU political opportunities does not appear favourable for the TTIP challengers (see Tab. A in Appendix), we have to specify our hypotheses crossnationally. In particular, following the POS approach, and combining the context opportunities concerning the TTIP, at both the national and European level, we hypothesise that social movements would be more motivated to address the European level when they have less leverage at home (*Hyp. 1b*), in an attempt to trigger “boomerang” effects (Keck & Sikkink 1998). For example, concerning environmental non-governmental organisations in the UK, FR and DE, on the basis of a content analysis of news wires, Poloni-Staudinger (2008) stress that changes in domestic elite alliances and electoral cleavages help to explain why groups choose to target activity at the supranational level. When the domestic opportunity structure is closed, supranational activity becomes more likely (and, to the contrary, the opening of the domestic political opportunity structure decreases supranational activity among groups). More specifically, in our work, we can expect that in countries where the political and discursive opportunities for the challengers of the TTIP (for more details on our operationalisation of POS/DOS, see Table A in appendix) are unfavourable (i.e. ‘closed’), social movements would be more Europe-oriented, either in terms of *degree* (i.e. EU as

actor, level of mobilisation and target) *and paths* of Europeanisation (i.e. developing an externalisation of protest). Viceversa, in countries where they deal with a more ‘open’ context of opportunities (i.e. POS/DOS), they may tend to be more focussed domestically for their mobilisation (either in terms of *degree and paths* of Europeanisation, i.e. developing a domestication of European protest, targeting domestic institution and organising at the national level). As for the ‘discursive opportunities’ it has been demonstrated for instance that the discourse of national political elites exerts a strong influence on the mobilisation of collective actors, opening up or vice versa posing constraints to them (Koopmans & Statham 2010).

Second, as social movement scholars have observed (Tilly 1978), opportunities vary *across time*, therefore, opening up or closing during one campaign. Likewise, we hypothesise (*Hyp. 1c*) a growth/decrease of Europeanisation of (anti TTIP) social movements (in terms of target, actors and events) over time as the European institutional opportunities, common to our six countries, open or close over time. Finally, beyond material resources, cognitive resources (Geddes and Guiraudon 2004) and cultural traditions also play an important role in facilitating or hampering the development of transnational strategies. For instance, policy analysis studies underline that expertise is a decisive factor that favours the presence of civil society in the EU policy-making (Rodekamp 2013), and movement scholars have showed that social movements as “newer, resource-poor organisations that tend to reject conventional politics” easily develop transnational identities and actions (della Porta & Mosca 2009: 783). From this point of view, SMOs could be expected (*Hyp.3b*) to be more motivated to develop supranational networks, identities, and actions than, for instance, political parties or trade unions, which are traditionally more deeply rooted in the nation states (Marks & McAdam 1996; Larsson 2014). To be sure, also recent studies focusing on interest groups and the European system of governance (Beyers & Kerremans 2011) have found that the groups’ material resources explain at a lesser extent their access to the EU than their relations with domestic parties and overall domestic embeddedness. Also in our study we will pay a particular attention to the relational resources of the anti TTIP movement.

Methods and data

Two primary methods have been used for the empirical analysis. To measure the degree and paths (i.e. forms) of Europeanisation of the Stop-TTIP organisations, we have conducted a *protest event analysis* (PEA), between 2014 (when the issue became fully visible on the EU policy agenda) and May 2016 in six European countries and at the EU level for a total of 784 events coded. Following a long-standing tradition in social movements research (Tarrow 1989; Tilly 1978), and despite its limitations (McCarthy & Zald 1996; Mueller 1997), we used PEA since it is a technique of

quantitative content analysis that allows the quantification of many protest properties, such as frequency, timing and duration, location, claims, etc. (Koopmans & Rucht 2002). In our study, in order to retrieve relevant information on the the anti TTIP protest in Europe, we relied on a combination of sources: *i.* national quality newspapers scanned for relevant articles using keywords (e.g. ‘TTIP & protest’, ‘TTIP & mobilisation’, etc.) on the Lexis Nexis database^{vi}; *ii.* online information portals, as for example Euronews and Euroobserver; and *iii.* the ‘news sections’ of the Stop TTIP organisations’ websites in the six countries (namely, specific sections where ‘news’ from other newspapers or press agencies are reported) ^{vii}. We used a formalised codebook. Our unit of analysis (the ‘protest event’) consists of the following elements (variables for the coding): an actor who initiates the protest event; the form of action; the target at which the action is directed; an object actor whose interests are affected by the event; and finally the substantive content of the event, which states what is to be done (issue). In order to measure the level ‘Europeanisation’ of each of these dimensions we added the variable ‘scope’, ranging from local, to national, crossnational, and European/supranational (for ‘measurement’ details see the endnotes in section 4). Only the categories sovranational/EU have been considered measuring ‘Europeanised’ actors, events and targets.

Cautiously, and with many interpretative caveats, our protest events allow for controlling if not the ‘real’ amount and forms of the protest, at least the associations between specific characteristics of protest repertoires, as well as general trends. Furthermore, *triangulation with other sources* was used to improve our interpretation of the PEA data. Indeed, in a second part of the study, aware of the critiques to the ‘structuralist bias’ of the POS approaches (Diani & McAdam 2003), we have integrated the PEA with 12 semi-structured interviews with key representatives of movement organisations and policy makers (see Table B in Appendix). For the interviewees selection, we followed a positional method and the so called ‘snowball’ technique (Denzin & Lincoln 2011). Finally, an in-depth analysis of documents (policy reports, statistical databases, Eurobarometer) concerning the TTIP agreement and the mobilisation at EU and domestic level allowed us to reconstruct its (political and cultural) context. For further details about our methods see Table C in appendix.

As for the country *cases selection*, the first criterion was to compare those countries represented by the highest number of Stop TTIP campaign members (out of the total number of 522 organisations of the coalition), in order to have a ‘critical mass’ of protest events to analyse. Secondly, this set of countries was chosen because they provide for sufficient variation along the dimensions we considered potentially relevant for the European mobilisation (see table A in Appendix).

(Multilevel) Political Opportunities and Europeanisation

The mobilisation intensity around European issues

A first indicator of Europeanisation of social movements is their mobilisation intensity around European issues, i.e.: how much do SMOs take part in public debates and actions concerning European politics (as the TTIP)? First of all, our protest event data confirm that the Stop- TTIP mobilisation is a significant and increasing phenomenon in the period under analysis (Figure 1): 784 total TTIP-related actions initiated by movements, NGOs, interest groups and various actors have been identified (respectively 172 in Germany, 129 in Austria, 122 in Italy, 90 in Spain, 94 in France, 87 in the UK, and 90 at the European level). Secondly, considerable variations across the six countries can be observed, with stable or increasing levels of Stop TTIP mobilisation for the majority of our countries.

<Figure 1 about here>

Out of the 784 total protest events, 228 have been organised in 2014, 467 in 2015 and 89 within the first 4 months of 2016 (for an hypothetical total, according to a linear projection, of 270 events in 2016). The events conducted at the EU level have been: 32 in 2014 (14% of the annual total), 48 in 2015 (10%) and 10 in 2016 (11%) for a total of 83 events (11% of the codified cases). Overall, for all the countries, the peak of mobilisation on the TTIP has occurred between the second semester of 2014 and first of 2015, with some very small variations. More specifically, in Spain (but the same holds true for the EU level) the intensity of mobilisation remained stable over time, France is the only country where it decreases, in Germany, already very high at the beginning of our analysis the intensity of mobilisation against the TTIP sharply increased from 2014 to 2016, as well as in AT, UK and IT, although not linearly^{viii}. Besides the number of actions, an additional relevant aspect of the intensity of mobilisation is the number of participants. According to our protest event data, the size of events organised against the TTIP in the period of our analysis is high: 796.299 participants in the first semester of 2014; 1.331.069 in the second; 148.649 in the first six months of 2015 and 3.277.768 in the second; and 226.940 in the first 4 months of 2016. In all countries, half of the events (50%) involve a high number of participants (on median, 300), confirming that this European issue was highly ‘participated’ by civil society- also involving a wide range of actors (as illustrated in section 5).

The data on the intensity of mobilisation may be understood via the POS framework, when looking at the changing political opportunities at the EU level. Our findings appear to be in line with the apparent opening of the decision-making process, since the protest reached its peak (similarly in most of our countries) when it seemed that the European Parliament could have supported the positions of

the Stop-TTIP movement. Actually, in April 2014 the EP postponed the vote on the TTIP to July 2015, creating a ‘momentum’ for social movements’ hopes and mobilisation. This -as it has been noticed (see Bouza García & Villar 2012; Greenwood 2012)- set indeed a favourable ‘context’ for the protest, opening the (perception of) room for new players in Brussels, although the 2014 ECI was immediately rejected by the Commission. When in July 2015 the European Parliament passed a resolution substantially in favour of the agreement, the only possible opening of the opportunity structure at the EU level was definitively closed. However, after the end of 2015 the mobilisation of civil society against the TTIP continued, assuming more expressive (and cognitive) forms rather than protest, as exemplified by the words of ‘Friends of the Earth’ representative: “the European institutions became even more closed to our requests over time, and the ‘wikileaks’ simply showed how we were right in denouncing the lack of transparency which characterised the decision-making – although our concerns had not been previously considered. Even the European Parliament, within which initially we did have some supporters and potential allies, was not very open to our ideas” (Int. 9).

European actors, targets and events

A second step in assessing the degree of Europeanisation of the (anti TTIP) social movements, is to examine to what extent the collective actors who protests, their targets, and their events have a European scope^{ix} (Figure 2). These indicators allow us to investigate the ‘saliency’ of the integration process in the everyday life of citizens, i.e. whether the nation state remains the primary focus of their political action and identities, or, on the contrary, actors increasingly frame their protest within a European dimension.

<Figure 2 here>

When looking at *the scope of the protesters* against TTIP, in all countries, ‘European’ actors account for a moderate proportion of events (4.5% on average – from 3.9% of European claimants in Austria to 10% in Spain and in the United Kingdom, with Germany in between with 5.8%), a level that however rises to 7% if we add the cross-national actors initiating anti TTIP events, i.e. those mobilising simultaneously in two or more European countries). Indeed, overall, national actors are still the main initiators of TTIP protests (in, respectively, 72% and 20% of cases). Differently, looking at *scope of the target of protest*, in all countries, although national (and subnational) institutions are still important targets (in 37% of cases), the role of European ones is relevant, accounting for more than one third of events. In a cross-country perspective, this picture varies from 70% of European

targets in the Italian and Spanish anti TTIP protest, to 30% in France, to 15% and 8% in Germany and United Kingdom. The high proportion of European level targets of the TTIP mobilisation is particularly relevant, especially when compared to previous research (della Porta and Caiani 2007; Koopmans and Statham 2010). Finally, another important indicator of the Europeanisation of social movements is the *level of mobilisation* (i.e. scope of the event), which is in principle independent from the scope of the subject actor and /or target, referring instead to the the capacity of creating ‘European’ initiatives. In the protests of the countries under study, about 10% of all events are organised at the EU level, against 83% at the domestic level. Once again the European reference remains less important in the events organised by the German and British organisations, whereas it is more prominent in the Spanish and Italian case, with France in between.

Also the national differences in the (Europeanisation of) mobilisation against TTIP emerged from our data, can be partly explained by the POS at the domestic level. More specifically, the *Austrian* political and discursive opportunities seem to be particularly open for the TTIP challengers both at the institutional level (with Left parties and Unions supportive of them) and at non institutional level (with 70% of Austrians against the TTIP vs. an EU average of 32%). Furthermore, there is transparency and institutional discussions with respect to the TTIP: for example, the Head of the Austrian government spoke out against some parts of the agreement (i.e. the ISDS) and there are growing concerns across the parties in parliament, with Parliamentary appeals and TTIP presentation before the Parliament (22/2/2016). Finally, the protesters seem to have ‘allies’ among economic actors, with small and medium enterprises publicly taking position against TTIP (Austrian Stop-TTIP campaigning representative 15/07/2015).

Similarly, also in *Germany* the political opportunities for the Stop TTIP mobilisation appears as very open: the movement can rely on ‘allies in power’ (like the Social Democrats), as well on the support of the Unions (and other economic categories such as the small businesses^x), and of the main institutions (Government, Parliament, MEPs, Judiciary)^{xi}. As explained by the representative of one German organisation, “the opportunities were fairly open since several political parties’, interest groups and trade unions have been particularly receptive to the demands of the movements (Int. 3). Furthermore, also the media are increasingly critical against the TTIP and there is a huge and increasing societal (awareness and) consensus in the country against the agreement (59% of Germans, Eurobarometer 2015).

To the contrary, in the case of *France* the political opportunities configuration is not so clear since on the one hand – from a non institutional standpoint – the Socialist government has clearly spoken against TTIP more recently (3 May 2016), whereas on the other hand the local authorities have been supportive of the protest initiatives from the beginning. For example, on the party level, although the

French Socialists and several MEPs stand against TTIP, also the right-wing parties tried to capitalise on the discontent of the people using the ‘TTIP’ issue. Furthermore, according to the Stop-TTIP coordinator the [‘multilevel’] institutional opportunities for the protest have been ambivalent, with local authorities more open than the national government to the request of the protesters but clearly less powerful in terms of decision-making (Int. 2). At the societal level, in fact, the opportunities for the protest against TTIP seem moderately favourable, with only a 34% of French citizens against the agreement (Eurobarometer 2015).

In *Italy* and *Spain*, both the political and discursive opportunities to the anti TTIP protest appear more closed, as explained by the Italian representatives of the Stop-TTIP campaign: “the chances of being heard by the national institutions have always been very low. The only way to be considered is to mobilise widely at the European level” (Int. 5). In Italy, although like in other countries local authorities took action against the TTIP (several dozens of municipalities and some important Regions), the Government is one of the main supporters of TTIP negotiations in EU, as confirmed by several public statements of the Economic Minister (among others, *Il Fatto Quotidiano*, 30/05/2016). Moreover, trade unions have an unclear and divided position on the TTIP and only 26% of Italians are against the agreement (Eurobarometer 2015). According to the representatives of the movement in the country this is also due “to the ‘silence’ or misleading communication on the issue by the media” (Int. 1). Similarly, in *Spain*, the movement against TTIP had to face ‘closed’ opportunities structure, made of the majority of political parties (i.e. PP, PSOE, UPyD y CiU) that have approved the treaty (e.g. the vote of the PSOE on it in May 2015) and a scarce information on the topic by traditional media. Also the public opinion support of the movement is moderate (with the ECI signatures quorum only at 17% in the country), and only 20% of the Spanish against the agreement (Eurobarometer 2015). According to the Spanish Stop-TTIP representatives (document 15/07/2015), this was also due “to the complicity of mass media that have not provided to citizens an accurate information on the topic” (p.13).

Finally, in *the United Kingdom* the political and (especially) discursive opportunities are slightly open for the movement. This is due to a configuration of power that sees: the independentist parties (e.g. the Scottish National party) as well as the national opposition and local authorities mobilising against the TTIP, and, more in general, a significant debate around the topic and information kept alive by several government committees and reports. Also the societal awareness is high (although surprisingly only 23% of population is against the TTIP, Eurobarometer 2015), with artists, celebrities and intellectuals taking openly critical positions against the agreement.

To summarise our assessment of the political and discursive opportunities considered together in the six countries (see Table A in Appendix for further operationalisation details): (a) Germany, ‘very

open'; (b) Austria, 'open'; (c) France and United Kingdom, 'slightly open'; (d) Italy and Spain, 'closed'.

In line with our research hypotheses concerning the multilevel nature of political opportunities, the crossnational analysis reveals that the Europeanisation of social movements is influenced by the general political and discursive opportunities in their own country. They tend to 'Europeanise' more (especially in terms of EU targets and events), where the domestic opportunities are closed, whereas in those countries, like Austria, Germany and, partly the UK, where the political and discursive opportunities are opener vis-à-vis the challengers, they 'Europeanise' to a lesser extent (see for confirmation Int. 3). In fact, the most numerous and bigger events are in countries characterised with an open opportunity structure (Austria and Germany), whereas in the others – characterised by more unfavourable political and discursive opportunities – the protest events are less numerous. The Italian exception, as a country where we found high levels of TTIP mobilisation in spite of an unfavourable political and societal context, can be explained by the interplay between the national and the EU context: the following section will address this aspect.

Time: The enduring Europeanisation from below

Regarding diacronichal trends (figure not showed), our data point to an enduring adaptation among non-institutional actors to the shift in competences to the supranational level. The presence of European level targets, actors and events of anti the TTIP social movements has indeed been increasing, although not in a linear fashion, over the years. In particular, EU targets and EU events tend to increase across time. In particular, events with an EU scope double, from 14% in 2014 to 38% in 2015 (and 18% in the first 4 months of 2016). Events with EU targets remain stable, from a very high 43% at the beginning of 2014 to the 40% in the first 4 months of 2016. Although the mobilisation by 'European' movements, very high at the beginning of the campaign (28% of cases in the first semester of 2014), tends to decrease towards the end of the period analysed, events organised by 'crossnational' movement actors (which can be interpreted as an intermediate category of 'horizontal' Europeanisation), initially absent, increases reaching 5% in 2016.

Forms of Europeanisation

This growing 'Europeanisation from below' follows however a peculiar pattern. Applying our typology of forms of Europeanisation to our data (Table 2)^{xii}, we observe that, overall, the Europeanisation of protest mainly assumes the forms of *domestication* (55.3%)^{xiii}, followed by *externalisation* (27.2%), where national actors exert pressure on European targets to have more

leverage at home, in a context that they perceive as ‘closed’ to their requests. *Supranational* dynamics are also relevant (14.9%), but *transnational pressure* applies only to 2.6% of cases^{xiv}.

<Table 1 here>

However, a comparison across countries points to important differences in the forms of Europeanisation: Italy and Spain are characterised by *externalisation* (in 73.8% and 69% of cases respectively) – as it is more typical of ‘closed’ context (see also Keck & Sicking 1998). Austria, Germany and the UK show instead primarily forms of *domestication* (89%, 84% and 79.5% respectively), which could be linked to weakness but also to a strategic choice within a political domestic context which is perceived as ‘open’ by civil society (for the Austrian case, see TTIP coalition document 15/07/2015). As far as *supranationalisation* is concerned, with EU actors which target directly EU institutions, we see it particularly present in events in Spain and France (in 7-9% of cases), whereas forms of Europeanisation via *transnational pressure* are more frequent in France (5.5%) and the UK (6.9%). In sum, the role of the interplay between the domestic and European opportunities in shaping collective mobilisation is confirmed when looking at the different paths of Europeanisation: *Externalisation*, is mainly present in those countries (as IT and ES) where the national context is closed. On the contrary, in those countries where the ‘opportunities’ are more open and the national institutions are considered a more trustable ‘connection’ to Brussels (as in AT, the UK and DE), *domestication* is the preferred form of Europeanisation.

Consensual or Conflictual Europeanisation?

Beyond end of ‘permissive consensus’ towards Europe, more recently scholars talk about a “constraining dissensus” (Hooghe & Marks 2009: 39) referring to a politicisation of the process of integration increasingly critical. Therefore, another relevant dimension to investigate in terms of *forms of Europeanisation* of movements is the degree of conflict in the process of Europeanisation. That is, do anti TTIP social movements moderate their repertoire of action when they address the European level?

According to our data, movement organisations tend to use mainly *demonstrative* (i.e. protest) actions (in about 50% of events) and, secondly, *conventional* actions (contacting/lobbying, consultation/cooperation, action toward courts, etc. in 20.9% of cases)^{xv}. 12% of the events take the form of *media-related actions*, and 7% are *online* actions (such as publications of online articles, petitions, donations). 9% of the events are *expressive* actions aimed at activating citizens on the TTIP issue with cultural and symbolic events such “rising social awareness with conference talks, lectures,

training sessions, articles, radio and TV programs” (Spanish Stop-TTIP representative, Stop-TTIP Coalition document, 15/07/2015)^{xvi}. Finally, only 1% of the events are *confrontational* actions. However, when looking at how the action strategies change at the EU level (namely either the protester or the event have an ‘European’ scope - Figure 3)^{xvii}, we see that, as hypothesised, the EU decision making style seems to influence the repertoire: the TTIP social movement tends to use strategies traditionally considered as common to interest groups, namely lobbying instead of protest.

<Figure 3 here>

More specifically, on the one hand, *conventional* actions (i.e. lobbying) increase to one third (31.2%) when the mobilisation occurs at the EU level, becoming the most important form of action^{xviii}; on the other hand, *demonstrative* actions (i.e. protest) sharply decrease to 25%. Indeed, as underlined by the representatives of the Stop-TTIP movements in Germany, their main strategy is “taking to the streets - showing that it's not clicks, but real people behind big numbers” (Stop-TTIP Coalition document 15/07/2015)^{xix}. Differently from other research findings (e.g. della Porta & Caiani 2009), *media-related* actions are not very frequent at the EU level (6.5%), whereas online activities are (22%)^{xx}. Surprisingly, *confrontational* actions are used more at the EU than at the national level (around 6% vs. 0.2% of cases), confirming that with ‘closed’ opportunities, mobilisation is more difficult, but when it occurs it is more radical (curvilinear relationship).

These findings on the moderation of the action repertoire at the EU level may be better interpreted by turning to the qualitative data of our interviews. Indeed, several civil society organisations stress that they mainly use knowledge and spreading out of information (i.e. mobilise cognitive resources, in our terms) at the European level, whereas political resources (as citizens’ direct mobilisation) are used mainly at the national level (Int. 1, 3, 7, 10). In fact, the various anti TTIP actors interviewed are fully aware of the multilevel nature of the campaign, as explained for example by the representative of the EU level organisation ‘Transport & Environment’ who notes that her group was “responsible for the organisation of lobbying at the EU level, whereas the affiliated national organisations organise protest events and marches at the national or even subnational level on their own” (Int. 8). Similarly, also the BEUC representative explains that the type of work done in Brussels “is mainly lobbying, whereas other forms of action are left to national or local organisations” (Int. 6) and the ‘Friends of the Earth’ group not only stresses a division of labour between the national and the EU level, but also emphasises the more favourable context for protest at the domestic one: “at the

national level we leave the job to other members of the Stop TTIP coalition and to our national sister organisations [whose] work is more effective, due to mass support. In Brussels we focus more on the diffusion of information [...] relationships with EP members” (Int. 9).

Organisational Characteristics and Europeanisation

Do SMOs and collective actors richer in resources have greater access to the EU level? The hypothesis according to which Europeanisation is facilitated by the availability of organisational resources (material and symbolic) is here tested by comparing the mobilisation of different types of actors mobilising in the anti TTIP campaign. Beyond similar political opportunities, we see from our data that the Europeanisation of the different types of groups that compose the anti –TTIP movement varies. First of all (data not showed in figure, available upon authors request), with regard to the *intensity of the mobilisation*, the prominent actor is represented by the stop-TTIP coalition as a whole (mobilising in 46% of all cases). Political parties and environmentalist groups come second (accounting both for 10% of protest events). Trade Unions follow (5.7%), together with civil right movements, economic groups (e.g. farmers) and think tanks. More specifically (Figure 4), when looking at the development of European actors (namely at the *scope of the actor* who initiates the protest as European), political parties and movement organisations belonging to the previous Global Justice Movement (GJM) account for a large proportion (20-30%). We find very few Unions organised at the EU level, as well as think tanks and economic interest groups (8-9%), whereas environmental and consumerist movements, as well as the TTIP coalition as a ‘whole’, stay in a median position (with 13-15% of events by EU level actors belonging to these categories).

<Figure 4 here>

In terms of *Europeanisation as level of mobilisation* (i.e. EU scope of the event), similarly political parties and groups belonging to the GJM movement stand out (accounting both for about 25-27% of cases). They are followed by environmental organisations and by the Stop-TTIP coalition as a ‘whole’ (which initiates events with a ‘EU scope’ in 19% of cases). All the other actors, trade unions included, are well below these figures. Finally, when looking at events addressing *EU targets*: trade unions, together with the Stop-TTIP as a whole, as well as political parties, are prominent (having EU targets in 42-52% of their cases). They are followed by environmentalists and GJM groups (with respectively

27% and 37% of EU target events). Third, we find think tanks and other professional-economic categories (addressing EU institutions in 14-15% of cases).

To conclude, our findings show that: (a) not only – as expected – traditionally stronger organisations, like political parties, ‘Europeanise’, but also actors less endorsed with material resources (as the GJM) do, at least in terms of European targets; (b) if there are still some thresholds for weaker organisations to mobilise on European politics (as the modest results of SMOs on all three dimensions of Europeanisation demonstrate), *relational resources* matter for European mobilisation. In fact, when the movements mobilise as a coalition (‘TTIP coalition as a whole’), they perform ‘better’ in terms of Europeanisation (on all the indicators), evidently compensating for the lack of material resources^{xxi}. This finding is reinforced by the data of Table 1 about the *different paths* of Europeanisation of the mobilisation, that shows that domestication is more significant for social movements (and interest groups) (in 67% of cases vs. 59%-45% of all other actors). However, when SMOs act as ‘coalition’ *externalisation* is more frequent (in 40% of cases vs. 20% for political parties, 23% for interest groups and 12% for social movements acting alone)^{xxii}. Also (c), our findings on the strong European activism of the JGM suggest the importance of the heritage of previous protest resources that, as noted by scholars, can be ‘eventful’ (Jasper et al. 2011), namely providing collective actors with identities, overlapping membership and networks useful for the action.

Furthermore, social movements and NGOs, beyond the national coordination, have started to build transnational ties and coordinating bodies: our data (Figure 5) indicate that SMOs and NGOs share a tendency to coordinate their actions transnationally and to address (thanks to these networks) European institutions^{xxiii}. With reference to the total events (N=784), in 54.7% of them the actors mobilise on their own, in 32.4% with another national actor and in 12.9% in coordination with an actor from another country (i.e. crossnational) or international (e.g. an international federation). Most importantly, we see that the more supranationally ‘networked’, the more the anti TTIP social movements ‘Europeanise’, namely they are able to organise events with an EU scope or to address the European institutions.

<Figure 5 here>

In fact, from the interviews it emerges that a multilevel structure is present in several SMOs: “activating unexpected allies” is the strategy underlined by the representatives of the TTIP protest in Germany (TTIP Coalition document 15/07/2015); also, as explained by the French representative of

the Stop-TTIP campaign, “we have tried to work also at the EU level but we usually do it together with the other Stop TTIP campaign representatives” (Int. 2). Similarly the representative of the European coordination unit stresses that “[...] the bulk of the organisation has been done coordinating domestic effort” (Int. 3) and another European NGO representative states that their main activity during the Stop-TTIP campaign has been their involvement “in an institutional setting, the TTIP Advisory Body [a coordination body] which allowed us to express our concerns vis-à-vis EU institutions” (Int. 6)^{xxiv}.

Put more broadly, our data confirm that European campaigns tend to consolidate European networks of activists (della Porta et al. 2009). This relevant degree of transnational embeddedness might be related to the weak institutionalisation of supranational movement actors, which pushes national movement organisations to be directly involved in multilevel pressures. In sum, coordinating, either at the national and the European level, does matter for the Europeanisation of collective action.

Conclusion

European integration multiplies both restrictions and opportunities for social movements, serving as an impetus to increase their range of intervention in order to overcome the former and exploit the latter. However, the question remains: Is the EU (as well as other supranational institutions) accountable to pressures from below? In this study we have addressed this question, by looking at the Europeanisation of movements and NGOs mobilising against the TTIP. We can summarise our findings as follows.

Firstly, our data show that the POS still matter and it documents a strong SMOs *adaptation in terms of multilevel governance*: The Stop-TTIP movement is playing a ‘double-level’ game (Putnam 1988) since EU institutions are a growing target, together with national governments. Compared to the mentioned previous studies on Europeanisation of political mobilisation, which found a certain general degree of Europeanisation (della Porta & Caiani 2009; Koopmans & Statham 2010; Seidendorf 2003) which were accompanied by some caveats, our data indicate that, at least when looking at the protest campaign against TTIP, there is a *significant* degree of Europeanisation of social movement actors in terms of: *i.* intensity of mobilisation around a genuine European(ised) and even technical policy; *ii.* development of European actors (through the transnational networking of domestic organisations); *iii.* level of mobilisation and repertoire of action (fully adapted to multilevel governance). The *Europeanisation of social movements is not a limited phenomenon* (for similar recent findings see also, Balme and Chabanet 2008; Monforte 2014; Ruzza 2014; Uba and Ugglia 2011).

Secondly, we found that this process has specific characteristics. In our study we find *differential Europeanisation*, which can be better understood by taking into account the *multilevel opportunity structure* exploited by the movement. With this regard, our work adds another piece of empirical research to support the intuition of those social movement scholars aware of the importance of the national context, and the necessity to take into account the multilevel opportunity structure in the analysis of (Europeanised) social movements, which act as “rooted cosmopolitans” (Tarrow 2005). Indeed, in line with the POS hypothesis, the political opportunities of the TTIP policy-making at the EU level influence the Europeanisation of social movements (higher when the opportunities are perceived as open, lower when they are closed); however, there is a great variation across countries on this respect, which can only be explained by the interplay of the EU and national political opportunities together. Our data stress that social movements ‘Europeanise’ more (especially in terms of targets and level of the mobilisation) when the opportunities are ‘closed’ at the national level (i.e. Italy and Spain), whereas in the other countries (mostly Austria, Germany, but also France and United Kingdom) with a more favourable context, the main targets and scope of the mobilisation are domestic. With this respect, the specific multilevel opportunities configuration influences also the paths of ‘Europeanisation’ of collective actors which tend to recur to *externalisation* when they do not have much leverage at home (as in the cases of closed political opportunities in Italy and Spain), whereas *domestication* is the most frequent path for movements facing a more open context of national opportunities (Austria, Germany, France and the United Kingdom). Also research in IR has pointed at the recent increase in the externalisation of protest toward international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), as the main strategy of transnationalisation of civil society groups when states censor or repress them (see among others della Porta & Parks 2015). More empirical and comparative studies are needed -on different policy issues and types of movements- to further elaborate hypotheses on the link between the two (or more) levels. More specifically, while literature on political opportunity in the European Union properly is generally rare (della Porta & Parks 2015), our study is theoretically in line with those scholars stressing that adaptation to the EU level is crucial (della Porta et al. 2009; Lahusen 1999: 202), and it offers an empirical contribution to the research stressing that *a variable model of political opportunity structure* is preferable in order to account for interacting opportunities at multiple levels (Bieler 2005; della Porta & Caianni 2007; Lahusen 2004; Sikkink 2005).

Thirdly, in line with our hypothesis according to which the decision making style influences the strategies of action (e.g. Marks & McAdam 1999; Tilly 1978), we find *more lobbying than protest at the EU level* also with respect social movements^{xxv}. In fact, as expected, we find that, overall, conventional actions are more frequent at the EU level, whereas demonstrative strategies are more

used at the national and local level. This finding would also, indirectly, support those who consider that professionalisation of the NGOs at the EU level has the potential to improve representativeness (Saurugger 2006). Also, it must be noted how online actions are becoming increasingly relevant in terms of repertoire of action at the EU level, as an effect presumably of the enlargement of citizens' repertoire of political participation and of growing interest in transnational issues (della Porta et al. 2009).

Finally, in line with recent literature comparing the Europeanisation of different types of SMOs, in this article we argue that, beyond material, also *relational resources* play an important role in the transnationalisation of civil society organisations (see also Monforte 2014; Ruzza 2004). More specifically, we showed that *not only economic resource-rich organisations* (such as political parties or unions) are capable of targeting EU institutions and staging EU protests, but also social movement organisations, especially when they coordinate their action^{xxvi}. By exploiting networks, movements can increase their effectiveness in multilevel arenas through resource and knowledge exchange with other movements and IGOs (Rucht 2004). In this, our findings emphasise the role of cognitive resources (such as the building of new collective identities through framing, the mobilisation of expertise, etc., Geddes & Guiraudon 2004; Lahusen 2004; Monforte 2014) to access EU institutions. In sum, Europeanisation 'from below' is increasingly becoming a reality: The European public space is fully acknowledged as a relevant one, not substituting the national level but complementing it. From our research (as in ACTA, see Parks 2015), it seems that SMOs have definitively come of age in their multilevel capacities, and – if not adequately considered – they may possibly soon be an increasing challenge to EU institutions in other policy areas.

References

- Balme, R. & Chabanet, D. (2002). Introduction. Action collective et gouvernance de l'Union Européenne. In R. Balme, D. Chabanet, & V. Wright (eds), *L'action collective en Europe*. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
- Balme, R. & Chabanet, D. (2008). *European Governance and Democracy: Power and Protest in the EU*. Lanham (Md.): Rowman & Littlefield.
- Beyers, J. (2002). Gaining and Seeking Access: The European Adaptation of Domestic Interest Associations. *European Journal of Political Research* 41(5): 585–612.
- Beyers, J. & Kerremans, B. (2011). Domestic Embeddedness and the Dynamics of Multilevel Venue Shopping in Four EU Member States. *Governance* 25(2): 263–290.

- Bieler, A. (2005). European Integration and the Transnational Restructuring of Social Relations: The Emergence of Labour as a Regional Actor?. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 43(3): 461–484.
- Bourne, A. & Chatzopoulou, S. (2015). Social movements and the construction of crisis actors: Collective responsibility, Identity and Governance. *International Journal of Public Administration* 38(12): 874–883.
- Bouza Garcia, L. & Del Rio Villar, S. (2012). The ECI as a Democratic Innovation. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 13(3): 312-324.
- Chabanet, D. (2002). Les marches européennes contre le chômage, la précarité et les exclusions. In R. Balme, D. Chabanet, & V. Wright (eds), *L'action collective en Europe*. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
- della Porta, D. & Caiani, M. (2007). Europeanisation from Below? Social Movements and Europe. *Mobilization* 12(1): 1-20.
- della Porta, D. & Caiani, M. (2009). *Social Movements and Europeanisation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- della Porta, D. & Mattoni, A. (2014). Patterns of diffusion and the transnational dimension of protest in the movements of the crisis: An introduction. In della Porta, D. and Mattoni, A. (eds) *Spreading protests: Social movements in times of crisis*. Colchester: ECPR Press.
- della Porta, D. & Mosca, L. (2009). Searching the net: Web sites' qualities in the global justice movement. *Information, Communication & Society* 12(6): 771-792.
- della Porta, D. & Parks, L. (2015). Europeanisation and social movements: before and after the great recession. In Börner, S. & M. Eig Müller (eds) *European integration, processes of change and the national experience*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- della Porta, D. & Parks, L. (2016). Social movements, the European crisis, and EU political opportunities. *Comparative European Politics* 15(64): 1-18.
- della Porta, D. & Tarrow, S. (eds) (2005). *Transnational Movements and Global Activism*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- della Porta, D., Kriesi, H. & Rucht, D. (2009). Social Movements in a Globalizing World: An Introduction. In D. della Porta, H. Kriesi & D. Rucht (eds) *Social Movements in a Globalizing World*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Denzin, N. K. & Lincoln, Y.N. (eds) (2011). *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*. London: Sage.
- Diani, M. & McAdam, D. (2003). *Social movements and networks: Relational approaches to collective action*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Dierckx, S. (2015). European unions and the repoliticization of transnational capital: labor's stance regarding the FTT, The TTIP, and the CETA. *Labor History*, 56(3): 327-344.
- European Commission (2015). *Media use in the European Union*. Standard Eurobarometer 84.
- European Commission (2016). *The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)- Stay of Play*.
- Geddes, A. & Guiraudon, V. (2004). The emergence of a European Union policy paradigm amidst contrasting national models: Britain, France and EU anti-discrimination policy, *West European Politics* 27(2): 334–353.
- Giugni, M. & Passy, F. (2002). Le champ politique de l'immigration en Europe: Opportunités, mobilisations et héritage de l'Etat national. In R. Balme, D. Chabanet, & V. Wright (eds), *L'action collective en Europe*. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
- Greenwood, J. (2007). *Interest Representation in the European Union*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Greenwood, J. (2012). The European Citizens' Initiative and EU Civil Society Organisations. *Perspectives on European Politics & Society* 13 (3): 325-336.
- Hooghe, L. & Marks, G. (2009). A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus. *British Journal of Political Science* 39(1): 1-23.
- Imig, D. & S. Tarrow (eds) (2001). *Contentious Europeans. Protest and Politics in an Emerging Polity*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
- Imig, D. & Tarrow S. (2000). Political contention in a Europeanising polity. *West European Politics* 23(4): 73-93.
- Imig, D. (2004). Contestation in the Streets: European Protest and the Emerging Euro-politics. In G. Marks & M.R. Steenbergen (eds), *European Integration and Political Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jasper, J. & Goodwin, J. (eds) (2011). *Contention in Context: Political opportunities and the emergence of protest*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Keck, M. E. & Sikkink, K. (1998). *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Kitschelt, H. P. (1986). Political opportunity structure and political protest: Antinuclear movements in four democracies. *British Journal of Political Science* 1: 57-85.
- Koopmans, R.; Statham, P; Giugni, M. & Passy, F. (2005). *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Koopmans, R. & Rucht, D. (2002). Protest event analysis. In B. Klandermans & S. Staggenborg (eds), *Methods of Social Movement Research*. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press.

- Koopmans, R. & Statham, P. (2010). *The Making of a Public Sphere*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kousis, M. (2014). The Transnational Dimension of the Greek Protest Campaign Against Troika Memoranda and Austerity Policies, 2010-2012. In della Porta, D. and Mattoni, A. (eds), *Spreading protests: Social movements in times of crisis*. Colchester: ECPR Press.
- Kriesi, H. (2004). Political Context and Opportunity. In D.H. Snow, S.A. Soule & H. Kriesi (eds), *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Ladrech, R. (1994). Europeanisation of domestic politics and institutions: The case of France. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 32(1): 69-88.
- Lahusen, C. (1999). International campaigns in context: collective action between the local and the global. In *Social Movements in a Globalizing World*. UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lahusen, C. (2004). Joining the Cocktail Circuit: Social Movement Organisations at the European Union. *Mobilization* 9(1): 55-71.
- Larsson, B. (2014). Transnational trade union action in Europe – the significance of national and sectoral industrial relations. *European Societies* 16(3): 378–400.
- Leiren, M.R. & Parks, L. (2014). When trade unions succeed: Cases of blocked liberalisation in the common market. *European Journal of Political Research* 53(3): 465-479.
- Marks, G. & McAdam, D. (1996). Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political Opportunity in the European Union. *West European Politics* 19(2): 249-278.
- Marks, G. & McAdam, D. (1999). On the Relationship of Political Opportunities to the Form of Collective Action: the Case of the European Union. In D. della Porta, H. Kriesi & D. Rucht (eds), *Social Movements in a Globalizing World*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mathers, A. (2016). *Struggling for a Social Europe. Neoliberal Globalization and the Birth of a European Social Movement*. Abingdon-New York: Routledge.
- Mazey, S. & Richardson, J. J. (2002). Pluralisme ouvert ou restreint? Les groupes d'intérêt l'Union Européenne. In Balme R., Chabanet, D. & V. Wright, *L'action collective en Europe*. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
- McCarthy, J. & Zald, M.N. (eds) (1996). *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framing*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Meyer, D.S. (2004). Protest and Political Opportunities. *Annual Review of Sociology* 30: 125-145.
- Monforte, P. (2014). The Cognitive Dimension of Social Movements' Europeanisation Processes. The Case of the Protests against 'Fortress Europe'. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 15(1): 120-137.

- Morin, J.F., Novotna, T., Ponjaert, F. & Telò, M. (eds.) (2015). *The Politics of Transatlantic Trade Negotiations: TTIP in a Globalized World*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Mueller, C. (1997). Media Measurement Models of Protest Event Data. *Mobilization* 2(2): 165–84.
- Parks, L. (2015). *In the Corridors and in the Streets*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Poloni-Staudinger, L. M. (2008). The domestic opportunity structure and supranational activity: An explanation of environmental group activity at the European Union level. *European Union Politics* 9(4): 531-558.
- Putnam, R. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. *International Organisation* 42(3): 427-460.
- Radaelli, C. M. & Franchino F. (2004). Analysing Political Change in Italy. *Journal of European Public Policy* 11(6): 941–53.
- Risse, T., Green Cowles, M. & Caporaso, J. (2001). Europeanisation and Domestic Change: Introduction. In Green Cowles, M., Caporaso, J. & T. Risse (eds) *Transforming Europe. Europeanisation and Domestic Change*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1–20.
- Rodekamp, M. (2013). *Their Members' Voice: Civil Society Organisations in the European Union*. Wiesbaden: Springer.
- Rootes, C. (2002). The Europeanisation of Environmentalism. In R. Balme, D. Chabanet, & V. Wright (eds), *L'action collective en Europe*. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
- Rucht, D. (2002). The EU as a Target of Political Mobilisation: Is There a Europeanisation of Conflict? In R. Balme, D. Chabanet, & V. Wright (eds), *L'action collective en Europe*. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
- Rucht, D. (2004). Movement allies, adversaries, and third parties. In D.H. Snow, S.A. Soule & H. Kriesi (eds), *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Ruzza, C. (2004). Environmental Sustainability and Policy Networks in Tourist Locations. *Foedus* 11.
- Ruzza, C. (2014). Civil Society Actors and EU Fundamental Rights Policy: Opportunities and Challenges. *Human Right Review* 15: 65-81.
- Saurugger, S. (2006). The Professionalisation of interest representation: A problem for the participation of civil society in EU governance. In S. Smismans (ed.), *European Governance and Civil Society*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
- Seidendorf, S. (2003). Europeanisation of national identity discourses. Comparing French and German Printed Media. Paper presented at *European Consortium for Political Research* meeting.

- Sikkink, K. (2005). Patterns of Multilevel Governance. In D. Della Porta & S. Tarrow (eds) *Transnational Protest and Global Activism*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Tarrow, S. (1989). *Democracy and disorder. Protest and politics in Italy, 1965-1975*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Tarrow, S. (1994). *Social Movements in Europe: Movement Society or Europeanisation of Conflict?* Florence: European University Institute.
- Tarrow, S. (1998). *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tarrow, S. (2005). *The New Transnational Activism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tilly, C. (1978). *From Mobilisation to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Uba, K. & Uggla, F. (2011). Protest Actions against the European Union, 1992–2007, *West European Politics* 34 (2): 384-393.

ⁱ The European Citizens' Initiative (ECI) is a EU procedure, introduced by the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, aimed at enabling the "EU citizens to participate directly in the development of EU policies" (see <http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/welcome>). It enables 1 million citizens of the EU, who are nationals of at least 1/4 of the member states, to call directly on the EC to propose a legal act.

ⁱⁱ The notion of 'scope of the actor' initiating the protest and of the 'target' toward the protest is directed refers to the organisational extension of the organisation and/or institution. E.g. a protest against the EU Commission has a 'European scope of the target'. The notion of the 'scope of the event/action' refers instead to the scope of the mobilisation – namely, to the geographical and/or political scope of the substantive mobilisation of the event. For further details about our measurements, see the following sections.

ⁱⁱⁱ Only for 'Europeanised' protests, namely protests with EU actors, events and targets.

^{iv} Among the various operationalisations of political opportunities (for a detailed literature review of the concept, see Meyer 2004), in this study we look at the dimensions of the context illustrated in Appendix A, which combines both institutional features and discursive factors of the 'TTIP' POS and COS/DOS, both at the EU and national level.

^v However, some criticise this perspective showing that not all social movements involved on the EU level politics have been transformed into fragmented field of individual interest groups and lobbies (e.g. Lahusen 2004).

^{vi} One (left wing oriented) per country (since it has been showed by the literature on PEA that doubling the newspapers do not increase significantly the number of events found, Koopmans & Rucht 2002): *La Repubblica* for Italy, *El Pais* for Spain, and analogous ones, according to Lexis Nexis availability. However mainstream newspapers did not provide us with many protest events (see next endnote).

^{vii} This mix of sources allowed us 1) to bypass the media blackout on the TTIP issue present in some of the mainstream media in our six countries, and 2) to balance the possible biases introduced by using (also) the news sections of the SMOs and NGOs websites. In addition, redundant articles have been eliminated and intercoders' reliability tests and online discussions of difficult cases have been done.

^{viii} The number of protest events passed from 5 in Italy at the beginning of 2014 to 16 in 2016, with a peak of 54 events in the first semester of 2015; from 5 to 9 in UK in the same period, with a peak of 44 events in the second semester of

2015; from 8 to 13 in AT with a peak of 72 events in the first semester of 2015 and from 20 to 27 in DE with a peak of 50 events in the first semester of 2015. In Spain the overall amount of events remained stable from 5 in 2014 to 6 in 2016, with a peak of events in the central years of our analysis. The same holds true for events organised at the EU level (10 in 2014 and 2016 respectively, with a peak of 22-25 events in the central years).

^{ix} As mentioned the ‘scope’ of the actor organising the protest event and the scope of the addressee refer to the organisational extension of the organisation and/or institution (e.g. Italian Government, European Commission, etc.). In our coding scheme the categories for the scope of the actor/target vary from ‘local’ (city/district or regional) to ‘crossnational/multilateral’ (which refers to ‘involving actors from two or more countries’), to supranational, i.e. ‘European’. The notion of the ‘scope’ of the mobilisation refers to the geographical and/or political scope of the substantive mobilisation of the event. For instance, if an article mentions an anti TTIP event organised in Bruxelles or simultaneously in more than one of our selected European countries, the scope of this protest event is ‘European’.

^x E.g. the German Trade Union Federation as well as the ‘Chambres of commerce’ joined the anti-TTIP coalition from the very beginning (Stop-TTIP document 15/07/2015).

^{xi} For example, the German Parliament established a ‘petition committee’ on TTIP.

^{xii} For the typology and related analyses, we considered, relying on Imig and Tarrow’s 2001 criteria, all events related to the anti TTIP mobilisation since they by default involve claims ‘launched in response to the EU policies and institutions’. To obtain the four types of Europeanisation, we crossed the scope of the protester (national vs. European) and the scope of the target (national vs. European). In order to measure the level ‘Europeanisation’ of each of these dimensions we added the variable ‘scope’, ranging from local, to national, crossnational, and European/supranational (for ‘measurement’ details see the endnotes in section 4). Only the categories sovranational/EU have been considered measuring ‘Europeanised’ actors, events and targets.

^{xiii} An example of domestication is the lobbying done by anti TTIP movements in Spain on the political parties with the aim of introduce the TTIP issue in their program or the case of the German coalition "TTIP unfairhandelbar" which submitted a petition to the German Parliament with over 68,000 signatures (14/10/2014; source: our PEA data).

^{xiv} An example of ‘transnational pressure’ is the case of the event called ‘Municipalities against TTIP’ that was celebrated in Madrid with the participation of European local government representatives and political parties (30/06/2015; source: our PEA data).

^{xv} In order to classify the repertoires of action, we distinguished six main social movement action strategies (Tarrow 1989): *Conventional actions* associated with conventional politics and the institutional arena (e.g. related to electoral campaigns). *Media related actions* (e.g. organising press conferences, distributing releases or pay for advertisements, giving interviews/letters to newspapers, etc.); *Demonstrative actions*, which are legal actions aimed at mobilising large numbers of people (e.g. street demonstrations – legal and nonviolent – rallies, petitions, etc.); *Expressive actions*, i.e. initiatives whose aim is more to unite the militants rather than to display the movement’s strength; *Confrontational actions*, which are also nonviolent, but aimed at disrupting official policies or institutions, and therefore usually illegal (e.g. blockades, occupations, etc.) and *on line actions* (e.g. mail bombing, etc.).

^{xvi} Examples of *expressive* actions are the case of the Trojan horse brought by the TTIP protestors around many European cities or the ‘Transatlantic Resistance Journey Against TTIP’ organised by the European Greens in June 2015 in Madrid (source: PEA data).

^{xvii} The Cramer V between scope of the actor (Nat. vs. EU) and type of action is 0.27***; between scope of the event (Nat vs. EU) and type of action=0.40***. For a matter of space constraints, Figure 3 shows only data obtained selecting as basis of the analysis ‘EU scope events’. However, the same trends (data available upon request) emerge also when we

select events with ‘European actors’ as the basis for the analysis: *conventional* actions are 20% at the national vs. 26% at the EU level; and *demonstrative* actions (i.e. protest) are 54% at the national vs. 14% at the EU level.

^{xviii} To be noted that this change of repertoire of action holds true both for countries characterised by a more consensual ‘movementistic’ tradition, such as DE and UK, and for those with a more ‘protest culture’. Cramer V between event scope and type of action, disaggregated per country =0.22** (for event scope national), 0.26** (for event scope EU).

^{xix} For example, on April 18, 2015, more than 50 Spanish cities participated in the Global Day of action against TTIP (source: our PEA data). Similarly, during an election campaign event of the SPD in Hamburg, 120 German citizens organised a flashmob against TTIP and CETA (ibid.).

^{xx} As examples of online actions at the EU level we can mention the case of the Stop-TTIP UK movement that before the 2014 EU elections emailed 150 European candidates to ask for their position on TTIP (19/03/2016, PEA).

^{xxi} To this we can add that not only ‘relational resources’ matter, but also they seem to interact with the POS of a country: in those countries where the POS is more closed (as in Italy or partly in France), this is compensated with the high coordination capacity of civil society actors and to address the European level (disaggregated data, not showed).

^{xxii} Focusing on events made by political parties, supranationalisation is the dominant form of Europeanisation (representing about 25% of cases).

^{xxiii} To measure the level of “transnational embeddedness,” we coded if the event was organised only by one actor or in coordination with another actor, either national or organisations abroad as well as international organisations. The indicators compare the percentage of protests with EU targets and EU events organised by single vs. ‘networked’ actors.

^{xxiv} We can observe a higher degree of transnational embeddedness among Spanish and German social movement actors and a lower level for the Italian and french, with the English and Austrian ones in between (Cramer V 0.49***). Transnational contacts do not seem typical of the most institutionalised and resourceful movement traditions, but are all the most relevant for the more contentious Southern movements.

^{xxv} Although when the few protest emerges at the EU level, it is disruptive, according, as expected, to a curvilinear relationship between (closed) context and radicalness of collective action.

^{xxvi} Although the focus of this study on the Europeanisation of social movements is mainly on the POS approach, for further research purposes the history of the SMOs at the national level (that goes beyond the scope of this article) should be considered. In fact, the SMOs composing the anti TTIP coalition display different experiences of protest, of networking, and they mobilise in contexts in which this issue has different levels of salience (see section 6). All these dimensions play a role in the process of Europeanisation of social movements, in particular with respect to relational resources.