Brain processes for “good” and “bad” feelings: How far back in evolution?

The question of whether fish can experience pain or any other feelings can only be resolved by neurobiologically targeted experiments. This commentary summarizes why this is essential for resolving scientific debates about consciousness in other animals, and offers specific experiments that need to be done: (i) those that evaluate the rewarding and punishing effects of specific brain regions and systems (for instance, with deep-brain stimulation); (ii) those that evaluate the capacity of animals to regulate their affective states; and (iii) those that have direct implications for human affective feelings, with specific predictions — for instance, the development of new treatments for human affective disorders

In Search of the Neurobiological Substrates for Social Playfulness in Mammalian Brains

Play behavior is a fundamental and intrinsic neurobehavioral process in the mammalian brain. Using rough-and-tumble play in the juvenile rat as a model system to study mammalian playfulness, some of the relevant neurobiological substrates for this behavior have been identified, and in this review this progress. A primary-process executive circuit for play in the rat that includes thalamic intralaminar nuclei, frontal cortex and striatum can be gleaned from these data. Other neural areas that may interact with this putative circuit include amygdala, ventral hypothalamus, periaqueductal gray (PAG), and deep tectum, as well as ascending dopamine systems which participate in all types of seeking urges At the neurochemical level, considerable evidence points to specific cholinergic and dopaminergic controls, but also endogenous opioids and cannabinoids as having a positive modulatory influence over playfulness, with all europeptides known to have aversive effects to reduce play. Monoamines such as norepinephrine and serotonin certainly modulate play, but they influence all psychobehavioral systems, suggesting non-specific effects. We proceed to discuss how increased insights into the neurobiological mechanisms of play can inform our understanding of normal and abnormal childhood development

Impulsive Children on Psychostimulants: A National Scandal in the Making?

Flyer for Spring 1998 ICS Faculty Fellow Lecture by Jaak Panksepp.https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/ics_fellow_lectures/1028/thumbnail.jp

Neuroimaging Helps to Clarify Brain Affective Processing Without Necessarily Clarifying Emotions

Literally, Neuroimaging gives us deeper insight into the brain's function. But, what actually is its function? The brain is an organ, almost just as our lungs and hearts. The big difference is that we can see the imprints of evolutionary progressions in its organization. Although the stamp of evolution is clearly imprinted in the genes that govern the functions of all the other organs, that stamp is special within the brain. Brain functions that evolved earlier are concentrated in more caudal and medial regions of the brain while those that emerged later (eg., neocortex) are concentrated more rostrally and laterally. Thus, although our brain is an organ like no other in the body, we should envision the mind as largely the product of this bodily organ, although mind is surely not disconnected from other bodily functions

Does any aspect of mind survive brain damage that typically leads to a persistent vegetative state? Ethical considerations

Recent neuroscientific evidence brings into question the conclusion that all aspects of consciousness are gone in patients who have descended into a persistent vegetative state (PVS). Here we summarize the evidence from human brain imaging as well as neurological damage in animals and humans suggesting that some form of consciousness can survive brain damage that commonly causes PVS. We also raise the issue that neuroscientific evidence indicates that raw emotional feelings (primary-process affects) can exist without any cognitive awareness of those feelings. Likewise, the basic brain mechanisms for thirst and hunger exist in brain regions typically not damaged by PVS. If affective feelings can exist without cognitive awareness of those feelings, then it is possible that the instinctual emotional actions and pain "reflexes" often exhibited by PVS patients may indicate some level of mentality remaining in PVS patients. Indeed, it is possible such raw affective feelings are intensified when PVS patients are removed from life-supports. They may still experience a variety of primary-process affective states that could constitute forms of suffering. If so, withdrawal of life-support may violate the principle of nonmaleficence and be tantamount to inflicting inadvertent "cruel and unusual punishment" on patients whose potential distress, during the process of dying, needs to be considered in ethical decision-making about how such individuals should be treated, especially when their lives are ended by termination of life-supports. Medical wisdom may dictate the use of more rapid pharmacological forms of euthanasia that minimize distress than the de facto euthanasia of life-support termination that may lead to excruciating feelings of pure thirst and other negative affective feelings in the absence of any reflective awareness

Intranasal adminsitration of oxytocin in postnatal depression: Implications for psychodynamic psychotherapy from a randomized double-blind pilot study

Oxytocin is a neuropeptide that is active in the central nervous system and is generally considered to be involved in prosocial behaviors and feelings. In light of its documented positive effect on maternal behavior, we designed a study to ascertain whether oxytocin exerts any therapeutic effects on depressive symptoms in women affected by maternal postnatal depression. A group of 16 mothers were recruited in a randomized double-blind study: the women agreed to take part in a brief course of psychoanalytic psychotherapy (12 sessions, once a week) while also being administered, during the 12-weeks period, a daily dose of intranasal oxytocin (or a placebo). The pre-treatment evaluation also included a personality assessment of the major primary-process emotional command systems described by Panksepp (1998) and a semi-quantitative assessment by the therapist of the mother\u2019s depressive symptoms and of her personality. No significant effect on depressive symptomatology was found following the administration of oxytocin (as compared to a placebo) during the period of psychotherapy. Nevertheless, a personality trait evaluation of the mothers, conducted in our overall sample group, showed a decrease in the narcissistic trait only within the group who took oxytocin. The depressive (dysphoric) trait was in fact significantly affected by psychotherapy (this effect was only present in the placebo group so it may reflect a positive placebo effect enhancing the favorable influence of psychotherapy on depressive symptoms) but not in the presence of oxytocin. Therefore, the neuropeptide would appear to play some role in the modulation of cerebral functions involved in the self-centered (narcissistic) dimension of the suffering that can occur with postnatal depression. Based on these results, there was support for our hypothesis that what is generally defined as postnatal depression may include disturbances of narcissistic affective balance, and oxytocin supplementation can counteract that type of affective disturbance. The resulting improvements in well-being, reflected in better self-centering in post-partuent mothers, may in turn facilitate better interpersonal acceptance of (and interactions with) the child and thereby, improved recognition of the child\u2019s needs

Cross-Species Affective Neuroscience Decoding of the Primal Affective Experiences of Humans and Related Animals

BACKGROUND: The issue of whether other animals have internally felt experiences has vexed animal behavioral science since its inception. Although most investigators remain agnostic on such contentious issues, there is now abundant experimental evidence indicating that all mammals have negatively and positively-valenced emotional networks concentrated in homologous brain regions that mediate affective experiences when animals are emotionally aroused. That is what the neuroscientific evidence indicates. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: The relevant lines of evidence are as follows: 1) It is easy to elicit powerful unconditioned emotional responses using localized electrical stimulation of the brain (ESB); these effects are concentrated in ancient subcortical brain regions. Seven types of emotional arousals have been described; using a special capitalized nomenclature for such primary process emotional systems, they are SEEKING, RAGE, FEAR, LUST, CARE, PANIC/GRIEF and PLAY. 2) These brain circuits are situated in homologous subcortical brain regions in all vertebrates tested. Thus, if one activates FEAR arousal circuits in rats, cats or primates, all exhibit similar fear responses. 3) All primary-process emotional-instinctual urges, even ones as complex as social PLAY, remain intact after radical neo-decortication early in life; thus, the neocortex is not essential for the generation of primary-process emotionality. 4) Using diverse measures, one can demonstrate that animals like and dislike ESB of brain regions that evoke unconditioned instinctual emotional behaviors: Such ESBs can serve as 'rewards' and 'punishments' in diverse approach and escape/avoidance learning tasks. 5) Comparable ESB of human brains yield comparable affective experiences. Thus, robust evidence indicates that raw primary-process (i.e., instinctual, unconditioned) emotional behaviors and feelings emanate from homologous brain functions in all mammals (see Appendix S1), which are regulated by higher brain regions. Such findings suggest nested-hierarchies of BrainMind affective processing, with primal emotional functions being foundational for secondary-process learning and memory mechanisms, which interface with tertiary-process cognitive-thoughtful functions of the BrainMind

Inverse Effects of Oxytocin on Attributing Mental Activity to Others in Depressed and Healthy Subjects: A Double-Blind Placebo Controlled fMRI Study

Background: Oxytocin is a stress-attenuating and pro-social neuropeptide. To date, no study has looked at the effects of oxytocin in modulating brain activity in depressed individuals nor attempted to correlate this activity with attribution of mental activity in others. Method: We enrolled 10 unmedicated depressed adults and 10 matched healthy controls in a crossover, double blind placebo controlled fMRI 40 i.u. intra-nasal oxytocin study (20 i.u. per nostril). Each subject performed reading the mind in the eyes task (RMET) before and after inhalation of oxytocin or placebo control for a total of 80 scans. Results: Before oxytocin administration, RMET engaged the medial and lateral prefrontal cortex, amygdala, insula and associative areas. Depressed subjects showed increased anterior ventral activation for the RMET minus gender identification contrast whereas matched controls showed increased dorsal and frontal activity. Compared to placebo, oxytocin in depressed subjects showed increased activity in the superior middle frontal gyrus and insula, while controls exhibited more activity in ventral regions. Oxytocin also led to inverse effects in reaction times on attribution task between groups, with controls getting faster and depressed individuals slower to respond. Conclusion: Depression is associated with increased paralimbic activity during emotional mental attribution of others, appearing to be distinctly modulated by oxytocin when compared to healthy controls. Further studies are needed to explore long-term exposure to pro-social neuropeptides on mood in depressed populations and assess their clinical relevance