Evidence, Inference and Human Evolution: Essays in the Philosophy of Cognitive Archaeology

The promise of cognitive archaeology is considerable: the discipline can potentially outline a chronology of human cognitive evolution, and offer insights into the dynamics involved. However, the field faces two major methodological hurdles. First, it is a historical science; one that requires running inferences from the archaeological record to the cognitive capacities of our hominin ancestors. Second, it requires synthesising work from a disparate range of disciplines, including archaeology, cognitive science, and evolutionary biology. The overall goal of this thesis is to demonstrate how philosophers of biology can help meet these challenges using the philosophical tools of analysis and synthesis. Chapters 1-3 analyse various inferential strategies employed by cognitive archaeologists, and identify problems for those strategies. These problems relate to theoretical diversity, cultural variation, and the explanation of historical phenomena with multiple causal inputs. Chapters 1-3 also propose solutions to these problems. Together, they contribute to the growing literature aimed at developing a reliable inferential framework for cognitive archaeology. Chapters 4-6 synthesise work from archaeology, cognitive science and evolutionary biology in order to produce first-order claims about the evolution of particular cognitive capacities. These capacities include technical cognition, language, and theory of mind. Chapters 4-6 align with a growing trend amongst philosophers of biology for unifying theoretical work across disciplinary boundaries. Producing a robust science of human evolution is a daunting challenge. In this thesis, I aim to highlight the role both cognitive archaeology and philosophy of biology can play in addressing this challenge. I demonstrate that interdisciplinary work is essential to understanding our evolutionary origins

Teleosemantics and the Hard Problem of Content

Hutto and Myin claim that teleosemantics cannot account for mental content. In their view, teleosemantics accounts for a poorer kind of relation between cognitive states and the world but lacks the theoretical tools to account for a richer kind. We show that their objection imposes two criteria on theories of content: a truth-evaluable criterion and an intensionality criterion. For the objection to go through, teleosemantics must be subject to both these criteria and must fail to satisfy them. We argue that teleosemantics meets the truth-evaluable criterion and is not required to meet the intensionality criterion. We conclude that Hutto and Myin’s objection fails

Teleosemantics, Structural Resemblance and Predictive Processing

We propose a pluralist account of content for predictive processing systems. Our pluralism combines Millikan's teleosemantics with existing structural resemblance accounts. The paper has two goals. First, we outline how a teleosemantic treatment of signal passing in predictive processing systems would work, and how it integrates with structural resemblance accounts. We show that the core explanatory motivations and conceptual machinery of teleosemantics and predictive processing mesh together well. Second, we argue this pluralist approach expands the range of empirical cases to which the predictive processing framework might be successfully applied. This is because our pluralism is practice-oriented. A range of different notions of content are used in the cognitive sciences to explain behaviour, and some of these cases look to employ teleosemantic notions. As a result, our pluralism gives predictive processing the scope to cover these cases

Free Energy: A User's Guide

Over the last fifteen years, an ambitious explanatory framework has been proposed to unify explanations across biology and cognitive science. Active inference, whose most famous tenet is the free energy principle, has inspired excitement and confusion in equal measure. Here, we lay the ground for proper critical analysis of active inference, in three ways. First, we give simplified versions of its core mathematical models. Second, we outline the historical development of active inference and its relationship to other theoretical approaches. Third, we describe three different kinds of claim -- labelled mathematical, empirical and general -- routinely made by proponents of the framework, and suggest dialectical links between them. Overall, we aim to increase philosophical understanding of active inference so that it may be more readily evaluated. This is a manuscript draft of the Introduction to the Topical Collection "The Free Energy Principle: From Biology to Cognition", forthcoming in Biology & Philosophy

Free Energy: A User's Guide

Over the last fifteen years, an ambitious explanatory framework has been proposed to unify explanations across biology and cognitive science. Active inference, whose most famous tenet is the free energy principle, has inspired excitement and confusion in equal measure. Here, we lay the ground for proper critical analysis of active inference, in three ways. First, we give simplified versions of its core mathematical models. Second, we outline the historical development of active inference and its relationship to other theoretical approaches. Third, we describe three different kinds of claim -- labelled mathematical, empirical and general -- routinely made by proponents of the framework, and suggest dialectical links between them. Overall, we aim to increase philosophical understanding of active inference so that it may be more readily evaluated. This is a manuscript draft of the Introduction to the Topical Collection "The Free Energy Principle: From Biology to Cognition", forthcoming in Biology & Philosophy

A randomized, double-blind comparison of OROS® hydromorphone and controlled-release morphine for the control of chronic cancer pain

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Long-acting opioid formulations are advocated for maintaining pain control in chronic cancer pain. OROS^®hydromorphone is a sustained-release formulation of hydromorphone that requires dosing once daily to maintain therapeutic concentrations. The objective of this study was to demonstrate the clinical equivalence of immediate-release and sustained-release formulations of hydromorphone and morphine for chronic cancer pain.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>200 patients with cancer pain (requiring ≤ 540 mg/d of oral morphine) participated in this double-blind, parallel-group trial. Patients were randomized to receive hydromorphone or morphine (immediate-release for 2–9 days, sustained-release for 10–15 days). Efficacy was assessed with the Brief Pain Inventory (BPI), investigator and patient global evaluations, Eastern Cooperative Oncology Group performance status, and the Mini-Mental State Examination. The primary endpoint was the 'worst pain in the past 24 hours' item of the BPI, in both the immediate-release and sustained-release study phases, with treatments deemed equivalent if the 95% confidence intervals (CI) of the between-group differences at endpoint were between -1.5 and 1.5. No equivalence limits were defined for secondary endpoints.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Least-squares mean differences (95% CI) between groups were 0.2 (-0.4, 0.9) in the immediate-release phase and -0.8 (-1.6, -0.01) in the sustained-release phase (intent-to-treat population), indicating that the immediate-release formulations met the pre-specified equivalence criteria, but that the lower limit of the 95% CI (-1.6) was outside the boundary (-1.5) for the sustained-release formulations. BPI 'pain now PM' was significantly lower with OROS^®hydromorphone compared with controlled-release morphine (least-squares mean difference [95% CI], -0.77 [-1.49, -0.05]; <it>p </it>= 0.0372). Scores for other secondary efficacy variables were similar between the two sustained-release treatments. At endpoint, > 70% of investigators and patients rated both treatments as good to excellent. The safety profiles of hydromorphone and morphine were similar and typical of opioid analgesics.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>Equivalence was demonstrated for immediate-release formulations of hydromorphone and morphine, but not for the sustained-release formulations of OROS^®hydromorphone and controlled-release morphine. The direction of the mean difference between the treatments (-0.8) and the out-of-range lower limit of the 95% CI (-1.6) were in favor of OROS^®hydromorphone.</p> <p>Trial registration</p> <p>ClinicalTrials.gov: NCT0041054</p