NORMAS SOCIALES, SOLIDARIDAD Y COORDINACIÓN EN EL JUEGO DE ULTIMÁTUM

Social norms in ultimatum’s game establish that extremely unequal offers lead to failure. However, under the obedience of the norm, and far from Nash Equilibrium, negotiated wealth is favorable for proposers when information given is incomplete. In our experiment, every participant knew the actions taken by his peers in a context of repeated negotiation. The results show that under these circumstances, receivers sequentially obtain a mayor portion of wealth, which is said to reinforce the norm. The facts show a behavior of solidarity coordination in the latter, but not visible in proposersLa norma social del juego de ultimátum establece que toda oferta pronunciadamente desigual desemboque en el fracaso. Aún bajo el cumplimiento de la norma, y lejos del Equilibrio de Nash, la riqueza negociada es favorable para los emisores cuando la información suministrada es incompleta. En nuestro experimento, cada participante conoció las acciones seguidas por sus pares bajo un contexto repetitivo de negociación. Los resultados mostraron que bajo dichas circunstancias, los receptores obtienen una porción secuencialmente mayor de la riqueza, y acaban fortaleciendo la norma. Los hechos presentaron una conducta de coordinación solidaria en los últimos, no identificable en los emisores.&nbsp

Asimetrías sociales y negociación en el juego de ultimátum : un estudio comparado

Fil: Fajfar, Pablo. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Económica

Effects of immediacy of feedback on estimations and performance

We investigated the role of anticipation of feedback in performance and estimation about own performance. We submitted 155 participants to a test of verbal aptitude, and we requested them to give estimations of their own performance and the performance of other participants. There were two treatments: immediate feedback and delayed feedback. Participants in the immediate-feedback group were informed that they would receive feedback on their performance immediately after finishing the test, whereas participants in the delayed-feedback group were informed that they would receive feedback a week after taking the test. The immediate-feedback group performed better than the delayed-feedback group. Furthermore, the former underestimated their own performance. On the other hand, participants on the delayed-feedback group made unbiased estimations. We present a mathematical model based on construal-level theory, decision affect theory, temporal discounting, and Moore and Healy\u27s model of overestimation. The model suggests that the source of differences in performance and in estimations of own performance is a construal of the feedback situation that modifies the expected utility of the task