Spectrum and Variability of Mrk501 as observed by the CAT Imaging Telescope

The CAT Imaging Telescope has observed the BL Lac object Markarian 501 between March and August 1997. We report here on the variability over this time including several large flares. We present also preliminary spectra for all these data, for the low emission state, and for the largest flare.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figures, Late

Observation of the Crab Nebula Gamma-Ray Emission Above 220 Gev by the Cat Cherenkov Imaging Telescope

The CAT imaging telescope, recently built on the site of the former solar plant Themis (French Pyrenees), observed gamma-rays from the Crab nebula from October 1996 to March 1997. This steady source, often considered as the standard candle of very-high-energy gamma-ray astronomy, is used as a test-beam to probe the performances of the new telescope, particularly its energy threshold (220 GeV at 20 degrees zenith angle) and the stability of its response. Due to the fine-grain camera, an accurate analysis of the longitudinal profiles of shower images is performed, yielding the source position in two dimensions for each individual shower.Comment: 5 pages, 3 figures, Tex, contribution to 25th ICRC Durba

Detection of Vhe Gamma-Rays from MRK 501 with the Cat Imaging Telescope

The CAT imaging telescope on the site on the former solar plant Themis has been observing gamma-rays from Mrk501 above 220 GeV in March and April 1997. This source is shown to be highly variable and the light curve is presented. The detected gamma-ray rate for the most intense flare is in excess of 10 per minute.Comment: 5 pages, 4 figures, Tex, contribution to 25th ICRC Durba

Stimmensplitting und Koalitionswahl

Hat sich die Unabhängigkeitsstrategie der FDP bei der letzten Bundestagswahl ausgezahlt? Wäre die FDP erfolgreicher gewesen, wenn sie im Vorfeld klar signalisiert hätte, dass man eine Koalition mit der Union anstrebt? Wie war das bei den Grünen, die ja im Gegensatz zur FDP keine Zweifel aufkommen ließen? Natürlich können wir nicht wie in einer Simulation oder einem Experiment einfach den Wahlkampf wiederholen und noch einmal wählen lassen. Um eine befriedigende Antwort auf diese Frage zu finden, vergleichen wir den Kontext der Bundestagswahl 2002 mit den zurückliegenden Bundestagswahlen. Aus dem Längsschnittvergleich versuchen wir Rückschlüsse auf den substanziellen Einfluss von strategischem Stimmensplitting im Sinne einer Koalitionswahl auf das Wahlergebnis gerade der kleinen Parteien zu ziehen. Um unsere Forschungsfrage zu beantworten und substanzielle Schlüsse ziehen zu können, muss zuerst klar sein, in welcher Form und warum Stimmensplitting relevant sein kann, welche Rolle dabei Koalitionsabsprachen vor einer jeden Wahl spielen und, schließlich, welche alternativen Erklärungsmöglichkeiten die Literatur zum Thema Stimmensplitting und strategischem Wählen anzubieten hat. Nur wenn wir auch die Wirkung alternativer und zum Teil konkurrierender Hypothesen zulassen, können wir unserer Schlußfolgerungen sicher sein

Divergent platforms

Models of electoral competition between two opportunistic, office-motivated parties typically predict that both parties become indistinguishable in equilibrium. I show that this strong connection between the office motivation of parties and their equilibrium choice of identical platforms depends on two—possibly false—assumptions: (1) Issue spaces are uni-dimensional and (2) Parties are unitary actors whose preferences can be represented by expected utilities. I provide an example of a two-party model in which parties offer substantially different equilibrium platforms even though no exogenous differences between parties are assumed. In this example, some voters’ preferences over the 2-dimensional issue space exhibit non-convexities and parties evaluate their actions with respect to a set of beliefs on the electorate

Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size

We study the equilibria of the standard pivotal-voter participation game between two groups of voters of asymmetric sizes (majority and minority), as originally proposed by Palfrey and Rosenthal (Public Choice 41(1):7–53, 1983). We find a unique equilibrium wherein the minority votes with certainty and the majority votes with probability in (0,1); we prove that this is the only equilibrium in which voters of only one group play a pure strategy, and we provide sufficient conditions for its existence. Equilibria where voters of both groups vote with probability in (0, 1) are analyzed numerically