Egalitarian justice and expected value

According to all-luck egalitarianism, the differential distributive effects of both brute luck, which defines the outcome of risks which are not deliberately taken, and option luck, which defines the outcome of deliberate gambles, are unjust. Exactly how to correct the effects of option luck is, however, a complex issue. This article argues that (a) option luck should be neutralized not just by correcting luck among gamblers, but among the community as a whole, because it would be unfair for gamblers as a group to be disadvantaged relative to non-gamblers by bad option luck; (b) individuals should receive the warranted expected results of their gambles, except insofar as individuals blamelessly lacked the ability to ascertain which expectations were warranted; and (c) where societal resources are insufficient to deliver expected results to gamblers, gamblers should receive a lesser distributive share which is in proportion to the expected results. Where all-luck egalitarianism is understood in this way, it allows risk-takers to impose externalities on non-risk-takers, which seems counterintuitive. This may, however, be an advantage as it provides a luck egalitarian rationale for assisting ‘negligent victims’

Person-Affecting Paretian Egalitarianism with Variable Population Size

http://web.missouri.edu/~klinechair/on-line%20papers/person-affecting%20APE.docWhere there is a fixed population (i.e., who exists does not depend on what choice an agent makes), the deontic version of anonymous Paretian egalitarianism holds that an option is just if and only if (1) it is anonymously Pareto optimal (i.e., no feasible alternative has a permutation that is Pareto superior), and (2) it is no less equal than any other anonymously Pareto optimal option. We shall develop and discuss a version of this approach for the variable population case (i.e., where who exists does depend on what choice an agent makes). More specifically, we shall develop and discuss it in the context of a person-affecting framework—in which an option is just if and only if it wrongs no one according to certain plausible conditions on wronging

Territorial rights and colonial wrongs

What is wrong with colonialism? The standard—albeit often implicit—answer to this question has been that colonialism was wrong because it violated the territorial rights of indigenous peoples, where territorial rights were grounded on acquisition theories. Recently, the standard view has come under attack: according to critics, acquisition based accounts do not provide solid theoretical grounds to condemn colonial relations. Indeed, historically they were used to justify colonialism. Various alternative accounts of the wrong of colonialism have been developed. According to some, colonialism involved a violation of territorial rights grounded on legitimate state theory. Others reject all explanations of colonialism's wrongfulness based on territorial rights, and argue that colonial practices were wrong because they departed from ideals of economic, social, and political association. In this article, we articulate and defend the standard view against critics: colonialism involved a procedural wrong; this wrong is not the violation of standards of equality and reciprocity, but the violation of territorial rights; and the best foundation for such territorial rights is acquisition based, not legitimacy based. We argue that this issue is not just of historical interest, it has relevant implications for the normative evaluation of contemporary inequalities

Robert Nozick on nonhuman animals : rights, value and the meaning of life

In his chapter, Josh Milburn argues that Robert Nozick considers nonhuman animals in his philosophical writings, but that these discussions are downplayed in animal ethics and Nozick scholarship. This is regrettable, Milburn proposes, as Nozick is far more sympathetic to animal rights than many other libertarians. Milburn thus offers an analysis of Nozick’s animal ethics. Nozick’s arguments concerning vegetarianism and speciesism are considered, and Milburn argues that tensions in Nozick’s political philosophy potentially open the door to animal rights. Whatever their place in his political philosophy, Milburn contends, nonhuman animals find a comfortable home in Nozick’s axiology and ethics, with their value and the significance of our duties towards them affirmed. Milburn concludes that animal ethicists could learn from Nozick’s distinctive arguments and approaches and find an unexpected ally

Gaus on Coercion and Welfare-State Capitalism: A Critique

This article examines a novel line of argument in support of welfare-state capitalism proposed by Gerald Gaus. The novelty of Gaus’ argument lies in its contention that welfare-state capitalism can be justified on the basis of the contractualist mode of justification made famous by Rawls. Gaus argues that economic regimes, such as propertyowning democracy, are more coercive than welfare-state capitalism insofar as they require a greater degree of tax-imposed redistribution among citizens. Given the degree of coercion needed by these regimes, he contends that parties to a contract would not agree to them, whereas they would agree to welfare-state capitalism by virtue of the lesser degree of coercion it needs. It is argued in this article that Gaus fails to show that welfare-state capitalism is less coercive than property-owning democracy. Indeed, once one directs one’s attention towards those with the smallest range of valuable opportunities for action, there is reason to worry more about the coercion imposed by welfare-state capitalism than by property-owning democracy

Epistemic Consequentialism: Haters Gonna Hate

Epistemic consequentialism has been charged with ignoring the epistemic separateness of propositions and with (thereby) allowing trade-offs between propositions. Here, I do two things. First, I investigate the metaphor of the epistemic separateness of propositions. I argue that either (i) the metaphor is meaningfully unpacked in a way that is modeled on the moral separateness of persons, in which case it doesn’t support a ban on trade-offs or (ii) it isn’t meaningfully unpacked, in which case it really doesn’t support a ban on trade-offs. Second, I consider the strategy of arguing against the trade-off permitting conception of epistemic rationality that is central to epistemic consequentialism on the basis of our intuitive verdicts about the permissibility of trade-offs in cases. I argue the execution of this strategy suffers a methodological mistake that, once corrected, vitiates the probative value of those intuitive verdicts. Hence the conclusion: the separateness of propositions provides no support for a ban on trade-offs, and an influential independent argument for such a ban is flawed

Examining the Link Between Religion and Corporate Governance: Insights From Nigeria

This article examines whether the degree of religiosity in an institutional environment can stimulate the emergence of a robust corporate governance system. This study utilizes the Nigerian business environment as its context and embraces a qualitative interpretivist research approach. This approach permitted the engagement of a qualitative content analysis (QCA) methodology to generate insights from interviewees. Findings from the study indicate that despite the high religiosity among Nigerians, religion has not stimulated the desired corporate governance system in Nigeria. The primary explanation for this outcome is the presence of rational ordering over religious preferences thus highlighting the fact that religion, as presently understood and practiced by stakeholders, is inconsistent with the principles underpinning good corporate governance