98 research outputs found
Dynamical organization towards consensus in the Axelrod model on complex networks
We analyze the dynamics toward cultural consensus in the Axelrod model on
scale-free networks. By looking at the microscopic dynamics of the model, we
are able to show how culture traits spread across different cultural features.
We compare the diffusion at the level of cultural features to the growth of
cultural consensus at the global level, finding important differences between
these two processes. In particular, we show that even when most of the cultural
features have reached macroscopic consensus, there are still no signals of
globalization. Finally, we analyze the topology of consensus clusters both for
global culture and at the feature level of representation.Comment: 8 pages, 7 figures. Final version published in Physical Review
Robustness of Cooperation in the Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma on Complex Networks
Recent studies on the evolutionary dynamics of the Prisoner's Dilemma game in
scale-free networks have demonstrated that the heterogeneity of the network
interconnections enhances the evolutionary success of cooperation. In this
paper we address the issue of how the characterization of the asymptotic states
of the evolutionary dynamics depends on the initial concentration of
cooperators. We find that the measure and the connectedness properties of the
set of nodes where cooperation reaches fixation is largely independent of
initial conditions, in contrast with the behavior of both the set of nodes
where defection is fixed, and the fluctuating nodes. We also check for the
robustness of these results when varying the degree heterogeneity along a
one-parametric family of networks interpolating between the class of
Erdos-Renyi graphs and the Barabasi-Albert networks.Comment: 18 pages, 6 figures, revised version accepted for publication in New
Journal of Physics (2007
Effects of dimers on cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
We investigate the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game in structured
populations by introducing dimers, which are defined as that two players in
each dimer always hold a same strategy. We find that influences of dimers on
cooperation depend on the type of dimers and the population structure. For
those dimers in which players interact with each other, the cooperation level
increases with the number of dimers though the cooperation improvement level
depends on the type of network structures. On the other hand, the dimers, in
which there are not mutual interactions, will not do any good to the
cooperation level in a single community, but interestingly, will improve the
cooperation level in a population with two communities. We explore the
relationship between dimers and self-interactions and find that the effects of
dimers are similar to that of self-interactions. Also, we find that the dimers,
which are established over two communities in a multi-community network, act as
one type of interaction through which information between communities is
communicated by the requirement that two players in a dimer hold a same
strategy.Comment: 12 pages and 3 figure
Optimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperation
Recent research has identified interactions between networks as crucial for the outcome of evolutionary
games taking place on them. While the consensus is that interdependence does promote cooperation by
means of organizational complexity and enhanced reciprocity that is out of reach on isolated networks, we
here address the question just how much interdependence there should be. Intuitively, one might assume
the more the better. However, we show that in fact only an intermediate density of sufficiently strong
interactions between networks warrants an optimal resolution of social dilemmas. This is due to an intricate
interplay between the heterogeneity that causes an asymmetric strategy flow because of the additional links
between the networks, and the independent formation of cooperative patterns on each individual network.
Presented results are robust to variations of the strategy updating rule, the topology of interdependent
networks, and the governing social dilemma, thus suggesting a high degree of universality
Interdependent network reciprocity in evolutionary games
Besides the structure of interactions within networks, also the interactions between networks are of the outmost
importance. We therefore study the outcome of the public goods game on two interdependent networks that are
connected by means of a utility function, which determines how payoffs on both networks jointly influence the
success of players in each individual network. We show that an unbiased coupling allows the spontaneous
emergence of interdependent network reciprocity, which is capable to maintain healthy levels of public
cooperation even in extremely adverse conditions. The mechanism, however, requires simultaneous formation of
correlated cooperator clusters on both networks. If this does not emerge or if the coordination process is
disturbed, network reciprocity fails, resulting in the total collapse of cooperation. Network interdependence can
thus be exploited effectively to promote cooperation past the limits imposed by isolated networks, but only if the
coordination between the interdependent networks is not disturbe
Different reactions to adverse neighborhoods in games of cooperation
In social dilemmas, cooperation among randomly interacting individuals is
often difficult to achieve. The situation changes if interactions take place in
a network where the network structure jointly evolves with the behavioral
strategies of the interacting individuals. In particular, cooperation can be
stabilized if individuals tend to cut interaction links when facing adverse
neighborhoods. Here we consider two different types of reaction to adverse
neighborhoods, and all possible mixtures between these reactions. When faced
with a gloomy outlook, players can either choose to cut and rewire some of
their links to other individuals, or they can migrate to another location and
establish new links in the new local neighborhood. We find that in general
local rewiring is more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than
emigration from adverse neighborhoods. Rewiring helps to maintain the diversity
in the degree distribution of players and favors the spontaneous emergence of
cooperative clusters. Both properties are known to favor the evolution of
cooperation on networks. Interestingly, a mixture of migration and rewiring is
even more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than rewiring on its own.
While most models only consider a single type of reaction to adverse
neighborhoods, the coexistence of several such reactions may actually be an
optimal setting for the evolution of cooperation.Comment: 12 pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in PLoS ON
Wisdom of groups promotes cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas
Whether or not to change strategy depends not only on the personal success of
each individual, but also on the success of others. Using this as motivation,
we study the evolution of cooperation in games that describe social dilemmas,
where the propensity to adopt a different strategy depends both on individual
fitness as well as on the strategies of neighbors. Regardless of whether the
evolutionary process is governed by pairwise or group interactions, we show
that plugging into the "wisdom of groups" strongly promotes cooperative
behavior. The more the wider knowledge is taken into account the more the
evolution of defectors is impaired. We explain this by revealing a dynamically
decelerated invasion process, by means of which interfaces separating different
domains remain smooth and defectors therefore become unable to efficiently
invade cooperators. This in turn invigorates spatial reciprocity and
establishes decentralized decision making as very beneficial for resolving
social dilemmas.Comment: 8 two-column pages, 7 figures; accepted for publication in Scientific
Report
Emergence of scale-free leadership structure in social recommender systems
The study of the organization of social networks is important for
understanding of opinion formation, rumor spreading, and the emergence of
trends and fashion. This paper reports empirical analysis of networks extracted
from four leading sites with social functionality (Delicious, Flickr, Twitter
and YouTube) and shows that they all display a scale-free leadership structure.
To reproduce this feature, we propose an adaptive network model driven by
social recommending. Artificial agent-based simulations of this model highlight
a "good get richer" mechanism where users with broad interests and good
judgments are likely to become popular leaders for the others. Simulations also
indicate that the studied social recommendation mechanism can gradually improve
the user experience by adapting to tastes of its users. Finally we outline
implications for real online resource-sharing systems
Self-organization towards optimally interdependent networks by means of coevolution
Coevolution between strategy and network structure is established as a means to arrive at the optimal conditions needed to resolve social dilemmas. Yet recent research has highlighted that the interdependence between networks may be just as important as the structure of an individual network. We therefore introduce the coevolution of strategy and network interdependence to see whether this can give rise to elevated levels of cooperation in the prisonerʼs dilemma game. We show that the interdependence between networks self-organizes so as to yield optimal conditions for the evolution of cooperation. Even under extremely adverse conditions, cooperators can prevail where on isolated networks they would perish. This is due to the spontaneous emergence of a two-class society, with only the upper class being allowed to control and take advantage of the interdependence. Spatial patterns reveal that cooperators, once arriving at the upper class, are much more competent than defectors in sustaining compact clusters of followers. Indeed, the asymmetric exploitation of interdependence confers to them a strong evolutionary advantage that may resolve even the toughest of social dilemmas
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