Autoreactive marginal zone B cells are spontaneously activated but lymph node B cells require T cell help

In K/BxN mice, arthritis is induced by autoantibodies against glucose-6-phosphate-isomerase (GPI). To investigate B cell tolerance to GPI in nonautoimmune mice, we increased the GPI-reactive B cell frequency using a low affinity anti-GPI H chain transgene. Surprisingly, anti-GPI B cells were not tolerant to this ubiquitously expressed and circulating autoantigen. Instead, they were found in two functionally distinct compartments: an activated population in the splenic marginal zone (MZ) and an antigenically ignorant one in the recirculating follicular/lymph node (LN) pool. This difference in activation was due to increased autoantigen availability in the MZ. Importantly, the LN anti-GPI B cells remained functionally competent and could be induced to secrete autoantibodies in response to cognate T cell help in vitro and in vivo. Therefore, our study of low affinity autoreactive B cells reveals two distinct but potentially concurrent mechanisms for their activation, of which one is T cell dependent and the other is T cell independent

Strong Neurophilosophy and the Matter of Bat Consciousness: A case study

In “What is it like to be boring and myopic?” Kathleen Akins offers an interesting, empirically driven, argument for thinking that there is nothing that it is like to be a bat. She suggests that bats are “boring” in the sense that they are governed by behavioral scripts and simple, non-representational, control loops, and are best characterized as biological automatons. Her approach has been well received by philosophers sympathetic to empirically informed philosophy of mind. But, despite its influence, her work has not met with any critical appraisal. It is argued that a reconsideration of the empirical results shows that bats are not boring automatons, driven by short input-output loops, instincts, and reflexes. Grounds are provided for thinking that bats satisfy a range of philosophically and scientifically interesting elaborations of the general idea that consciousness is best understood in terms of representational functions. A more complete examination of bat sensory capabilities suggests there is something that it is like after all. The discussion of bats is also used to develop an objection to strongly neurophilosophical approaches to animal consciousness

Embodying the mind and representing the body

Does the existence of body representations undermine the explanatory role of the body? Or do certain types of representation depend so closely upon the body that their involvement in a cognitive task implicates the body itself? In the introduction of this special issue we explore lines of tension and complement that might hold between the notions of embodiment and body representations, which remain too often neglected or obscure. To do so, we distinguish two conceptions of embodiment that either put weight on the explanatory role of the body itself or body representations. We further analyse how and to what extent body representations can be said to be embodied. Finally, we give an overview of the full volume articulated around foundational issues (How should we define the notion of embodiment? To what extent and in what sense is embodiment compatible with representationalism? To what extent and in what sense are sensorimotor approaches similar to behaviourism?) and their applications in several cognitive domains (perception, concepts, selfhood, social cognition)

Analgesic and Anti-Inflammatory Effects of the Novel Semicarbazide-Sensitive Amine-Oxidase Inhibitor SzV-1287 in Chronic Arthritis Models of the Mouse.

Semicarbazide-sensitive amine oxidase (SSAO) catalyses oxidative deamination of primary amines. Since there is no data about its function in pain and arthritis mechanisms, we investigated the effects of our novel SSAO inhibitor SzV-1287 in chronic mouse models of joint inflammation. Effects of SzV-1287 (20 mg/kg i.p./day) were investigated in the K/BxN serum-transfer and complete Freund's adjuvant (CFA)-evoked active immunization models compared to the reference SSAO inhibitor LJP-1207. Mechanonociception was assessed by aesthesiometry, oedema by plethysmometry, clinical severity by scoring, joint function by grid test, myeloperoxidase activity by luminescence, vascular leakage by fluorescence in vivo imaging, histopathological changes by semiquantitative evaluation, and cytokines by Luminex assay. SzV-1287 significantly inhibited hyperalgesia and oedema in both models. Plasma leakage and keratinocyte chemoattractant production in the tibiotarsal joint, but not myeloperoxidase activity was significantly reduced by SzV-1287 in K/BxN-arthritis. SzV-1287 did not influence vascular and cellular mechanisms in CFA-arthritis, but significantly decreased histopathological alterations. There was no difference in the anti-hyperalgesic and anti-inflammatory actions of SzV-1287 and LJP-1207, but only SzV-1287 decreased CFA-induced tissue damage. Unlike SzV-1287, LJP-1207 induced cartilage destruction, which was confirmed in vitro. SzV-1287 exerts potent analgesic and anti-inflammatory actions in chronic arthritis models of distinct mechanisms, without inducing cartilage damage

Introduction

A small movement dedicated to applying neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and using philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience began 20–25 years ago and has been gaining momentum ever since. The central thought behind it is that certain basic questions about human cognition, questions that have been studied in many cases for millennia, will be answered only by a philosophically sophisticated grasp of what contemporary neuroscience is teaching us about how the human brain processes information.The evidence for this proposition is now overwhelming. The philosophical problem of perception has been transformed by new knowledge about the vision systems in the brain. Our understanding of memory has been deepened by knowing that two quite different systems in the brain are involved in short- and long-term memory. Knowing something about how language is implemented in the brain has transformed our understanding of the structure of language, especially the structure of many breakdowns in language. And so on. On the other hand, a great deal is still unclear about the implications of this new knowledge of the brain. Are cognitive functions localized in the brain in the way assumed by most recent work on brain imaging? Does it even make sense to think of cognitive activity being localized in such a way? Does knowing about the areas active in the brain when we are conscious of something hold any promise for helping with long-standing puzzles about the nature and role of consciousness? And so o

Knowing what we can do : actions, intentions, and the construction of phenomenal experience

“The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com” copyright SpringerHow do questions concerning consciousness and phenomenal experience relate to, or interface with, questions concerning plans, knowledge and intentions? At least in the case of visual experience the relation, we shall argue, is tight. Visual perceptual experience, we shall argue, is fixed by an agent's direct unmediated knowledge concerning her poise (or apparent poise) over a currently enabled action space. An action space, in this specific sense, is to be understood not as a fine-grained matrix of possibilities for bodily movement, but as a matrix of possibilities for pursuing and accomplishing one's intentional actions, goals and projects. If this is correct, the links between planning, intention and perceptual experience are tight, while (contrary to some recent accounts invoking the notion of 'sensorimotor expectations') the links between embodied activity and perceptual experience, though real, are indirect. What matters is not bodily activity itself, but our practical ! knowledge (which need not be verbalized or in any way explicit) of our own possibilities for action. Such knowledge, selected, shaped and filtered by the grid of plans, goals, and intentions, plays, we argue, a constitutive role in explaining the content and character of visual perceptual experience.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio

Differential Roles of IDO1 and IDO2 in T and B Cell Inflammatory Immune Responses

Indoleamine-2,3-dioxygenase (IDO)1 and IDO2 are two closely related tryptophan catabolizing enzymes encoded by linked genes. The IDO pathway is also immunomodulatory, with IDO1 well-characterized as a mediator of tumor immune evasion. Due to its homology with IDO1, IDO2 has been proposed to have a similar immunoregulatory function. Indeed, IDO2, like IDO1, is necessary for the differentiation of regulatory T cellsin vitro. However, compared to IDO1,in vivostudies demonstrated a contrasting role for IDO2, with experiments in preclinical models of autoimmune arthritis establishing a proinflammatory role for IDO2 in mediating B and T cell activation driving autoimmune disease. Given their potentially opposing roles in inflammatory responses, interpretation of results obtained using IDO1 or IDO2 single knockout mice could be complicated by the expression of the other enzyme. Here we use IDO1 and IDO2 single and double knockout (dko) mice to define the differential roles of IDO1 and IDO2 in B cell-mediated immune responses. Autoreactive T and B cell responses and severity of joint inflammation were decreased in IDO2 ko, but not IDO1 ko arthritic mice. Dko mice had a reduction in the number of autoantibody secreting cells and severity of arthritis: however, percentages of differentiated T cells and their associated cytokines were not reduced compared to IDO1 ko or wild-type mice. These data suggest that autoreactive B cell responses are mediated by IDO2, while autoreactive T cell responses are indirectly affected by IDO1 expression in the IDO2 ko mice. IDO2 also influenced antibody responses in models of influenza infection and immunization with T cell-independent type II antigens. Taken together, these studies provide evidence for the contrasting roles IDO1 and IDO2 play in immune responses, with IDO1 mediating T cell suppressive effects and IDO2 working directly in B cells as a proinflammatory mediator of B cell responses