Thyroid Hormone as a Method of Reducing Damage to Donor Hearts after Circulatory Arrest

There is a chronic lack of donor hearts to meet the need for heart transplant both in the US and worldwide. Further, the use of available hearts is limited by the short period between collection and implantation during which the heart can be safely preserved ex vivo. Using mid-thermic Langendorff machine perfusion, we have been able to preserve the metabolic function of a healthy heart for up to 8 hours, twice the limit for current static cold storage. We have also been able to preserve the metabolic function of a damaged DCD Heart collected 30 minutes after cardiac arrest for a period of 8 hours. We further investigated whether it was possible to improve the preservation of DCD heart using treatment with 10 μM Triiodothyronine to stimulate the tissue metabolism and we did find a reduction in damage markers in the treated DCD hearts as compared to the untreated group

Grounding procedural rights

Contrary to the widely accepted consensus, Christopher Heath Wellman argues that there are no pre-institutional judicial procedural rights. Thus commonly affirmed rights like the right to a fair trial cannot be assumed in the literature on punishment and legal philosophy as they usually are. Wellman canvasses and rejects a variety of grounds proposed for such rights. I answer his skepticism by proposing two novel grounds for procedural rights. First, a general right against unreasonable risk of punishment grounds rights to an institutionalized system of punishment. Second, to complement and extend the first ground, I more controversially propose a right to provision of the robust good of security. People have a right to others' protecting for avoiding wrongfully harming them: when I take an action that is reasonably expected to threaten the protected interests of others, I must take appropriate care to avoid setting back those interests. Inflicting punishment on someone--intentionally harming them in response to a violation--is prima facie wrongful, so I can only count as taking appropriate care in punishing when I follow familiar procedures that reliably and redundantly test whether they are liable to such punishment, i.e. whether they have forfeited their right against punishment through a culpable act

Institutional Legitimacy

Political legitimacy is best understood as one type of a broader notion, which I call institutional legitimacy. An institution is legitimate in my sense when it has the right to function. The right to function correlates to a duty of non-interference. Understanding legitimacy in this way favorably contrasts with legitimacy understood in the traditional way, as the right to rule correlating to a duty of obedience. It helps unify our discourses of legitimacy across a wider range of practices, especially including the many evaluations we increasingly make of international institutions of various sorts, but also including domestic institutions

Visual Perception as Patterning: Cavendish against Hobbes on Sensation

Many of Margaret Cavendish’s criticisms of Thomas Hobbes in the Philosophical Letters (1664) relate to the disorder and damage that she holds would result if Hobbesian pressure were the cause of visual perception. In this paper, I argue that her “two men” thought experiment in Letter IV is aimed at a different goal: to show the explanatory potency of her account. First, I connect Cavendish’s view of visual perception as “patterning” to the “two men” thought experiment in Letter IV. Second, I provide a potential reply on Hobbes’s behalf that appeals to physiological differences between perceivers’ sense organs, drawing upon Hobbes’s optics in De homine. Third, I argue that such a reply would misunderstand Cavendish’s objective of showing the limited explanatory resources available in understanding visual perception as pressing when compared to her view of visual perception as patterning

Uncivil Disobedience: Political Commitment and Violence

Standard accounts of civil disobedience include nonviolence as a necessary condition. Here I argue that such accounts are mistaken and that civil disobedience can include violence in many aspects, primarily excepting violence directed at other persons. I base this argument on a novel understanding of civil disobedience: the special character of the practice comes from its combination of condemnation of a political practice with an expressed commitment to the political. The commitment to the political is a commitment to engaging with others as co-members in the on-going political project of living together. I show how such an understanding of civil disobedience is superior to the Rawlsian strain of thought, which focuses on fidelity to law. Rawls was concerned with civil disobedience solely in the context of overriding political obligation. The project of characterizing a contestatory political practice that can be distinguished and used in a wider variety of contexts than Rawls is concerned with, including under illegitimate regimes, beyond the nation-state, or on behalf of anarchism, requires a different understanding of civil disobedience

In defense of exclusionary reasons

Exclusionary defeat is Joseph Raz’s proposal for understanding the more complex, layered structure of practical reasoning. Exclusionary reasons are widely appealed to in legal theory and consistently arise in many other areas of philosophy. They have also been subject to a variety of challenges. I propose a new account of exclusionary reasons based on their justificatory role, rejecting Raz’s motivational account and especially contrasting exclusion with undercutting defeat. I explain the appeal and coherence of exclusionary reasons by appeal to commonsense value pluralism and the intermediate space of public policies, social roles, and organizations. We often want our choices to have a certain character or instantiate a certain value and in order to do so, that choice can only be based on a restricted set of reasons. Exclusion explains how pro tanto practical reasons can be disqualified from counting towards a choice of a particular kind without being outweighed or undercut

A non-monotonic constitutive model is not necessary to obtain shear banding phenomena in entangled polymer solutions

In 1975 Doi and Edwards predicted that entangled polymer melts and solutions can have a constitutive instability, signified by a decreasing stress for shear rates greater than the inverse of the reptation time. Experiments did not support this, and more sophisticated theories incorporated Marrucci's idea (1996) of removing constraints by advection; this produced a monotonically increasing stress and thus stable constitutive behavior. Recent experiments have suggested that entangled polymer solutions may possess a constitutive instability after all, and have led some workers to question the validity of existing constitutive models. In this Letter we use a simple modern constitutive model for entangled polymers, the non-stretching Rolie-Poly model with an added solvent viscosity, and show that (1) instability and shear banding is captured within this simple class of models; (2) shear banding phenomena is observable for weakly stable fluids in flow geometries that impose a sufficiently inhomogeneous total shear stress; (3) transient phenomena can possess inhomogeneities that resemble shear banding, even for weakly stable fluids. Many of these results are model-independent.Comment: 5 figure