Employee empowerment, equality plans and job satisfaction: an empirical analysis of the demand-control model.

The paper investigates the effects of individual employees' empowerment on different forms of job satisfaction in British workplaces while controlling for the presence of job demands and whether these effects depend on the presence of an equality plan in the workplace. The demand-control model that the authors test proposes that imbalances between the demands placed on employees and the control they have in their job negatively affect employee well-being and health. Control may also be strengthened, and demands mitigated, by effective equality policies. This study looks at nine forms of job satisfaction and examines the individual effects of job demands, job control, the interaction of control and demands and their joint effects with equality plans. The study uses matched employee–employer British data from the 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS). The authors conduct principal component analysis (PCA) and logit estimations and estimate a recursive simultaneous bivariate probit model. Employee empowerment, or job control, is a key predictor of job satisfaction, and job demands are negatively associated with various aspects of job satisfaction. The presence of equality plans strengthens the positive effects of job control and mitigates the detrimental effects of job demands. Consistent with the demand-control model, employees are more likely to be satisfied in low strain jobs (jobs with low demands and high control) than in high strain jobs (jobs with high demands and low control). Employees in passive jobs (jobs with low demand and low control) on the other hand are less likely to be satisfied with achievement and influence than employees in low strain job. Much of the empirical literature has focused on collective empowerment practices and none has tested the demand-control model. This paper adds to the literature on employee empowerment practices with a focus on individualised job control and the way its effects interact with equality plans. In the process, the authors provide novel and rigorous empirical evidence on an extended version of the demand-control model

Employee Representation and Flexible Working Time

This paper provides evidence on the effect of employee representation on working time flexibility in private-sector European establishments. A 2002 European Union directive granted information, consultation and representation rights to employees on a range of key business, employment and work organization issues beyond a certain firm size. We exploit the quasi-experimental variation in employee representation introduced by the implementation of the Directive in four countries (Cyprus, Ireland, Poland and the UK) with no previous legislation on the subject. The empirical analysis is based on repeated cross-section establishment-level data from the last three rounds of the European Company Survey. Difference-in-difference estimates suggest that the Directive had a positive and significant effect on both employee representation and the utilisation of flexible working-time arrangements for eligible establishments. The greater use of flexible working-time schemes is driven by establishments in which no local wage-negotiations take place and those with a high proportion of female workers. Our results are consistent with the idea that employee representation provides an endogenous rule-enforcement mechanism in second-best scenarios in which incomplete contracting problems are pervasive and third-party arbitration is unfeasible. Quite paradoxically, the relaxation of shareholders' property rights and the limits imposed on managerial discretion as a result of the operation of employee representation seem necessary to achieve certain valuable forms of organizational flexibility in market economies

Provider diversity in the NHS: impact on quality and innovation

The overall objective of the research project has been to assess the impact of provider diversity on quality and innovation in the NHS. The specific research aims were to identify the differences in performance between non-profit Third Sector organisations, for-profit private enterprises, and incumbent public sector institutions within the NHS as providers of health care services, as well as the factors that affect the entry and growth of new private and Third Sector providers. The study used both qualitative and quantitative methods based on case studies of four Local Health Economies (LHEs). Qualitative methods included documentary analysis and interviews with key informants and managers of both commissioning and provider organisations. To provide a focus to the study, two tracer conditions were followed: orthopaedic surgery and home health care for frail older people. In the case of hospital inpatient care, data on patient characteristics were also collected from the HES database. The analysis of this data provided preliminary estimates of the effects of provider type on quality, controlling for client characteristics and case mix. In addition, a survey of patient experience in diverse provider organisations was analysed to compare the different dimensions of quality of provision of acute services between incumbent NHS organisations and new independent sector treatment centres. The research has shown that, in respect of inpatient hospital services, diverse providers supply health services of at least as good quality as traditional NHS providers, and that there is ample opportunity to expand their scale and scope as providers of services commissioned by the NHS. The research used patient experience survey data to investigate whether hospital ownership affects the quality of services reported by NHS patients in areas other than clinical quality. The raw survey data appear to show that private hospitals provide higher quality services than the public hospitals. However, further empirical analysis leads to a more nuanced understanding of the performance differences. Firstly, the analysis shows that each sector offers greater quality in certain specialties. Secondly, the analysis shows that differences in the quality of patients’ reported experience are mainly attributable to patient characteristics, the selection of patients into each type of hospital, and the characteristics of individual hospitals, rather than to hospital ownership as such. Controlling for such differences, NHS patients are on average likely to experience a similar quality of care in a public or privately-run hospital. Nevertheless, for specific groups of patients and for specific types of treatments, especially the more straightforward ones, the private sector provides an improved patient experience compared to the public sector. Elsewhere, the NHS continues to provide a high quality service and outperforms the private sector in a range of services and for a range of clients

Productivity, Capital and Labor in Labor-Managed and Conventional Firms

Despite a continuing interest in the compared efficiency of labor-managed and conventional firms, only a handful of comparative empirical studies exist. These studies suggest that labor-managed firms have the same productivity levels as conventional ones, but organize production differently. However, the data used in these studies cover a single industry, or firms matched by industry and size in manufacturing, and concern a few dozen firms. In addition, the use of constant-elasticity production functions in past studies has made it difficult to distinguish the effects of incentives embodied in the factors of production from those of scale differences that could be caused by the differences in factor demand behavior between conventional and labor-managed firms hypothesized by economic theory. The paper compares the productivity of labor-managed and conventional firms using two new panel data sets covering several thousand firms from France, including representative samples of conventional firms and all worker cooperatives with 20 employees or more in manufacturing and services. We present Generalized Least Squares (GLS) and Generalized Moments Method (GMM) estimations of translog production functions industry by industry for cooperative and conventional firms and test for the equality of their total factor productivities. We also allow systematic differences in scale and technology to be determined by the ownership form. The translog specification, which allows returns to scale to vary with input levels, makes it possible to disentangle embodied incentive effects from systematic differences in scale due to underinvestment in labor-managed firms. In the process, we also propose updated "stylized facts" about labor-managed firms in comparison with conventional firms. Our production function estimates suggest that cooperatives are at least as productive as conventional firms. However, the two types of firms organize production differently. Cooperatives are more X-efficient, i.e., they use their capital and labour more effectively, than conventional firms. With their current levels of inputs, cooperatives produce at least as much with the technology they have chosen as they would if they were using conventional firms' technology. In contrast, in several industries conventional firms would produce more with their current inputs if they were organizing production as cooperatives do. In all industries and in both data sets, both types of firms would produce at constant or decreasing returns to scale if they were using the same technology at their current input levels, and we find no evidence that returns to scale are systematically higher in cooperatives. Contrary to received wisdom, descriptive statistics indicate that workers' cooperatives are not always smaller or less capitalized than conventional firms, and grow at least as fast as conventional firms in all the industries studied

Employee-Owned Firms in France

International audienc

Innovation and the English National Health Service: A qualitative study of the independent sector treatment centre programme

Over the past two decades, an international trend of exposing public health services to different forms of economic organisation has emerged. In the English National Health Service (NHS), care is currently provided through a quasi-market including 'diverse' providers from the private and third sector. The predominant scheme through which private sector companies have been awarded NHS contracts is the Independent Sector Treatment Centre (ISTC) programme. ISTCs were designed to produce innovative models of service delivery for elective care and stimulate innovation among incumbent NHS providers. This paper investigates these claims using qualitative data on the impact of an ISTC upon a local health economy (LHE) composed of NHS organisations in England. Using the case of elective orthopaedic surgery, we conducted semi-structured interviews with senior managers from incumbent NHS providers and an ISTC in 2009. We show that ISTCs exhibit a different relationship with frontline clinicians because they counteract the power of professional communities associated with the NHS. This has positive and negative consequences for innovation. ISTCs have introduced new routines unencumbered by the extant norms of professional communities, but they appear to represent weaker learning environments and do not reproduce cooperation across organisational boundaries to the same extent as incumbent NHS providers.NHS UK Innovation Communities of practice Independent sector treatment centres Governance For-profit sector Clinicians

Paying for performance: incentive pay schemes and employees' financial participation

We present new comparable data on the incidence of performance pay schemes in Europe and the USA. We find that the percentage of employees exposed to incentive pay schemes ranges from around 10-15 percent in some European countries to over 40 percent in Scandinavian countries and the US. Individual pay and profit/gain sharing schemes are widely diffused, whereas share ownership schemes are much less common, particularly in Europe. We document a number of empirical regularities. Incentive pay is less common in countries with a higher share of small firms. Higher product and labour market regulation are associated with lower use of incentive pay. Capital market development is a necessary requirement for a wider diffusion of incentive pay, particularly sharing and ownership schemes. When we control for a large set of individual characteristics and company attributes, we find that the probability that a worker is covered by an incentive scheme is higher in large firms and in high-skilled occupations, while it is much lower for females