Liberalisation of Rail Freight Markets in the Old and New EU-Member States

This article examines whether the European Commission succeeded in reducing the negative socio-environmental externalities of road transport in Northern, Central and South-eastern Europe by introducing the First Infrastructure Package and Interoperability Directive that opened rail freight markets to competition. Using results from the EC-sponsored REORIENT project, the article searches for causal links between the completeness of legislative adherence and the occurrence of market rivalry. In so doing, it draws on the New Public Management (NPM) theorem which provided conceptual underpinnings for liberalisation policy and the notion of path-dependency warning that effectiveness of any public policy is contingent on the features of its implementation context. The article contrasts the adoption of rail deregulation directives by the old and rich EU-states in the Nordic region with the newly liberated, more recent EU-members in Central and South-eastern Europe in order to expose how the political, economic and cultural features of these countries affected the quality of legislative compliance and market rivalry. This method unearthed a clearly polarised picture of inter-country compliance and competition pattern. Norway, Sweden and Finland exhibit high levels of legal adherence without however, much intra-rail competition. Cut-off from the government subsidies, these countries’ state railways compete today with road operators, without however facing much rivalry from truckers. On the other hand, the new EU-members still lag on legislative conformance, but their licensing authorities granted operating permits to quite many private entrants. These carriers compete fiercely with the national incumbents, but the rail service quality they provide does not as yet threaten the dominance of truck in national freight transport. As a result, no inter-modal competition exists there. These findings indicate that liberalisation of rail freight market has not as yet reduced the road-rail imbalance in European freight markets nor curbed the negative socio-environmental externalities associated with motorised transport. Methodologically, this article exposed the analytical shortcoming of the NPM theorem and the strong empirical relevance of the path-dependency hypothesis

The Politics and Institutions of Project Approval - a Critical-Constructive Comment on the Theory of Strategic Misrepresentation

This article addresses theoretical and methodological explanations of miscalculations of costs and benefits in large infrastructure projects. In particular the focus is on the most influential theoretical contribution in this area, labeled ‘the theory of strategic misrepresentation’, a theory strongly associated with the work of Bent Flyvbjerg. The theory’s major explanation of cost overruns is that the registration and representation of data and the calculations of costs and benefits are made by planners in organisations that have economic interests in the results. They work in a context were they compete for scarce public resources, and in which lying pays off in the end. The result is, as Flyvbjerg expresses it, the ‘survival of the unfittest’. It is not the best projects that are built, but the most misrepresented ones. This theory, with its focus on the institutional context and incentive structures, represents a major step forward compared to the solely methodological explanations. However, it has several shortcomings both in theoretical and methodological terms. Methodologically, the research has not the design necessary for validating the conclusion of ‘the survival of the unfittest’. Theoretically, the framework does not offer any variation on the institutional variable nor when it comes to variation in planners (actors) motives and rationality. Hence, there is a need for a broader theoretical framework. We conclude our article by sketching such a framework, an institutional approach grounded in sociological theory, as well as applying it to Norwegian transport planning. The Norwegian research in this area does not support the thesis that project approval is a result of planners’ strategic actions. More often it is an outcome of institutions where politicians play a key role at all levels and stages of the planning process, often neglecting planners’ analyses and recommendations

Knut H. Alfsen, Dag O. Hessen & Eystein Jansen: Klimaendringer i Norge â forskernes forklaringer.

NFR-programmet Klimaendringer og konsekvenser for Norge (NORKLIMA) varte i 10 år og delte ut 1 milliard kroner til klimaforsking. I denne boken har tre sentrale forskere og erfarne formidlere fått i oppdrag å sammenfatte forskningsresultatene. Resultatet er eksemplarisk formidling av naturvitenskaplig forskning, og skaper undring over hva samfunnsforskningen har bidratt med

Institutional and Political Conditions For The Establishment Of Congestion Charging Regimes: A Comparison Of Norwegian And Swedish Experiences

In this paper we summarize the knowledge of how toll cordons in Norway have developed the last 20 years. We compare this with the recent development in the Swedish city Stockholm, in order to further elaborate the knowledge of conditions for the establishing of congestion charging regimes in urban areas. The initialization and spreading of toll cordons in Norway is analyzed as a result of the interplay between institutional conditions (legal institutions, procedures and the financial structure urban government is embedded in) and urban political coalitions. Several factors seems crucial for the establishing of toll cordons ; the experience of having a congestion problem; that someone takes leadership in the process; high level of trust among the actors, and the establishing of incentives, i.e, that toll cordons are likely to trigger extraordinary funding from the government or at least that the revenue will not lead to a reduction in such funding. The content of these toll cordons/transport packages has developed over time: • While originally revenue was solely used for road infrastructure, there is a general tendency towards increased investments in public transport. • There is a tendency that these packages have been prolonged, enhanced to new generations, while initially set up for a 15 to 20 years period. However; on important dimension, we can observe continuity rather than change.The revenue is solely used for infrastructure, not operation. • In most packages, there has been an emphasis on large project with strong symbolic power. • Although addressed in the initial phase, such elements as restrictions on car use, parking policy and congestion charging, are not included in the packages when these have passed the political process. In other words: The combination of procedural rules (local consensus) and economic incentives (local competition on scarce state budget) hinders further changes in the transport packages. The economic incentive leads to a decision making situation that induce the actors to focus on “fresh” money for infrastructure purpose. The demand for local agreement leads to a situation where every key actor necessary for such a broad agreement has a veto-position in the decision-making process. This is also an important explanation for the lack of interest and support for road pricing/congestion charging schemes in Norway. Are these hypotheses about important obstacles for congestion charging supported when comparing these cases with the establishing of the congestion charging trial in Sweden? In general that seems to be the case: In the process leading up to the trial in Sweden, they established a situation where local government had few or no cost with the trial and at the same time the use of the revenue was earmarked for the local transport system. Their demand for local agreement was narrowed to an absolute majority, rather than requiring a considerable majority. Hence, the strategy in Stockholm was that of political conflict rather than consensus-building, a strategy that proved successful because the same coalition held majority at both national and city level. In other words: altering these conditions are among the lessons to be learnt for Norwegians or others who want to follow in the foot-steps of Stockholm when it comes to introduction of congestion charging.Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies. Faculty of Economics and Business. The University of Sydne

Norwegian experiences with tendered buss services

Competitive tendering of local public transport services has been allowed in Norway since 1994. By 2005, 28 percent of all route production in Norway was procured on the basis of tendered contracts, covering around 40 percent of all passengers. The majority of the tendered contracts were gross cost contracts, whereas historically, most Norwegian contracts have been net cost contracts. This article analyses the effect of competitive tendering on operating cost and subsidies paid. It is found that competitive tendering reduces costs by 10 percent and that most of the cost reduction has been used to reduce subsidies for public transport by local authorities. The effects of competitive tendering in Norway are smaller compared to other countries. This can be attributed to the fact that the industry had improved efficiency over a long period before competitive tendering was introduced

Kompetanse i og om kollektivtrafikken

I dette paperet vil vi presentere en undersøkelse av hvordan norsk offentlig sektor har organisert arbeidet med kollektivtransport på vei, og hvilke ressurser som brukes til arbeidet med å legge til rette for kollektivtransport når det gjelder omfang og fordeling av kompetansen om kollektivtransport. Bakgrunnen for dette arbeidet er de store organisatoriske endringene i norsk samferdselssektor de siste 10-15 år har endret betingelsene for eierskap og forvaltning av kunnskap og kapital i samferdselssektoren, herunder endrede krav til innsikt og kompetanse om hva som skal til for å legge til rette for et godt kollektivtilbud. Undersøkelsen viser a) hvilken bakgrunn de som arbeider med kollektivtransport har, b) hvor kompetansen om kollektivtransport er plassert i forvaltningen, c) hvilke oppgaver dette omfatter og d) hvordan de som arbeider med dette uttrykker at betingelsene for å utføre jobben er. Kollektivkompetanse kan defineres som 1) kunnskap om planlegging og drift av kollektivsystemet og 2) kunnskap om hvordan prioriterere og samordne kollektivtransport med andre transportformer. Etter det vi kjenner til, har det ikke vært gjennomført noen systematisk undersøkelse av kollektivkompetanse i norsk forvaltning. I vår undersøkelse kartlegger vi i hvilken grad aktørene selv mener de har adekvat kompetanse til å utføre de oppgavene de er tillagt. Hovedkilder til dette arbeidet er kvalitative data om ansvarsdeling innen kollektivtransporten og intervjuer med sentrale aktører med ansvar for kollektivtransport i fylkeskommunene, administrasjonsselskap og Statens vegvesen. Informasjonen fra disse intervjuene er supplert med funn i tidligere arbeider som berører dette temaet, og som også har gitt inspirasjon til denne kartleggingen. Undersøkelsen viser at utfordringen i norsk kollektivtransportforvaltning ikke oppfattes å være utilstrekkelig kompetanse, men heller manglende kapasitet til å utføre oppgavene. Det er stor variasjon i hvordan fylkeskommunene organiserer arbeidet med kollektivtransport, både når det gjelder offentlig kjøp av transporttjenester og med hensyn til interne og eksterne samarbeidsformer. Videre er det også variasjon i den formelle kompetansen mellom de ulike fylkeskommunene, samtidig som de ulike fylkenes geografiske trekk (for eksempel om det er noen store byer i fylket) har betydning for tilgang på kompetanse i og utenfor organisasjonene

Regulating the regulator: The impact of professional procuring bodies on local public transport policy and its effectiveness

During the past 15 years competitive tenders have become a common procedure when procuring local bus services in Europe. In particular, tenders with gross cost contracts and the so-called Scandinavian model have gained popularity, resulting in a vast amount of research on optimal contractual relationships between government and operators. This paper pays attention to a rather neglected part of the Scandinavian model: the construction of professional procuring bodies and their relationship to the local public administration, focusing on its implications for policy steering and service performance. The paper outlines briefly two different perspectives of analyses of organisational models: one perspective is anchored in principal-agent theory and institutional economics; and the other perspective in political science. Empirically, the article is based on an evaluation of the relation between two Norwegian counties and the administrative company responsible for planning and procuring public transport services. This evaluation indicates, firstly, important common challenges for the county administration due to lack of regional administrative competencies in relation to the administrative company, which also hampers the county’s role as coordinator of policy areas of importance for public transport. Secondly, due to increased transaction costs, the establishment of administrative companies does not seem compatible with contracts relying on net cost solutions with huge scope for operator initiatives

Regulating the regulator: The impact of professional procuring bodies on local public transport policy and its effectiveness

During the past 15 years competitive tenders have become a common procedure when procuring local bus services in Europe. In particular, tenders with gross cost contracts and the so-called Scandinavian model have gained popularity, resulting in a vast amount of research on optimal contractual relationships between government and operators. This paper pays attention to a rather neglected part of the Scandinavian model: the construction of professional procuring bodies and their relationship to the local public administration, focusing on its implications for policy steering and service performance. The paper outlines briefly two different perspectives of analyses of organisational models: one perspective is anchored in principal-agent theory and institutional economics; and the other perspective in political science. Empirically, the article is based on an evaluation of the relation between two Norwegian counties and the administrative company responsible for planning and procuring public transport services. This evaluation indicates, firstly, important common challenges for the county administration due to lack of regional administrative competencies in relation to the administrative company, which also hampers the county's role as coordinator of policy areas of importance for public transport. Secondly, due to increased transaction costs, the establishment of administrative companies does not seem compatible with contracts relying on net cost solutions with huge scope for operator initiatives.Competitive tendering Professional procuring body Competition Public transport Contractual relationship