Wittgenstein’s Comparison between Philosophy, Aesthetics and Ethics

Wittgenstein compares philosophical explanations with explanations in aesthetics and ethics. According to him, the similarity between aesthetics and philosophy “reaches very far”, and as I aim to show, the comparison can be used to elucidate certain characteristic features of Wittgenstein’s philosophical approach. In particular, it can explain how his approach differs from metaphysical philosophy as well as clarifying the sense in which there are no theses or theories in philosophy, as Wittgenstein conceives it. In the last section of the essay, I examine certain consequences of Wittgenstein’s view, including the lack of conclusive arguments in philosophy. Rather than implying that philosophy falls short of its rational aspirations, I argue, Wittgenstein’s explanation of why there are (sometimes) no conclusive arguments in philosophy can help us to see in the right light the lack of agreement in philosophy, as well as explaining why this is not a defect

Gordon Baker on the Non-additivity of Philosophical Conceptions vs. The Possibility of Multidimensional Logical Descriptions

This paper discusses Gordon Baker’s interpretation of the later Wittgenstein, in particular his interpretation of the notion of Wittgensteinian philosophical conceptions (Auffassungen) and the notions of non-exclusivity, local incompatibility, non-additivity and global pluralism which Baker uses to characterize Wittgensteinian conceptions. On the basis of this discussion, and a critique of certain features of Baker’s interpretation of Wittgensteinian conceptions, I introduce the notion of a multidimensional logical description of language use, explaining how this notion, which Baker’s interpretation excludes, constitutes and important element of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophical method of clarification and perspicuous representation. I conclude by explaining how Baker’s problematic notions of local incompatibility and non-additivity, if they are seen in the light of Wittgenstein’s criticisms of certain views of the completeness of philosophical or logical accounts, nevertheless point in the right direction

The Problem of Domination by Reason and Its Non-relativistic Solution

This paper outlines a solution to what can be called “the problem of domination by reason”, “conceptual domination” or “clarificatorory injustice”, connected with how a philosopher may appear to be in a position to legitimately coerce, by means of arguments, an interlocutor who shares with her a concept or a conceptual system to accept a philosophical characterization of a concept or whatever the concept concerns. The proposed solution is based on a particular interpretation of what Wittgenstein means by agreement in his later philosophy, when he says that philosophy only states what anyone grants to it. Wittgenstein’s view and the proposed solution are characterized by their continued recognition of the value of logic and reason, truth and knowledge, as opposed to attempting to solve the problem by embracing relativism and questioning the value of the logic, reason, truth and knowledge. Relevant kind of disagreements licence no relativistic conclusions, because problems relating to them can be solved without going this far

Wittgenstein’s Investigations: Awakening the Imagination by Beth Savickey

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A particularist account of moral principles

In this article I respond to Rebecca Stangl’s criticism of Jonathan Dancy’s outline for a particularist account of moral principles which identifies a number of important problems that do call for a response from particularists. In order to give such a response I develop a novel particularist account of moral principles that avoids the problems in question. By clarifying the distinction between articulating a principle and examining its truth I explain, pace Stangl, how moral principles can be derived from imaginary or actual individual cases, how principles derived from particular cases can create general moral presumptions, how such principles can be justified, and what the truth of moral principles consists in. I conclude with a discussion of the employment of principles to justify moral judgments, and explain how the proposed account of moral principles avoids a problem concerning moral responsibility that arises for generalist accounts of the justificatory use of principles, such as Stangl assumes, according to which a principle ought to show the actual moral relevance of a property in a given case. Overall my aim is to articulate, by answering six puzzles that Dancy has raised for moral philosophy, an alternative to the traditional generalist picture of the role and significance of moral principles in/for moral thought

Perceptions of game writing : Exploring Inspiration and Conceptions of Writing from Creative Exercises

This thesis explores the perceptions of game writing as a practice among a group of aspiring game writers. This topic is approached by introducing the concept of inspiration as the object of study and conducting a creative writing workshop with six novice game writers using the mixed methods of a workshop as a research methodology and a set of unstructured interview techniques for data gathering. The background for this thesis combines both academic literature on the topic of game writing as well as professional handbooks for further insight. The purpose of this thesis is to provide perspective into how game writing is perceived to better understand the discipline and bring attention to the scarcely addressed topic of inspiration in game studies research. Based on the workshop's results, the analysis provides four distinct themes that represent the perceptions of game writing which are identified for their ludic and narrative elements respectively. The study concludes by proposing new potential avenues for research and development for future iterations of similar approaches, as well as recognizes the potential of implementing inspiration into future studies

On Wittgenstein’s and Carnap’s Conceptions of the Dissolution of Philosophical Problems, and against a Therapeutic Mix:How to Solve the Paradox of the Tractatus

In this article, I distinguish Wittgenstein's conception of the dissolution of philosophical problems from that of Carnap. I argue that the conception of dissolution assumed by the therapeutic interpretations of the Tractatus is more similar to Carnap's than to Wittgenstein's for whom dissolution involves spelling out an alternative in the context of which relevant problems do not arise. To clarify this I outline a non‐therapeutic resolute reading of the Tractatus that explains how Wittgenstein thought to be able to make a positive contribution to logic and the philosophy thereof without putting forward any (ineffable) theses. This explains why there is no paradox in the Tractatus

Wittgenstein's Thought Experiments and Relativity Theory

In this paper, I discuss the similarity between Wittgenstein’s use of thought experiments and Relativity Theory. I begin with introducing Wittgenstein’s idea of “thought experiments” and a tentative classification of different kinds of thought experiments in Wittgenstein’s work. Then, after presenting a short recap of some remarks on the analogy between Wittgenstein’s point of view and Einstein’s, I suggest three analogies between the status of Wittgenstein’s mental experiments and Relativity theory: the topics of time dilation, the search for invariants, and the role of measuring tools in Special Relativity. This last point will help to better define Wittgenstein’s idea of description as the core of his philosophical enterprise