There is No Problem of the Self

Because there is no agreed use of the term ‘self’, or characteristic features or even paradigm cases of selves, there is no idea of ‘the self’ to figure in philosophical problems. The term leads to troubles otherwise avoidable; and because legitimate discussions under the heading of ‘self’ are really about other things, it is gratuitous. I propose that we stop speaking of selves

Promoting Awareness of the Opioid Epidemic in Rural Vermont

Vermont is in the middle of an opioid epidemic. Heroin use fatalities are on the rise and the number of people in treatment for opioid use disorder in Rutland County has tripled in recent years. Despite this widespread problem, community members of Rutland County feel that there is reluctance to talk about opioid misuse and lack of awareness. This project aims to bring awareness, provide resources, and encourage people struggling with opioid use disorder to seek treatment.https://scholarworks.uvm.edu/fmclerk/1258/thumbnail.jp

“Relationship Connectivity” Counts:Lifetime Relationships, Family Structure, andRisk-Taking in Adulthood

The impacts of interpersonal relationships (in childhood and in early adulthood) on risk-taking behavior of young adults were the focus of this research. Data from the 2012 New Family Structures Survey (using a subset of 2,917 young adults aged 18-39), disaggregated by whether the respondents grew up in conventional or unconventional households, were augmented with eight interviews with health and counseling professionals. Healthy early family relationships and current romantic relationships offered the best protections against adult risk-taking behavior, irrespective of family household structure. On the other hand, a healthy parent-child relationship in adulthood and bullying victimization in childhood were both linked to increased risk-taking in later years, but only if raised in unconventional families. These findings contributed to the empirical literature on the consequences of healthy relationships, with natal families, peers, and partners, for positive life decisions and partly illuminated Agnew’s Strain and Aker’s Social Control Theories. Exploring a fuller range of unconventional family structures, a broader variety of risk-taking behaviors, and whether said behaviors turn into addictions will better highlight the long-term consequences of relationship connectivity for adult risk-taking

What does functionalism tell us about personal identity?

Sydney Shoemaker argues that the functionalist theory of mind entails a psychological-continuity view of personal identity, as well as providing a defense of that view against a crucial objection. I show that his view has surprising consequences, e.g. that no organism could have mental properties and that a thing's mental properties fail to supervene even weakly on its microstructure and surroundings. I then argue that the view founders on "fission" cases and rules out our being material things. Functionalism tells us little if anything about personal identity

Rethinking Our Work With Multilingual Writers: The Ethics and Responsibility of Language Teaching in the Writing Center

'Just shy of 9 AM on one of the last days of the semester, I raced into the writing center. Waiting for my first writer, I hastily checked my email where the subject line “SOS from June1” jumped out at me. June was a writer I knew well, and she was one of my former students in a writing center studio course for multilingual writers. Reading June’s email, her panic was apparent; she was extremely concerned with how a professor was grading her writing in a particular course. Though she had tried to discuss her concerns with her instructor, her account to me indicated this had been futile: “he said that this class is difficult and he cannot help me any more."'University Writing Cente

Utilizing Imogolite Nanotubes as a Tunable Catalytic Material for the Selective Isomerization of Glucose to Fructose

The isomerization of glucose to fructose is an important step in the conversion of biomass to valuable fuels and chemicals. A key challenge for the isomerization reaction is achieving high selectivity towards fructose using recyclable and inexpensive catalysts. Imogolite is a single-walled aluminosilicate nanotube characterized by surface areas of 200-400 m2/g and pore widths near 1 nm. In this study, imogolite nanotubes are used as a heterogeneous catalyst for the isomerization of glucose to fructose. Catalytic testing demonstrates the catalytic activity of imogolite for the isomerization of glucose to fructose. Imogolite is a highly tunable structure and can be modified through substitution of Si with Ge or through functionalization of methyl groups to the inner surface. These modifications change the surface properties of the nanotubes and enable tuning of the catalytic performance. Aluminosilicate imogolite is the most active material for the conversion of glucose. Conversion of glucose of 30% and selectivity for fructose of 45% is achieved using aluminosilicate imogolite. Modification of imogolite with germanium or methyl groups decreases the conversion, but increases the selectivity. Generally, the selectivity for fructose decreases as the conversion of glucose increases. Interestingly, the imogolite nanotubes have comparable catalytic selectivity at similar conversion as base catalyzed reactions. Catalyst recycling experiments revealed that organic content accumulates on the nanotubes that results in a minor reduction in conversion while maintaining similar catalytic selectivity. Overall, imogolite nanotubes demonstrate an active and tunable catalytic platform for the isomerization of glucose to fructose.American Chemical Society Petroleum Research Fund (ACS-PRF 55946-DNI5)National Science Foundation (NSF CBET 1605037; 1653587 and NSF CBET REU 1645126)Ohio State University Institute of Materials Research (OSU IMR FG0138)The Undergraduate Research Office and Office of ResearchA one-year embargo was granted for this item.Academic Major: Chemical Engineerin

Relativism and persistence

[FIRST PARAGRAPHS] Philosophers often talk as if what it takes for a person to persist through time were up to us, as individuals or as a linguistic community, to decide. In most ordinary situations it might be fully determinate whether someone has survived or perished: barring some unforeseen catastrophe, it is clear enough that you will still exist ten minutes from now, for example. But there is no shortage of actual and imaginary situations where it is not so clear whether one survives. Here reasonable people may disagree. There are "fission" cases where each of one's cerebral hemispheres is transplanted into a different head; Star-Trek-style "teletransportation" stories; actual cases of brain damage so severe that one can never again regain consciousness, even though one's circulation, breathing, digestion, and other "animal" functions continue; and stories where one's brain cells are gradually removed and replaced by cells from someone else, to name only a few favorites. In many such cases we say, correctly, that the person in question has perished; that is the right answer to the question, Has she survived? But in some of those very situations, we are told that it might have been correct to give the opposite answer, and say that the person perished--even if nothing different happened to her. Some philosophers say that we are free to choose at random between saying that the person has survived and saying that she has ceased to exist; both are equally correct descriptions of the same event. Others say that a different answer to the question, Has the person survived? is in fact false, but would be true if we had a different concept of personal identity, or if our conventions for individuating people were different--in short, if we thought and spoke differently

Personal identity and the radiation argument

Sydney Shoemaker has argued that, because we can imagine a people who take themselves to survive a 'brain-state-transfer' procedure, cerebrum transplant, or the like, we ought to conclude that we could survive such a thing. I claim that the argument faces two objections, and can be defended only by depriving it any real interest

The Ontology of Material Objects

[First paragraph] For a long time philosophers thought material objects were unproblematic. Or nearly so. There may have been a problem about what a material object is: a substance, a bundle of tropes, a compound of substratum and universals, a collection of sense-data, or what have you. But once that was settled there were supposed to be no further metaphysical problems about material objects. This illusion has now largely been dispelled. No one can get a Ph.D. in philosophy nowadays without encountering the puzzles of the ship of Theseus, the statue and the lump, the cat and its tail complement', amoebic fission, and others. These problems are especially pressing on the assumption that we ourselves are material objects