EMI Security Architecture

This document describes the various architectures of the three middlewares that comprise the EMI software stack. It also outlines the common efforts in the security area that allow interoperability between these middlewares. The assessment of the EMI Security presented in this document was performed internally by members of the Security Area of the EMI project

Virtualization and Cloud Computing Task Force Report V.0.7

Report of activities and research endeavors of the Virtualization and Cloud EMI Task Force

Addressing the Pilot security problem with gLExec

Abstract. The Grid security mechanisms were designed under the assumption that users would submit their jobs directly to the Grid gatekeepers. Many groups are however starting to use pilot-based infrastructures, where users submit jobs to a centralized queue and are successively transferred to the Grid resources by the pilot infrastructure. While this approach greatly improves the user experience, it does introduce several security and policy issues, the more serious being the lack of system level protection between the users and the inability for Grid sites to apply fine grained authorization policies. One possible solution to the problem is provided by gLExec, a X.509 aware suexec derivative. By using gLExec, the pilot workflow becomes as secure as any traditional one. 1

Re-thinking Grid Security Architecture

The security models used in Grid systems today strongly bear the marks of their diverse origin. Historically retrofitted to the distributed systems they are designed to protect and control, the security model is usually limited in scope and applicability, and its implementation tailored towards a few specific deployment scenarios. A common approach towards even the "basic" elements such as authentication to resources is only now emerging, whereas for more complex issues such as community organization, integration of site access control with operating systems, cross-domain resource provisioning, or overlay community Grids ("late authentication" for pilot job frameworks or community-based virtual machines) there is no single coherent and consistent "security" view. Via this paper we aim to share some observations on current security models and solutions found in Grid architectures and deployments today and identify architectural limitations in solving complex access control and policy enforcement scenarios in distributed resource management. The paper provides a short overview of the OGSA security services and other security solutions used in Grid middleware and operations practice. However, it is becoming clear that further development in Grid requires a fresh look at the concepts, both operationally and security-wise. This paper analyses the security aspects of different types of Grids and a set of use cases that may require extended security functionality, such as dynamic security context management, and management of stateful services. Recent developments in open systems security, and revisiting basic security concepts in networking and computing including the OSI Security Architecture and the concepts used in the Trusted Computing Base provide interesting examples on how some of the conceptual security problems in Grid can be addressed, and on how the shortcomings of current systems and the frequently proposed "ad-hoc" stop-gaps for what are in fact complex security manageability problems may be avoided. This paper is thus intended to initiate and stimulate the wider discussion on the concepts of Grid security, thereby setting the scene for and providing input to a Grid security taxonomy leading to a more consistent Grid Security Architecture