Contemporary statistical inference for infectious disease models using Stan

This paper is concerned with the application of recent statistical advances to inference of infectious disease dynamics. We describe the fitting of a class of epidemic models using Hamiltonian Monte Carlo and variational inference as implemented in the freely available Stan software. We apply the two methods to real data from outbreaks as well as routinely collected observations. Our results suggest that both inference methods are computationally feasible in this context, and show a trade-off between statistical efficiency versus computational speed. The latter appears particularly relevant for real-time applications

Genetic evidence for the association between COVID-19 epidemic severity and timing of non-pharmaceutical interventions

Unprecedented public health interventions including travel restrictions and national lockdowns have been implemented to stem the COVID-19 epidemic, but the effectiveness of non- pharmaceutical interventions is still debated. We carried out a phylogenetic analysis of more than 29,000 publicly available whole genome SARS-CoV-2 sequences from 57 locations to estimate the time that the epidemic originated in different places. These estimates were examined in relation to the dates of the most stringent interventions in each location as well as to the number of cumulative COVID-19 deaths and phylodynamic estimates of epidemic size. Here we report that the time elapsed between epidemic origin and maximum intervention is associated with different measures of epidemic severity and explains 11% of the variance in reported deaths one month after the most stringent intervention. Locations where strong non-pharmaceutical interventions were implemented earlier experienced 30 much less severe COVID-19 morbidity and mortality during the period of study

Report 36: Modelling ICU capacity under different epidemiological scenarios of the COVID-19 pandemic in three western European countries

The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has placed enormous strain on healthcare systems, particularly intensive care units (ICUs), with COVID-19 patient care being a key concern of healthcare system planning for winter 2020/21. Ensuring that all patients who require intensive care, irrespective of COVID-19 status, can access it during this time is essential. This study uses an integrated model of hospital capacity planning and epidemiological projections of COVID-19 patients to estimate the spare capacity of key ICU resources under different epidemic scenarios in France, Germany and Italy across the winter period of 2020/21. In particular, we examine the effect of implementing suppression strategies of varying effectiveness, triggered by different numbers of COVID-19 patients in ICU. The use of a ‘dual-demand’ (COVID-19 and non-COVID-19) patient model and the consideration of multiple ICU resources that determine capacity (beds, doctors, nurses and ventilators) and the interdependencies between them, provides a detailed insight into potential capacity constraints this winter. Without sufficient mitigation, we estimate that COVID-19 ICU patient numbers will exceed those seen in the first peak, resulting in substantial capacity deficits, with beds being consistently found to be the most constrained resource across countries. Lockdowns triggered based on ICU capacity could lead to large improvements in spare capacity during the winter season, with pressure being most effectively alleviated when lockdown is triggered early and implemented at a higher level of suppression. In many cases, maximum deficits are reduced to lower levels which can then be managed by expanding supply-side hospital capacity, to ensure that all patients can receive treatment. The success of such interventions also depends on baseline ICU bed numbers and average non-COVID-19 patient occupancy. We find that lockdowns of longer duration reduce the total number of days in deficit, but triggering lockdown earlier when COVID-19 ICU occupancy is lower is more effective in minimising deficits. Our results highlight the dependencies between different metrics, suggesting that absolute benefits of different strategies must be weighed against the feasibility and drawbacks of different amounts of time spent in lockdown

Seasonal influenza vaccination in Kenya: an economic evaluation using dynamic transmission modelling.

BACKGROUND: There is substantial burden of seasonal influenza in Kenya, which led the government to consider introducing a national influenza vaccination programme. Given the cost implications of a nationwide programme, local economic evaluation data are needed to inform policy on the design and benefits of influenza vaccination. We set out to estimate the cost-effectiveness of seasonal influenza vaccination in Kenya. METHODS: We fitted an age-stratified dynamic transmission model to active surveillance data from patients with influenza from 2010 to 2018. Using a societal perspective, we developed a decision tree cost-effectiveness model and estimated the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) per disability-adjusted life year (DALY) averted for three vaccine target groups: children 6-23 months (strategy I), 2-5 years (strategy II) and 6-14 years (strategy III) with either the Southern Hemisphere influenza vaccine (Strategy A) or Northern Hemisphere vaccine (Strategy B) or both (Strategy C: twice yearly vaccination campaigns, or Strategy D: year-round vaccination campaigns). We assessed cost-effectiveness by calculating incremental net monetary benefits (INMB) using a willingness-to-pay (WTP) threshold of 1-51% of the annual gross domestic product per capita ($17-$872). RESULTS: The mean number of infections across all ages was 2-15 million per year. When vaccination was well timed to influenza activity, the annual mean ICER per DALY averted for vaccinating children 6-23 months ranged between $749 and$1385 for strategy IA, $442 and$1877 for strategy IB, $678 and$4106 for strategy IC and $1147 and$7933 for strategy ID. For children 2-5 years, it ranged between $945 and$1573 for strategy IIA, $563 and$1869 for strategy IIB, $662 and$4085 for strategy IIC, and $1169 and$7897 for strategy IID. For children 6-14 years, it ranged between $923 and$3116 for strategy IIIA, $1005 and$2223 for strategy IIIB, $883 and$4727 for strategy IIIC and $1467 and$6813 for strategy IIID. Overall, no vaccination strategy was cost-effective at the minimum ($17) and median ($445) WTP thresholds. Vaccinating children 6-23 months once a year had the highest mean INMB value at $872 (WTP threshold upper limit); however, this strategy had very low probability of the highest net benefit. CONCLUSION: Vaccinating children 6-23 months once a year was the most favourable vaccination option; however, the strategy is unlikely to be cost-effective given the current WTP thresholds

Response to COVID-19 in South Korea and implications for lifting stringent interventions

Background After experiencing a sharp growth in COVID-19 cases early in the pandemic, South Korea rapidly controlled transmission while implementing less stringent national social distancing measures than countries in Europe and the US. This has led to substantial interest in their “test, trace, isolate” strategy. However, it is important to understand the epidemiological peculiarities of South Korea’s outbreak and characterise their response before attempting to emulate these measures elsewhere. Methods We systematically extracted numbers of suspected cases tested, PCR-confirmed cases, deaths, isolated confirmed cases, and numbers of confirmed cases with an identified epidemiological link from publicly available data. We estimated the time-varying reproduction number, Rt, using an established Bayesian framework, and reviewed the package of interventions implemented by South Korea using our extracted data, plus published literature and government sources. Results We estimated that after the initial rapid growth in cases, Rt dropped below one in early April before increasing to a maximum of 1.94 (95%CrI; 1.64-2.27) in May following outbreaks in Seoul Metropolitan Region. By mid-June Rt was back below one where it remained until the end of our study (July 13th). Despite less stringent “lockdown” measures, strong social distancing measures were implemented in high incidence areas and studies measured a considerable national decrease in movement in late-February. Testing capacity was swiftly increased, and protocols were in place to isolate suspected and confirmed cases quickly however we could not estimate the delay to isolation using our data. Accounting for just 10% of cases, individual case-based contact-tracing picked up a relatively minor proportion of total cases, with cluster investigations accounting for 66%. Conclusions Whilst early adoption of testing and contact-tracing are likely to be important for South Korea’s successful outbreak control, other factors including regional implementation of strong social distancing measures likely also contributed. The high volume of testing and low number of deaths suggests that South Korea experienced a small epidemic relative to other countries. Caution is needed in attempting to replicate the South Korean response in populations with larger more geographically widespread epidemics where finding, testing and isolating cases that are linked to clusters may be more difficult

Report 11: Evidence of initial success for China exiting COVID-19 social distancing policy after achieving containment

The COVID-19 epidemic was declared a Global Pandemic by WHO on 11 March 2020. As of 20 March 2020, over 254,000 cases and 10,000 deaths had been reported worldwide. The outbreak began in the Chinese city of Wuhan in December 2019. In response to the fast-growing epidemic, China imposed strict social distancing in Wuhan on 23 January 2020 followed closely by similar measures in other provinces. At the peak of the outbreak in China (early February), there were between 2,000 and 4,000 new confirmed cases per day. For the first time since the outbreak began there have been no new confirmed cases caused by local transmission in China reported for five consecutive days up to 23 March 2020. This is an indication that the social distancing measures enacted in China have led to control of COVID-19 in China. These interventions have also impacted economic productivity in China, and the ability of the Chinese economy to resume without restarting the epidemic is not yet clear. Here, we estimate transmissibility from reported cases and compare those estimates with daily data on within-city movement, as a proxy for economic activity. Initially, within-city movement and transmission were very strongly correlated in the 5 provinces most affected by the epidemic and Beijing. However, that correlation is no longer apparent even though within-city movement has started to increase. A similar analysis for Hong Kong shows that intermediate levels of local activity can be maintained while avoiding a large outbreak. These results do not preclude future epidemics in China, nor do they allow us to estimate the maximum proportion of previous within-city activity that will be recovered in the medium term. However, they do suggest that after very intense social distancing which resulted in containment, China has successfully exited their stringent social distancing policy to some degree. Globally, China is at a more advanced stage of the pandemic. Policies implemented to reduce the spread of COVID-19 in China and the exiting strategies that followed can inform decision making processes for countries once containment is achieved

Report 12: The global impact of COVID-19 and strategies for mitigation and suppression

The world faces a severe and acute public health emergency due to the ongoing COVID-19 global pandemic. How individual countries respond in the coming weeks will be critical in influencing the trajectory of national epidemics. Here we combine data on age-specific contact patterns and COVID-19 severity to project the health impact of the pandemic in 202 countries. We compare predicted mortality impacts in the absence of interventions or spontaneous social distancing with what might be achieved with policies aimed at mitigating or suppressing transmission. Our estimates of mortality and healthcare demand are based on data from China and high-income countries; differences in underlying health conditions and healthcare system capacity will likely result in different patterns in low income settings. We estimate that in the absence of interventions, COVID-19 would have resulted in 7.0 billion infections and 40 million deaths globally this year. Mitigation strategies focussing on shielding the elderly (60% reduction in social contacts) and slowing but not interrupting transmission (40% reduction in social contacts for wider population) could reduce this burden by half, saving 20 million lives, but we predict that even in this scenario, health systems in all countries will be quickly overwhelmed. This effect is likely to be most severe in lower income settings where capacity is lowest: our mitigated scenarios lead to peak demand for critical care beds in a typical low-income setting outstripping supply by a factor of 25, in contrast to a typical high-income setting where this factor is 7. As a result, we anticipate that the true burden in low income settings pursuing mitigation strategies could be substantially higher than reflected in these estimates. Our analysis therefore suggests that healthcare demand can only be kept within manageable levels through the rapid adoption of public health measures (including testing and isolation of cases and wider social distancing measures) to suppress transmission, similar to those being adopted in many countries at the current time. If a suppression strategy is implemented early (at 0.2 deaths per 100,000 population per week) and sustained, then 38.7 million lives could be saved whilst if it is initiated when death numbers are higher (1.6 deaths per 100,000 population per week) then 30.7 million lives could be saved. Delays in implementing strategies to suppress transmission will lead to worse outcomes and fewer lives saved. We do not consider the wider social and economic costs of suppression, which will be high and may be disproportionately so in lower income settings. Moreover, suppression strategies will need to be maintained in some manner until vaccines or effective treatments become available to avoid the risk of later epidemics. Our analysis highlights the challenging decisions faced by all governments in the coming weeks and months, but demonstrates the extent to which rapid, decisive and collective action now could save millions of lives

State-level tracking of COVID-19 in the United States

As of 1st June 2020, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported 104,232 confirmed or probable COVID-19-related deaths in the US. This was more than twice the number of deaths reported in the next most severely impacted country. We jointly model the US epidemic at the state-level, using publicly available deathdata within a Bayesian hierarchical semi-mechanistic framework. For each state, we estimate the number of individuals that have been infected, the number of individuals that are currently infectious and the time-varying reproduction number (the average number of secondary infections caused by an infected person). We use changes in mobility to capture the impact that non-pharmaceutical interventions and other behaviour changes have on therate of transmission of SARS-CoV-2. We estimate thatRtwas only below one in 23 states on 1st June. We also estimate that 3.7% [3.4%-4.0%] of the total population of the US had been infected, with wide variation between states, and approximately 0.01% of the population was infectious. We demonstrate good 3 week model forecasts of deaths with low error and good coverage of our credible intervals

Report 26: Reduction in mobility and COVID-19 transmission

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, countries have sought to control transmission of SARS-CoV-2 by restricting population movement through social distancing interventions, reducing the number of contacts. Mobility data represent an important proxy measure of social distancing. Here, we develop a framework to infer the relationship between mobility and the key measure of population-level disease transmission, the reproduction number (R). The framework is applied to 53 countries with sustained SARS-CoV-2 transmission based on two distinct country-specific automated measures of human mobility, Apple and Google mobility data. For both datasets, the relationship between mobility and transmission was consistent within and across countries and explained more than 85% of the variance in the observed variation in transmissibility. We quantified country-specific mobility thresholds defined as the reduction in mobility necessary to expect a decline in new infections (R<1). While social contacts were sufficiently reduced in France, Spain and the United Kingdom to control COVID-19 as of the 10th of May, we find that enhanced control measures are still warranted for the majority of countries. We found encouraging early evidence of some decoupling of transmission and mobility in 10 countries, a key indicator of successful easing of social-distancing restrictions. Easing social-distancing restrictions should be considered very carefully, as small increases in contact rates are likely to risk resurgence even where COVID-19 is apparently under control. Overall, strong population-wide social-distancing measures are effective to control COVID-19; however gradual easing of restrictions must be accompanied by alternative interventions, such as efficient contacttracing, to ensure control

Influenza Pandemic Waves under Various Mitigation Strategies with 2009 H1N1 as a Case Study

A significant feature of influenza pandemics is multiple waves of morbidity and mortality over a few months or years. The size of these successive waves depends on intervention strategies including antivirals and vaccination, as well as the effects of immunity gained from previous infection. However, the global vaccine manufacturing capacity is limited. Also, antiviral stockpiles are costly and thus, are limited to very few countries. The combined effect of antivirals and vaccination in successive waves of a pandemic has not been quantified. The effect of acquired immunity from vaccination and previous infection has also not been characterized. In times of a pandemic threat countries must consider the effects of a limited vaccine, limited antiviral use and the effects of prior immunity so as to adopt a pandemic strategy that will best aid the population. We developed a mathematical model describing the first and second waves of an influenza pandemic including drug therapy, vaccination and acquired immunity. The first wave model includes the use of antiviral drugs under different treatment profiles. In the second wave model the effects of antivirals, vaccination and immunity gained from the first wave are considered. The models are used to characterize the severity of infection in a population under different drug therapy and vaccination strategies, as well as school closure, so that public health policies regarding future influenza pandemics are better informed