Happiness Institutions

Bakhjulsstyrning av fordon är en möjlig konfiguration som lite glömts bort inom fordonstekniken. Tidigare arbeten inom ämnet bakhjulsstyrning är väldigt detaljerade och snäva i sin analys. I detta arbete vill författaren visa en bakgrund till hur olika farkoster styrs samt analys av detta. Syftet med arbetet är att utifrån litteratursökning och intervjuer kunna besvara vilken inverkan drivkällans placering och de konceptuella skillnaderna mellan olika farkoster har på styrningens placering. Samt vilka förväntade egenskaper en farkost får med icke konventionell styrning. Med hjälp av en simulering i MATLAB är syftet att kunna besvara vilken roll massa, hastighet och axellängd spelar för ett bakhjulsstyrt fordon och hur responsen ser ut jämfört med ett framhjulsstyrt fordon. Resultatet från intervjuerna och litteraturen visar att drivkällans placering nära rodret är väldigt viktig för fartygs styrningsförmåga. Däremot för flygplan påverkar det mest lastförmåga och för fordon tyngdpunktens placering. De konceptuella skillnaderna visar på att större fordon har mer att vinna på fyrhjulsstyrning då en mindre vändradie är merkritiskt för dessa och att flygplan som flyger i överljudsfart behöver andra vinguppsättningar. För fartyg har det visat sig att en liten vändradie är viktigt i hamnområden och att både stora och små fartyg då använder sig av bogpropellrar. De förväntade egenskaperna för en ickekonventionell styrning är främst negativ för fordon och fartyg, då det finns risk för instabilitet och överstyrning, medan flygplan redananvänder sig av styrningen fram i form av nosvingar. Simuleringarna visar att ett bakhjulsstyrt fordon bör ha en hastighetsbegränsning då det blir svårkontrollerat i höga hastigheter över 50km/h. En större massa har visat sig hämma magnituden av den laterala accelerationen en i fel riktning och en längre axellängd minskar rotationshastigheten kring gir-led. Resultaten visar också att ett bakhjulsstyrt fordon har en fördröjning av den laterala accelerationen jämfört med ett framhjulsstyrt fordon på 0,1-0,2 sekunder beroende av bland annat massa, axellängd och hastighet. Responstesten visar att denna fördröjning bidrar till att den laterala förflyttningen är fördröjd första sekunden för hastigheter 10-90km/h men att redan efterytterligare 1,5 sekunder är den dubbel så stor för hastigheter 50-90km/h. Slutsatsen är att fordon inte har bakhjulsstyrning i höga hastigheter på grund av den fördröjda responsen i början samt av att utslaget efter några sekunder blir väldigt mycket kraftigare vilket gör fordonet svårt att kontrollera.Rear wheel steering of vehicles is a possible steering, which has been forgotten in vehicle design. Earlier works show only details concerning one vehicle type from this subject. In this work the author will first present a background to how different vehicles are steered and then the analysis of it. The purpose with this paper is to from literature and interviews answer to which impact the placement of the engine and the conceptual differences have on the steering from different vessels. It will also answer which anticipated properties the steering will have if it´s not placed in a conventional way. Through simulation in MATLAB the paper will answer to which degree mass, velocity and length of axle influences steering behaviour of a rear wheal steered, RWS, car and how the steering response is different to a front wheal steered car, FWS. The result from the literature and the interview shows that placement of engine and propeller near the rudder is very important for a ships steering capability. For vehicles it has most effect on the centrum of gravity, which is to prefer in middle of the vehicle,and for airplanes the ability to place cargo. The conceptual differences shows that a larger vehicle has more to gain, if it is equipped with four wheel steering, due to turning radius is a more critical aspect. For airplanes in super sonic speed it reveals that they need another set of wings. Ships need a smaller turning radius in harbours and all size of ships then use thrusters. The properties of a vessel with not conventional steering are most negative for cars and ships because of risk for oversteering and instability, while for airplanes its already in use in form of canard wings. The simulations display that rear wheel steered vehicle should have a limit of velocity because of its behaviour in high speeds over 50 km/h. A larger mass has shown todepress the magnitude of lateral acceleration in wrong direction and a larger length of an axle is shown to depress the yaw-rate. The result also displays that a RWS vehicle has a delay of the lateral acceleration compared to a FWS vehicle with approximately 0,1-0,2 seconds depending on mass, velocity and length of axle. The test of response indicates that this delay contributes to the delay of the lateral movement of the vehicle the first second for speeds between 10-90 km/h, but after only 1,5 seconds further thelateral movement is twice the value for speeds 50-90km/h. The conclusion is that vehicle doesn’t have RWS due to the delay in response in the beginning and the very larger lateral movement after only seconds later, which makes the vehicle hard to control

Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review

Agencies possess enormous regulatory discretion. This discretion allows executive branch agencies in particular to insulate their decisions from presidential review by raising the costs of such review. They can do so, for example, through variations in policymaking form, cost-benefit analysis quality, timing strategies, and institutional coalition-building. This Article seeks to help shift the literature\u27s focus on courtcentered agency behavior to consider instead the role of the President under current executive orders. Specifically, the Article marshals public-choice insights to offer an analytic framework for what it calls agency self-insulation under presidential review, illustrates the phenomenon, and assesses some normative implications. The framework generates several empirically testable hypotheses regarding how presidential transitions and policy shifts will influence agency behavior. It also challenges the doctrinal focus on removal restrictions and highlights instead a more functional understanding of agency independence. Finally, these dynamics suggest a role for courts to help enforce separation of powers principles within the executive branch and also, along with Congress, to facilitate political monitoring by encouraging information from sources external to the presidential review process

Regulatory Textualism

This Article proposes a textualist approach to regulatory interpretation. Regulatory textualism, however, should be distinct from statutory textualism. Judges should interpret regulations armed not with dictionaries or other general linguistic aids, but rather with a hierarchy of sources that sheds light on the text’s public meaning. Methodologically, this approach tailors positive political theory insights to the rulemaking process. That process features a number of pivotal actors, or veto-gates, who must sign off on a regulation before it can proceed. The court’s interpretive task is to privilege those statements that are more likely to be credible—sincere, not strategic—reflections of the text’s public meaning. Specifically, the judge should first consider the preamble’s provision-by-provision explanations, which frequently respond to public comments raising potential ambiguities. If ambiguity persists, the judge should then consult the regulatory analyses, which predict the rule’s consequences under specific factual scenarios. Both congressional and presidential veto-gates, as well as the public more generally, rely on these analyses when engaging with the regulatory process. Finally, if these materials conflict, the court should then defer to the agency’s interpretation—provided that the agency provides a reasoned explanation. In this manner, regulatory textualism asks how the reasonable reader of a rule would have understood its meaning as negotiated by the President, Congress, and other politically legitimate actors

Civil Servant Disobedience

Bureaucratic resistance is a historically unexceptional feature of the administrative state. What is striking is the extent to which it has become publicly defiant under the Trump Administration. Civil servants are openly defying executive directives in their official capacity, despite strong norms to the contrary. The social practice raises both parallels and contrasts to civil disobedience by private citizens; it thus similarly raises the need for sustained scholarly debate. This article seeks to isolate the phenomenon of civil servant disobedience conceptually and begin an exploration into its normative implications. In particular, it considers the ideal of a reciprocal hierarchy, whereby political appointees consult the expertise and experience of career staff as required by statute. This ideal may help to inform evaluations of civil servant disobedience as a form of bureaucratic process-perfection alongside other legitimating criteria. These factors, however, might actually suggest that disobedience is usually difficult to justify in practice

Regulating the Rulemakers: A Proposal for Deliberative Cost-Benefit Analysis

How should democratic societies regulate their rulemakers? As administrative agencies grapple with novel challenges-from the environment, to public health, and now, to terrorism -- perennial questions reemerge. Chief among them are the appropriate limits of bureaucratic discretion amidst competing demands for expertise and public participation. Indeed, modern risks are increasingly complex. We need experts for sober insights into the consequences of our regulatory choices. Only then will administrative decision-making be informed. Yet, these same risks also breed greater uncertainties and, thus, harder political decisions. Even more urgent, then, becomes the need to ensure those decisions are transparent and accountable. Only then will administrative decision- making be legitimate

Regulatory Textualism

This Article proposes a textualist approach to regulatory interpretation. Regulatory textualism, however, should be distinct from statutory textualism. Judges should interpret regulations armed not with dictionaries or other general linguistic aids, but rather with a hierarchy of sources that sheds light on the text’s public meaning. Methodologically, this approach tailors positive political theory insights to the rulemaking process. That process features a number of pivotal actors, or veto-gates, who must sign off on a regulation before it can proceed. The court’s interpretive task is to privilege those statements that are more likely to be credible—sincere, not strategic—reflections of the text’s public meaning. Specifically, the judge should first consider the preamble’s provision-by-provision explanations, which frequently respond to public comments raising potential ambiguities. If ambiguity persists, the judge should then consult the regulatory analyses, which predict the rule’s consequences under specific factual scenarios. Both congressional and presidential veto-gates, as well as the public more generally, rely on these analyses when engaging with the regulatory process. Finally, if these materials conflict, the court should then defer to the agency’s interpretation—provided that the agency provides a reasoned explanation. In this manner, regulatory textualism asks how the reasonable reader of a rule would have understood its meaning as negotiated by the President, Congress, and other politically legitimate actors