Tom Regan on Kind Arguments against Animal Rights and for Human Rights

Tom Regan argues that human beings and some non-human animals have moral rights because they are “subjects of lives,” that is, roughly, conscious, sentient beings with an experiential welfare. A prominent critic, Carl Cohen, objects: he argues that only moral agents have rights and so animals, since they are not moral agents, lack rights. An objection to Cohen’s argument is that his theory of rights seems to imply that human beings who are not moral agents have no moral rights, but since these human beings have rights, his theory of rights is false, and so he fails to show that animals lack rights. Cohen responds that this objection fails because human beings who are not moral agents nevertheless are the “kind” of beings who are moral agents and so have rights, but animals are not that “kind” of being and so lack rights. Regan argues that Cohen’s “kind” arguments fail: they fail to explain why human beings who are not moral agents have rights and they fail to show that animals lack rights. Since Cohen’s “kind” arguments are influential, I review and critique Regan’s objections . I offer suggestions for stronger responses to arguments like Cohen’s

Ethical Egoism

Selfishness is often considered a vice and selfish actions are often judged to be wrong. But sometimes we ought to do what’s best for ourselves: in a sense, we sometimes should be selfish. The ethical theory known as ethical egoism states that we are always morally required to do what’s in our own self-interest. The view isn’t that we are selfish—this is psychological egoism—but that we ought to be. This essay explores ethical egoism and the main arguments for and against it. [Note: there are links for two versions below; a 1000 Word Philosophy version and a longer version in "Introduction to Ethics: An Open Educational Resource"

Thinking Critically About Abortion

An editorial / opinion piece on abortion: "I’m a philosophy professor who specializes in medical ethics and I teach and write about the ethics of abortion. So I am very familiar with the medical, legal and – most importantly – ethical or moral issues related to HB 481, the so-called “heartbeat bill” that would effectively ban abortion in Georgia. At least hundreds of other philosophy, ethics and law professors in Georgia teach these ethical debates about abortion: they are also, to varying degrees, experts on the issues. What is taught is the arguments about the ethics of abortion, that is, the reasons to think that abortion is wrong and the reasons to think that it’s not wrong. Evaluating these arguments requires understanding and skill. Much of these skills amount to consistently asking ‘What do you mean?’ and ‘Why think that?’ We need better arguments on these issues, and asking and answering these questions helps with that. . .

Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing

Sadly, there are people in very bad medical conditions who want to die. They are in pain, they are suffering, and they no longer find their quality of life to be at an acceptable level anymore. When people like this are kept alive by machines or other medical treatments, can it be morally permissible to let them die? Advocates of “passive euthanasia” argue that it can be. Their reasons, however, suggest that it can sometimes be not wrong to actively kill some patients, i.e., that “active euthanasia” can be permissible also. This essay reviews these arguments

Early and Later Abortions: Ethics and Law

Most abortions occur early in pregnancy. I argue that these abortions, and so most abortions, are not morally wrong and that the best arguments given to think that these abortions are wrong are weak. I also argue that these abortions, and probably all abortions, should be legal. I begin by observing that people sometimes respond to the issue by describing the circumstances of abortion, not offering reasons for their views about those circumstances; I then dismiss “question-begging” arguments about abortion that merely assume the conclusions they are given to support; most importantly, I evaluate many arguments: both common, often-heard arguments and arguments developed by philosophers. My defense of abortion is based on facts about early fetuses’ not yet possessing consciousness or any mental life, awareness or feeling, as well as concerns about rights to one’s own body

Arabis recta Vill. (Brassicaceae) in Poland : distribution, habitats and threat assessment

Arabis recta is one of the rarest species in Poland. It has been reported from 15 sites, mostly in the Nida Basin (Małopolska Upland). The plant is a component of xerothermic grasslands but it can also grow in arable fields and fallows. In Poland, Arabis recta is considered to be threatened by natural succession and herbicide use. However, according to recent studies, it should be treated as an endangered species (EN category) in the country

Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies

Many historically-influential philosophers had profoundly wrong moral views or behaved very badly. Aristotle thought women were “deformed men” and that some people were slaves “by nature.” Descartes had disturbing views about non-human animals. Hume and Kant were racists. Hegel disparaged Africans. Nietzsche despised sick people. Mill condoned colonialism. Fanon was homophobic. Frege was anti-Semitic; Heidegger was a Nazi. Schopenhauer was sexist. Rousseau abandoned his children. Wittgenstein beat his young students. Unfortunately, these examples are just a start. These philosophers are famous for their intellectual accomplishments, yet they display serious moral or intellectual flaws in their beliefs or actions. At least, some of their views were false, ultimately unjustified and, perhaps, harmful. How should we respond to brilliant-but-flawed philosophers from the past? Here we explore the issues, asking questions and offering few answers. Any insights gained here might be applicable to contemporary imperfect philosophers, scholars in other fields, and people in general

New localities of Viola stagnina in Poland

Viola stagnina Kit. is a species regarded as a river corridor plant because of its confinement to river valleys in Central Europe. It is a component of alluvial meadows with natural flooding regime (Cnidion dubii alliance). V. stagnina is rare and red-listed in some European countries. Seven new localities of V. stagnina, its distribution map in Poland and information about possible methods of protecting the species are presented

New localities of Rosa gallica (Rosaceae) in Southern Poland

The paper presents new records for rare and endangered species - Rosa gallica L. from southern Poland. At each of the new stations french rose occupies secondary, anthropogenic habitats. Distribution map and habitat preferences of the studied species are provided