An Investigation Report on Auction Mechanism Design

Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used in solving real-world optimization problems, and in structuring stock or futures exchanges. Auctions also provide a very valuable testing-ground for economic theory, and they play an important role in computer-based control systems. Auction mechanism design aims to manipulate the rules of an auction in order to achieve specific goals. Economists traditionally use mathematical methods, mainly game theory, to analyze auctions and design new auction forms. However, due to the high complexity of auctions, the mathematical models are typically simplified to obtain results, and this makes it difficult to apply results derived from such models to market environments in the real world. As a result, researchers are turning to empirical approaches. This report aims to survey the theoretical and empirical approaches to designing auction mechanisms and trading strategies with more weights on empirical ones, and build the foundation for further research in the field

Automated Auction Mechanism Design with Competing Markets

Resource allocation is a major issue in multiple areas of computer science. Despite the wide range of resource types across these areas, for example real commodities in e-commerce and computing resources in distributed computing, auctions are commonly used in solving the optimization problems involved in these areas, since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes. Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Auction mechanism design aims to manipulate the rules of an auction in order to achieve specific goals. Economists traditionally use mathematical methods, mainly game theory, to analyze auctions and design new auction forms. However, due to the high complexity of auctions, the mathematical models are typically simplified to obtain results, and this makes it difficult to apply results derived from such models to market environments in the real world. As a result, researchers are turning to empirical approaches. Following this line of work, we present what we call a grey-box approach to automated auction mechanism design using reinforcement learning and evolutionary computation methods. We first describe a new strategic game, called \cat, which were designed to run multiple markets that compete to attract traders and make profit. The CAT game enables us to address the imbalance between prior work in this field that studied auctions in an isolated environment and the actual competitive situation that markets face. We then define a novel, parameterized framework for auction mechanisms, and present a classification of auction rules with each as a building block fitting into the framework. Finally we evaluate the viability of building blocks, and acquire auction mechanisms by combining viable blocks through iterations of CAT games. We carried out experiments to examine the effectiveness of the grey-box approach. The best mechanisms we learnt were able to outperform the standard mechanisms against which learning took place and carefully hand-coded mechanisms which won tournaments based on the CAT game. These best mechanisms were also able to outperform mechanisms from the literature even when the evaluation did not take place in the context of CAT games. These results suggest that the grey-box approach can generate robust double auction mechanisms and, as a consequence, is an effective approach to automated mechanism design. The contributions of this work are two-fold. First, the grey-box approach helps to design better auction mechanisms which can play a central role in solutions to resource allocation problems in various application domains of computer science. Second, the parameterized view and the reinforcement learning-based search method can be used in other strategic, competitive situations where decision making processes are complex and difficult to design and evaluate manually

Research and implementation of integrated concurrent software development environment based on Object-Oriented Petri Nets

While network technologies and environments get more and more popular, the demand for concurrent systems becomes stronger and stronger. But the characteristics of concurrency make it difficult to develop them. This dissertation combines Object-Oriented technology and Petri Nets theory, and put forth OOPN (OO Petri Nets) model to describe concurrent systems. Based on the research of conventional development methods of concurrent software, this article advances a new one, which integrates specification, validation and auto-generating codes. Accordingly, an integrated development environment for concurrent software, i.e., OOPN-IDE, comes into being, which mainly includes the following four tools: the concurrent system modeling tool in either graphics mode or text mode, multi-user modeling coordinator, the concurrent system simulator and enactor, the concurrent system deadlock detector. This dissertation contains the following innovations: 1) Combine OO and Petri Nets. Especially, it is described how OO is benefited from Petri Nets. 2) Petri Nets support the whole cycle of modeling, simulation and enaction. Petri Net structures are kept in generated programs rather than being translated into program structures in the traditional way. The execution of the concurrent programs is based on the firing of the transitions in net models. Thus, we can monitor and control the systems in the view of Petri Nets. 3) Multi users can model coordinately. OOPN-IDE uses a client/server architecture. Multi clients can be involved in a single model simultaneously. The possibility of developing large systems is seen. 4) OOPN-IDE is cross-platform. OOPN-IDE is based on Java and can be used on multi operating systems. It has been tested and appraised by experts in a heterogeneous environment involving Windows 95/98/NT and Solaris 2.x. 5) The future work is discussed

A Grey-Box Approach to Automated Mechanism Design

Auctions play an important role in electronic commerce, and have been used to solve problems in distributed computing. Automated approaches to designing effective auction mechanisms are helpful in reducing the burden of traditional game theoretic, analytic approaches and in searching through the large space of possible auction mechanisms. This paper presents an approach to automated mechanism design (AMD) in the domain of double auctions. We describe a novel parametrized space of double auctions, and then introduce an evolutionary search method that searches this space of parameters. The approach evaluates auction mechanisms using the framework of the TAC Market Design Game and relates the performance of the markets in that game to their constituent parts using reinforcement learning. Experiments show that the strongest mechanisms we found using this approach not only win the Market Design Game against known, strong opponents, but also exhibit desirable economic properties when they run in isolation.Comment: 18 pages, 2 figures, 2 tables, and 1 algorithm. Extended abstract to appear in the proceedings of AAMAS'201

MBA: A market-based approach to data allocation and migration for cloud database

With the coming shift to cloud computing, cloud database is emerging to provide database service over the Internet. In the cloud-based environment, data are distributed at internet scale and the system needs to handle a huge number of user queries simultaneously without delay. How data are distributed among the servers has a crucial impact on the query load distribution and the system response time. In this paper, we propose a market-based control method, called MBA, to achieve query load balance via reasonable data distribution. In MBA, database nodes are treated as traders in a market, and certain market rules are used to intelligently decide data allocation and migration. We built a prototype system and conducted extensive experiments. Experimental results show that the MBA method signicantly improves system performance in terms of average query response time and fairness

Characterizing Effective Auction Mechanisms: Insights from the 2007 TAC Mechanism Design Competition

This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007 TAC Market Design competition. It presents a classification of the entries to the competition, and uses this classification to compare these entries. The paper also attempts to relate market dynamics to the auction rules adopted by these entries and their adaptive strategies via a set of post-tournament experiments. Based on this analysis, the paper speculates about the design of effective auction mechanisms, both in the setting of this competition and in the more general case