Culture and cognition

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/91934/1/culture_and_cognition.pd

Cultural similarities and differences in social inference: Evidence from behavioral predictions and lay theories of behavior

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/91937/1/cultural_similarities_differences.pd

Before the Pandemic Ends: Making Sure This Never Happens Again

Introduction On 30 January 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a Global Health Emergency of international concern attendant to the emergence and spread of SARS-CoV-2, nearly two months after the first reported emergence of human cases in Wuhan, China. In the subsequent two months, global, national and local health personnel and infrastructures have been overwhelmed, leading to suffering and death for infected people, and the threat of socio-economic instability and potential collapse for humanity as a whole. This shows that our current and traditional mode of coping, anchored in responses after the fact, is not capable of dealing with the crisis of emerging infectious disease. Given all of our technological expertise, why is there an emerging disease crisis, and why are we losing the battle to contain and diminish emerging diseases? Part of the reason is that the prevailing paradigm explaining the biology of pathogen-host associations (coevolution, evolutionary arms races) has assumed that pathogens must evolve new capacities - special mutations – in order to colonize new hosts and produce emergent disease (e.g. Parrish and Kawaoka, 2005). In this erroneous but broadly prevalent view, the evolution of new capacities creates new opportunities for pathogens. Further, given that mutations are both rare and undirected, the highly specialized nature of pathogen-host relationships should produce an evolutionary firewall limiting dissemination; by those definitions, emergences should be rare (for a historical review see Brooks et al., 2019). Pathogens, however, have become far better at finding us than our traditional understanding predicts. We face considerable risk space for pathogens and disease that directly threaten us, our crops and livestock – through expanding interfaces bringing pathogens and hosts into increasing proximity, exacerbated by environmental disruption and urban density, fueled by globalized trade and travel. We need a new paradigm that explains what we are seeing. Additional section headers: The Stockholm Paradigm The DAMA Protocol A Sense of Urgency and Long-Term Commitment Reference

Two sword lengths apart: Credible commitment problems and physical violence in democratic national legislatures

Ideally, national legislatures in democracies should be venues for peacefully resolving conflicts between opposing groups. However, they can become places of physical violence. Such violence can be an indication that countries’ legislative institutions are functioning far from the democratic ideal of being venues for peaceful conflict reconciliation. In some cases, such as Ukraine prior to the 2014 outbreak of armed conflict in the country’s east and south, violence can indicate and possibly fuel deeper political divisions. In this first global study of legislative violence, I show that brawls are more likely when legislators find it difficult to credibly commit to follow peaceful bargains. Credible commitment problems are more acute in countries with new democracies and disproportionate electoral outcomes – that is, when electoral votes for parties do not closely correspond to the legislative seats they are given. I find robust support for this argument by first examining a case study of legislative violence in the antebellum United States Senate. Pro- and anti-slavery senators became increasingly unable to maintain credible commitments in the lead-up to the 1856 caning of Senator Charles Sumner as the allocation of seats in the legislative body became more disproportional. Second, I find further support for my argument in a new global dataset of contemporary instances of violence in national legislatures. In addition, I find strong evidence that violence is more likely in legislatures with small minority governments. Despite reasonable expectations, civil wars are not associated with more legislative violence

Cultural preferences for formal versus intuitive reasoning

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/91932/1/cultural_preferences.pd

A Persuasive Peace: Syrian Refugees' Attitudes Towards Compromise and Civil War Termination

Civilians who have fled violent conflict and settled in neighboring countries are integral to processes of civil war termination. Contingent on their attitudes, they can either back peaceful settlements or support warring groups and continued fighting. Attitudes toward peaceful settlement are expected to be especially obdurate for civilians who have been exposed to violence. In a survey of 1,120 Syrian refugees in Turkey conducted in 2016, we use experiments to examine attitudes towards two critical phases of conflict termination – a ceasefire and a peace agreement. We examine the rigidity/flexibility of refugees’ attitudes to see if subtle changes in how wartime losses are framed or in who endorses a peace process can shift willingness to compromise with the incumbent Assad regime. Our results show, first, that refugees are far more likely to agree to a ceasefire proposed by a civilian as opposed to one proposed by armed actors from either the Syrian government or the opposition. Second, simply describing the refugee community’s wartime experience as suffering rather than sacrifice substantially increases willingness to compromise with the regime to bring about peace. This effect remains strong among those who experienced greater violence. Together, these results show that even among a highly pro-opposition population that has experienced severe violence, willingness to settle and make peace are remarkably flexible and dependent upon these cues

The BCN Challenge to Compatibilist Free Will and Personal Responsibility

Many philosophers ignore developments in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences that purport to challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility. The reason for this is that the challenge is often framed as a denial of the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, most philosophers think that the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to responsibility and free will. Rather it is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that the scientific findings indicate that it is not so obvious that our views of free will and responsibility can be grounded in the ability to act for reasons without introducing metaphysical obscurities. This poses a challenge to philosophers. We draw the conclusion that philosophers are wrong not to address the recent scientific developments and that scientists are mistaken in formulating their challenge in terms of the freedom to do otherwise