Rumination: Cognitive Consequences of Training to Inhibit the Negative

Background and Objectives: To explore cognitive factors in ruminative thinking, we assessed the effect of a single-session of inhibition training on subsequent biases in attention and interpretation. Methods: We randomly assigned participants to either inhibit or attend to negative stimuli. Inhibition was assessed by using assessment trials embedded throughout the training, and interpretation bias was assessed following the training. Results: Trait rumination moderated training effects on both measures. Low ruminators in the inhibition-training condition maintained their level of inhibition of negative stimuli, but those in the attention-training condition showed a non-significant trend for decreased inhibition. Participants also showed a transfer-congruent tendency in interpretation bias, with reduced bias by those trained to inhibit negative stimuli, compared to those trained to attend to negative stimuli. In contrast, high ruminators in the inhibition training condition showed a training-incongruent decrease in inhibition of negative stimuli, but no change in inhibition when trained to attend to negative stimuli. No effects of the training on interpretation bias were observed among high ruminators. Finally, the training did not affect subsequent measures of mood or state rumination, even when trait rumination scores were taken into account. Limitations: This study used a single session of inhibition training rather than a multisession training, and this may explain the null effects among high ruminators. Conclusions: Findings highlight the critical role that trait rumination plays in moderating the effect of inhibition training. Our results suggest that inhibition training may provide an effective technique to change inhibition bias and later interpretation bias

Training to Inhibit Negative Content Affects Memory and Rumination

Depressive rumination, the tendency to engage in repetitive self-focus in response to distress, seems to be affected by a variety of cognitive biases that in turn maintain negative emotional states. The current study examined whether the difficulty in inhibiting attention to negative information contributes to rumination and to rumination-related biases in memory. Seventy-nine ruminators underwent a 3-week computer-based training, designed to increase either inhibition of negative words or attention to them. On immediate post-training trials, as well as on 2-week follow-up tests, we found evidence for transfer of inhibition training. Training effects also occurred on session-by-session and post-training measures of state rumination, but not on a measure of trait rumination, assessed 2 weeks later. Finally, participants who were trained to inhibit negative material subsequently showed less negative bias on a memory test. These findings further establish the causal role of biased inhibition in rumination, and substantiate the view of rumination as a habit that encourages people to perceive, interpret, and remember events in a repetitive self-focused manner

Ruminators (Unlike Others) Fail to Show Suppression-Induced Forgetting on Indirect Measures of Memory

Suppression is a useful everyday skill leading to the clinically important outcome of forgetting. Suppression-induced forgetting, investigated with the think/no-think (TNT) paradigm, is typically demonstrated on direct tests of memory, even though indirect tests are often more ecologically valid. We report results from two TNT experiments terminating in indirect tests—tests that seem not to measure memory. For a subset of the participants in Experiment 1, latencies to rate word valence were delayed by flankers previously learned but not by flankers previously learned and then suppressed on 16 occasions. For a similar subset in Experiment 2, cue meaning denoted by free associations reflected the meaning established during learning, but less so when targets had been suppressed. These subsets showing suppression effects were students who did not describe themselves as ruminators. That ruminators failed to show “forgetting” on either test suggests that ruminative habits cannot be easily overcome by practicing suppression

The Brief State Rumination Inventory (BSRI): Validation and Psychometric Evaluation

Depressive rumination is an emotion regulation strategy that is considered a major risk factor for depression and other emotional disorders. While well-established measures of trait rumination are available, a psychometrically sound measure of state rumination is lacking. We report on the development and validation of a new self-report measure, the Brief State Rumination Inventory (BSRI), in both Dutch and English. In Study 1, we report the results of a multi-group confirmatory factor analysis across three independent samples (n\u2009=\u2009155; n\u2009=\u2009141; n\u2009=\u2009199). The analysis supported the unidimensionality and measurement invariance of the 8-item BSRI. We also examined its construct validity, showing that scores on the BSRI were positively related to measures of negative affect, trait rumination, and symptoms of depression and anxiety. Scores were negatively related to adaptive emotion regulation strategies and to positive affect. In Study 2 (n\u2009=\u200960), we demonstrated the measure\u2019s sensitivity to an experimental manipulation of rumination. Taken together, these findings suggest that the BSRI is a quick-to-administer, valid, and reliable measure of state ruminatio

Looking on the Dark Side: Rumination and Cognitive Bias Modification

To understand cognitive bases of self-reported ruminative tendencies, we examined interpretations and subsequent memories of ambiguous situations depicting opportunities for rumination. In Experiment 1, we recruited students, randomly assigned them to a distracting or ruminative concentration task, and then measured their latencies to complete fragments that resolved situational ambiguity in either a ruminative or a benign direction. Students in the ruminative task condition who previously self-identified as brooders were quicker to complete ruminative fragments. In Experiment 2, we simulated this bias to investigate its possible contribution to rumination; nonbrooding students were trained to make ruminative or benign resolutions of ambiguous situations. Ruminative training led to more negative continuations of new, potentially ruminative situations in a subsequent transfer task. Next, ruminative training also caused more negatively valenced errors in recalling the ambiguous transfer situations. Finally, after reflection about a personal experience, state-rumination scores were higher in the ruminative condition. These results establish the causal role of interpretation biases in ruminative patterns of thought

Interpretation Bias Characterizes Trait Rumination

Background and Objectives: Rumination, a maladaptive cognitive style of responding to negative mood, is thought to be maintained by a variety of cognitive biases. However, it is unknown whether rumination is characterized by interpretation biases. Methods: Two experiments examined the link between rumination and interpretation biases, revealed in lexical-decision tasks (LDT). A homograph with both benign and ruminative or otherwise negative meaning was presented on each trial and followed by a letter string, to which participants responded by judging whether it was a word or a non-word. Letter strings were nonwords or words related or unrelated to one meaning of the homograph. Results: In both experiments, faster latencies to respond to targets related to the ruminative meaning of the homographs were produced by students with higher scores on self-report measures of rumination. Moreover, these biases were associated with both brooding, the maladaptive form of rumination, and reflection, the more adaptive component. No measure of rumination was significantly correlated with general biases toward negative meaning (Experiment 1) or with threatening interpretations of homographs (Experiment 2). Limitations: The paucity of available rumination-related homographs dictated the use of nonfully randomized stimuli presentation (Experiment 1) or the use of only one set of the meanings associated with the homographs (Experiment 2). Conclusions: Rumination is associated with a tendency to interpret ambiguous information in a rumination-consistent manner. This tendency may exacerbate ruminative thinking and can possibly be a target for future intervention

The Relationships of Personality and Cognitive Styles with Self-Reported Symptoms of Depression and Anxiety

Many studies have reported concurrent relationships between depressive symptoms and various personality, cognitive, and personality-cognitive vulnerabilities, but the degree of overlap among these vulnerabilities is unclear. Moreover, whereas most investigations of these vulnerabilities have focused on depression, their possible relationships with anxiety have not been adequately examined. The present study included 550 high school juniors and examined the cross-sectional relationships among neuroticism, negative inferential style, dysfunctional attitudes, sociotropy, and autonomy, with a wide range of anxiety and depressive symptoms, as well as the incremental validity of these different putative vulnerabilities when examined simultaneously. Correlational analyses revealed that all five vulnerabilities were significantly related to symptoms of both anxiety and depression. Whereas neuroticism accounted for significant unique variance in all symptom outcomes, individual cognitive and personality-cognitive vulnerabilities accounted for small and only sometimes statistically significant variance across outcomes. Importantly, however, for most outcomes the majority of symptom variance was accounted for by shared aspects of the vulnerabilities rather than unique aspects. Implications of these results for understanding cognitive and personality-cognitive vulnerabilities to depression and anxiety are discussed

Clear approach, fuzzy avoidance: Subgoals as a mediator of the relationship between goal orientation and well-being.

Clear approach, fuzzy avoidance: Subgoals as a mediator of the relationship between goal orientation and well-being