Private Contracting and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Provision of Tag-Along Rights in an Emerging Market

We analyse controlling owners incentive to provide non-controlling owners with better protection against self-dealing through offering new shares with tag-along rights, - the private contracting alternative to equal price provision in takeover legislation. Our model identifies two counteracting effects: The benefit of offering tag-along rights is the anti-expropriation effect which makes it harder for new owners to finance a takeover through expropriation of minority owners. The cost is the rent transfer effect which implies that there is a wealth transfer from controlling owners to existing minority owners. Empirically we test the implications of the model using data on equity offerings in Brazil. Consistent with the theoretical predictions we find that offering tag-along rights increases market value of a firm and that companies offering shares with tag-along rights offer larger claims, have less disproportional ownership structure, have a smaller group of existing minority shareholders and are more likely to issue new shares. The paper, thus, find strong support for private contracting being an important alternative governance mechanism to legal protection of investors.Private contracting, Corporate governance, Emerging markets, Tag-along rights

A Role for the RNA Chaperone Hfq in Controlling Adherent-Invasive Escherichia coli Colonization and Virulence

Adherent-invasive Escherichia coli (AIEC) has been linked with the onset and perpetuation of inflammatory bowel diseases. The AIEC strain LF82 was originally isolated from an ileal biopsy from a patient with Crohn's disease. The pathogenesis of LF82 results from its abnormal adherence to and subsequent invasion of the intestinal epithelium coupled with its ability to survive phagocytosis by macrophages once it has crossed the intestinal barrier. To gain further insight into AIEC pathogenesis we employed the nematode Caenorhabditis elegans as an in vivo infection model. We demonstrate that AIEC strain LF82 forms a persistent infection in C. elegans, thereby reducing the host lifespan significantly. This host killing phenotype was associated with massive bacterial colonization of the nematode intestine and damage to the intestinal epithelial surface. C. elegans killing was independent of known LF82 virulence determinants but was abolished by deletion of the LF82 hfq gene, which encodes an RNA chaperone involved in mediating posttranscriptional gene regulation by small non-coding RNAs. This finding reveals that important aspects of LF82 pathogenesis are controlled at the posttranscriptional level by riboregulation. The role of Hfq in LF82 virulence was independent of its function in regulating RpoS and RpoE activity. Further, LF82Δhfq mutants were non-motile, impaired in cell invasion and highly sensitive to various chemical stress conditions, reinforcing the multifaceted function of Hfq in mediating bacterial adaptation. This study highlights the usefulness of simple non-mammalian infection systems for the identification and analysis of bacterial virulence factors

Effects of Anacetrapib in Patients with Atherosclerotic Vascular Disease

BACKGROUND: Patients with atherosclerotic vascular disease remain at high risk for cardiovascular events despite effective statin-based treatment of low-density lipoprotein (LDL) cholesterol levels. The inhibition of cholesteryl ester transfer protein (CETP) by anacetrapib reduces LDL cholesterol levels and increases high-density lipoprotein (HDL) cholesterol levels. However, trials of other CETP inhibitors have shown neutral or adverse effects on cardiovascular outcomes. METHODS: We conducted a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled trial involving 30,449 adults with atherosclerotic vascular disease who were receiving intensive atorvastatin therapy and who had a mean LDL cholesterol level of 61 mg per deciliter (1.58 mmol per liter), a mean non-HDL cholesterol level of 92 mg per deciliter (2.38 mmol per liter), and a mean HDL cholesterol level of 40 mg per deciliter (1.03 mmol per liter). The patients were assigned to receive either 100 mg of anacetrapib once daily (15,225 patients) or matching placebo (15,224 patients). The primary outcome was the first major coronary event, a composite of coronary death, myocardial infarction, or coronary revascularization. RESULTS: During the median follow-up period of 4.1 years, the primary outcome occurred in significantly fewer patients in the anacetrapib group than in the placebo group (1640 of 15,225 patients [10.8%] vs. 1803 of 15,224 patients [11.8%]; rate ratio, 0.91; 95% confidence interval, 0.85 to 0.97; P=0.004). The relative difference in risk was similar across multiple prespecified subgroups. At the trial midpoint, the mean level of HDL cholesterol was higher by 43 mg per deciliter (1.12 mmol per liter) in the anacetrapib group than in the placebo group (a relative difference of 104%), and the mean level of non-HDL cholesterol was lower by 17 mg per deciliter (0.44 mmol per liter), a relative difference of -18%. There were no significant between-group differences in the risk of death, cancer, or other serious adverse events. CONCLUSIONS: Among patients with atherosclerotic vascular disease who were receiving intensive statin therapy, the use of anacetrapib resulted in a lower incidence of major coronary events than the use of placebo. (Funded by Merck and others; Current Controlled Trials number, ISRCTN48678192 ; ClinicalTrials.gov number, NCT01252953 ; and EudraCT number, 2010-023467-18 .)

Private contracting and corporate governance: Evidence from the provision of tag-along rights in Brazil

We identify two opposing effects of issuing equity with tag-along rights that secure an equal price in the event of a takeover. First, the anti-self dealing effect commits controlling owners to sell only to new owners that increase shareholder value. Second, the rent transfer effect shifts rents to existing unprotected minority owners. The institutional setting in Brazil's stock market allows us to test this trade-off. We find that announcements of tag-along rights are associated with an average cumulative abnormal return of around 5%, and that the probability of issuing shares with tag-along rights increases with the cost of self-dealing and decreases in the share of existing unprotected minority investors. Overall, our analysis confirms that private contracting can mitigate the economic costs associated with the inadequate legal protection of investors in emerging markets. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved

Private Contracting and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Provision of Tag-Along Rights in an Emerging Market

November 2007We analyse controlling owners incentive to provide non-controlling owners with better protection against self-dealing through offering new shares with tag-along rights, - the private contracting alternative to equal price provision in takeover legislation. Our model identifies two counteracting effects: The benefit of offering tag-along rights is the anti-expropriation effect which makes it harder for new owners to finance a takeover through expropriation of minority owners. The cost is the rent transfer effect which implies that there is a wealth transfer from controlling owners to existing minority owners. Empirically we test the implications of the model using data on equity offerings in Brazil. Consistent with the theoretical predictions we find that offering tag-along rights increases market value of a firm and that companies offering shares with tag-along rights offer larger claims, have less disproportional ownership structure, have a smaller group of existing minority shareholders and are more likely to issue new shares. The paper, thus, find strong support for private contracting being an important alternative governance mechanism to legal protection of investors.20, [6] p

Private Contracting and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Provision of Tag-Along Rights in an Emerging Market

November 2007We analyse controlling owners incentive to provide non-controlling owners with better protection against self-dealing through offering new shares with tag-along rights, - the private contracting alternative to equal price provision in takeover legislation. Our model identifies two counteracting effects: The benefit of offering tag-along rights is the anti-expropriation effect which makes it harder for new owners to finance a takeover through expropriation of minority owners. The cost is the rent transfer effect which implies that there is a wealth transfer from controlling owners to existing minority owners. Empirically we test the implications of the model using data on equity offerings in Brazil. Consistent with the theoretical predictions we find that offering tag-along rights increases market value of a firm and that companies offering shares with tag-along rights offer larger claims, have less disproportional ownership structure, have a smaller group of existing minority shareholders and are more likely to issue new shares. The paper, thus, find strong support for private contracting being an important alternative governance mechanism to legal protection of investors