78 research outputs found
Crying Wolf? On the Price Discrimination of Online Airline Tickets
International audiencePrice discrimination refers to the practice of dynamically varying the prices of goods based on a customer's purchasing power and willingness to pay. In this paper, motivated by several anecdotal ac-counts, we report on a three-week experiment, conducted in search of price discrimination in airline tickets. Despite presenting the companies with multiple opportunities for discriminating us, and contrary to our expectations, we do not find any evidence for systematic price discrimi-nation. At the same time, we witness the highly volatile prices of certain airlines which make it hard to establish cause and effect. Finally, we provide alternative explanations for the observed price differences
Web Runner 2049: Evaluating Third-Party Anti-bot Services
International audienceGiven the ever-increasing number of malicious bots scouring the web, many websites are turning to specialized services that advertise their ability to detect bots and block them. In this paper, we investigate the design and implementation details of commercial anti-bot services in an effort to understand how they operate and whether they can effectively identify and block malicious bots in practice. We analyze the JavaScript code which their clients need to include in their websites and perform a set of gray box and black box analyses of their proprietary back-end logic, by simulating bots utilizing well-known automation tools and popular browsers. On the positive side, our results show that by relying on browser fingerprinting, more than 75% of protected websites in our dataset, successfully defend against attacks by basic bots built with Python scripts or PhantomJS. At the same time, by using less popular browsers in terms of automation (e.g., Safari on Mac and Chrome on Android) attackers can successfully bypass the protection of up to 82% of protected websites. Our findings show that the majority of protected websites are prone to bot attacks and the existing anti-bot solutions cannot substantially limit the ability of determined attackers. We have responsibly disclosed our findings with the anti-bot service providers
Fingerprinting in Style: Detecting Browser Extensions via Injected Style Sheets
International audienceBrowser extensions enhance the web experience and have seen great adoption from users in the past decade. At the same time, past research has shown that online trackers can use various techniques to infer the presence of installed extensions and abuse them to track users as well as uncover sensitive information about them. In this work we present a novel extension-fingerprinting vector showing how style modifications from browser extensions can be abused to identify installed extensions. We propose a pipeline that analyzes extensions both statically and dynamically and pinpoints their injected style sheets. Based on these, we craft a set of triggers that uniquely identify browser extensions from the context of the visited page. We analyzed 116K extensions from Chrome's Web Store and report that 6,645 of them inject style sheets on any website that users visit. Our pipeline has created triggers that uniquely identify 4,446 of these extensions, 1,074 (24%) of which could not be fingerprinted with previous techniques. Given the power of this new extension-fingerprinting vector, we propose specific countermeasures against style fingerprinting that have minimal impact on the overall user experience
Complex Security Policy? A Longitudinal Analysis of Deployed Content Security Policies.
The Content Security Policy (CSP) mechanism was developed as a mitigation against script injection attacks in 2010. In this paper, we leverage the unique vantage point of the Internet Archive to conduct a historical and longitudinal analysis of how CSP deployment has evolved for a set of 10,000 highly ranked domains. In doing so, we document the long-term struggle site operators face when trying to roll out CSP for content restriction and highlight that even seemingly secure whitelists can be bypassed through expired or typo domains. Next to these new insights, we also shed light on the usage of CSP for other use cases, in particular, TLS enforcement and framing control. Here, we find that CSP can be easily deployed to fit those security scenarios, but both lack wide-spread adoption. Specifically, while the underspecified and thus inconsistently implemented X-Frame-Options header is increasingly used on the Web, CSP’s well-specified and secure alternative cannot keep up. To understand the reasons behind this, we run a notification campaign and subsequent survey, concluding that operators have often experienced the complexity of CSP (and given up), utterly unaware of the easy-to-deploy components of CSP. Hence, we find the complexity of secure, yet functional content restriction gives CSP a bad reputation, resulting in operators not leveraging its potential to secure a site against the non-original attack vectors
Large-Scale Analysis of Pop-Up Scam on Typosquatting URLs
Today, many different types of scams can be found on the internet. Online
criminals are always finding new creative ways to trick internet users, be it
in the form of lottery scams, downloading scam apps for smartphones or fake
gambling websites. This paper presents a large-scale study on one particular
delivery method of online scam: pop-up scam on typosquatting domains.
Typosquatting describes the concept of registering domains which are very
similar to existing ones while deliberately containing common typing errors;
these domains are then used to trick online users while under the belief of
browsing the intended website. Pop-up scam uses JavaScript alert boxes to
present a message which attracts the user's attention very effectively, as they
are a blocking user interface element.
Our study among typosquatting domains derived from the Alexa Top 1 Million
list revealed on 8255 distinct typosquatting URLs a total of 9857 pop-up
messages, out of which 8828 were malicious. The vast majority of those distinct
URLs (7176) were targeted and displayed pop-up messages to one specific HTTP
user agent only. Based on our scans, we present an in-depth analysis as well as
a detailed classification of different targeting parameters (user agent and
language) which triggered varying kinds of pop-up scams.Comment: 9 pages, 11 figure
Assessing the Privacy Benefits of Domain Name Encryption
As Internet users have become more savvy about the potential for their
Internet communication to be observed, the use of network traffic encryption
technologies (e.g., HTTPS/TLS) is on the rise. However, even when encryption is
enabled, users leak information about the domains they visit via DNS queries
and via the Server Name Indication (SNI) extension of TLS. Two recent proposals
to ameliorate this issue are DNS over HTTPS/TLS (DoH/DoT) and Encrypted SNI
(ESNI). In this paper we aim to assess the privacy benefits of these proposals
by considering the relationship between hostnames and IP addresses, the latter
of which are still exposed. We perform DNS queries from nine vantage points
around the globe to characterize this relationship. We quantify the privacy
gain offered by ESNI for different hosting and CDN providers using two
different metrics, the k-anonymity degree due to co-hosting and the dynamics of
IP address changes. We find that 20% of the domains studied will not gain any
privacy benefit since they have a one-to-one mapping between their hostname and
IP address. On the other hand, 30% will gain a significant privacy benefit with
a k value greater than 100, since these domains are co-hosted with more than
100 other domains. Domains whose visitors' privacy will meaningfully improve
are far less popular, while for popular domains the benefit is not significant.
Analyzing the dynamics of IP addresses of long-lived domains, we find that only
7.7% of them change their hosting IP addresses on a daily basis. We conclude by
discussing potential approaches for website owners and hosting/CDN providers
for maximizing the privacy benefits of ESNI.Comment: In Proceedings of the 15th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (ASIA CCS '20), October 5-9, 2020, Taipei, Taiwa
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