Belief as an act of reason

Most philosophers assume (often without argument) that belief is a mental state. Call their view the orthodoxy. In a pair of recent papers, Matthew Boyle has argued that the orthodoxy is mistaken: belief is not a state but (as I like to put it) an act of reason. I argue here that at least part of his disagreement with the orthodoxy rests on an equivocation. For to say that belief is an act of reason might mean either (i) that it’s an actualization of its subject’s rational capacities or (ii) that it’s a rational activity (hence, a certain kind of event). And, though belief is not an act of reason in the second sense, it may nonetheless be one in the first: it may be a static actualization of its subject’s rational capacities

BELIEF AS AN ACT OF REASON

Abstract Most philosophers assume (often without argument) that belief is a mental state. Call their view the orthodoxy. In a pair of recent papers, Matthew Boyle has argued that the orthodoxy is mistaken: belief is not a state but (as I like to put it) an act of reason. I argue here that at least part of his disagreement with the orthodoxy rests on an equivocation. For to say that belief is an act of reason might mean either (i) that it’s an actualization of its subject’s rational capacities or (ii) that it’s a rational activity (hence, a certain kind of event). And, though belief is not an act of reason in the second sense, it may nonetheless be one in the first: it may be a static actualization of its subject’s rational capacities

Toward a Virtue of Irresolution: an Exploration of Descartes\u27 Personal Philosophy

This paper explores an apparent tension in Descartes\u27 practical philosophy between an agent\u27s commitment to the search for practical knowledge and the necessity for the agent to act, at least sometimes, on the basis of a judgment he recognizes (or suspects) to be uncertain, and so possibly false. The main argument of the paper is that the psychological mechanisms through which the agent brings himself to act with certainty on the basis of uncertain judgments threatens the very happiness that is the good of Descrates\u27 practical philosophy. More specificaly, the worry is that one cannot maintain a real commitment to the search for practical knowledge while at the same time recognizing that one\u27s knowledge is inadequate, and still avoid the kind of anxiety and irresolution that Descartes seems to think are the greatest threats to human happiness