Large Scale Deployment of Renewables for Electricity Generation

Comparisons of resource assessments suggest resource constraints are not an obstacle to the large-scale deployment of renewable energy technologies. Economic analysis identifies barriers to the adoption of renewable energy sources resulting from market structure, competition in an uneven playing field and various non-market place barriers. However, even if these barriers are removed, the problem of ‘technology lock-out’ remains. The key policy response is strategic deployment coupled with increased R&D support to accelerate the pace of improvement through market experience. The paper suggests significant contributions from various technologies, but does not assess their optimal or maximal market share

Optimal congestion treatment for bilateral electricity trading

How to treat transmission constraints in electricity markets that are not based on a pool but on bilateral trading? Three approaches are currently discussed: First, the system operator resolves constraints and socialises costs; second, physical transmission contracts; third, locational charging with the option of financial hedging. Socialisation of costs for constraint resolution results in inefficient dispatch and incorrect incentives for investment in generation. Physical contracts and locational charging designs have identical properties in a very simplified model world, but differ if transaction costs, illiquid markets and uncertainty about demand are considered. Physical transmission contracts are best designed as zonal access rights, but have to be centrally administered to be efficient. Only locational charging can cope with uncertainty and volatility of electricity demand efficiently and non-discriminatory

Integrating Transmission and Energy Markets Mitigates Market Power

Integrating Transmission and Energy Markets Mitigates Market Powe

Opening the Electricity Market to Renewable Energy: Making Better Use of the Grid

Opening the electricity market to renewable energy sources would create flexibility for the further integration of renewable energy, leading to considerably lower costs and emissions. This requires the electricity markets to be reorganized in three ways. Firstly, most trading, and therefore production decision-making, is completed at least one day prior to electricity production. But it must be possible to make adjustments on shorter timescales, in order to effectively utilize wind forecasts, which are only relatively accurate a few hours ahead of production. Secondly, demand for operating reserve to stabilize the grid varies with the uncertainty of forecasts for wind and other generation. Most power plants can offer operating reserve, but only together with electricity. At present, however, operating reserve is traded separately from electricity, often in long-term contracts. And thirdly, network operators generally compensate market participants for grid constraints. But with around 200 GWs of new wind and solar capacity being built by 2020, grid expansion must be combined with transparent, market-based congestion management. The introduction of an independent system operator offering an integrated platform for short-term power trading using a pricing system that internalises network constraints ("nodal pricing") could meet these conditions, allowing further openings of the power market for renewable electrical energy. Experience in the US and simulations for Europe show that international transmission capacity is up to 30% better utilized, congestion management alone yielding annual savings of 1 - 2 billion euros.Market design, renewable energy, nodal pricing, transmission

How EU trade policy can enhance climate action Options to boost low-carbon investment and address carbon leakage. CEPS Policy Priorities for 2019-2024, 23 September 2019

In her Political Guidelines, Commission President-elect Ursula von der Leyen sets climate neutrality as one of the central objectives of a proposed European Green Deal. EU member states are now discussing whether to formally agree on an objective for climate neutrality in 2050. Some have already set deadlines – Finland as early as 2035. This has triggered reflection on the adequate policy mix, notably with a view to making a business case for low-carbon innovation and investment while addressing carbon leakage. The Commission President-elect thinks that this will require a carbon border tax. To address the strategic need for a robust EU framework for low-carbon investment, we recommend that the European Commission i) investigates the economic, legal, and administrative viability and implementation timeline of carbon price adjustments at the border, ii) examines the possibility to extend the EU Emissions Trading System to include consumption of carbon intensive materials and iii) explores the potential of product standards to achieve the same aim. All these approaches have different advantages and shortcomings in terms of political acceptability, effectiveness and implications for the world trade system. To support partner countries in advancing climate action, both bilateral and multilateral measures should be prepared

Mainstreaming New Renewable Energy Technologies

This paper outlines the benefits, obstacles and options for governments to support international markets for technology development. International markets for new energy technologies offer greater scope, thereby increasing the incentives and opportunities for technology improvements. As the market is supported by more independent governments, the confidence of technology developers and producers that future markets for their products will exist is increasing, thus enabling capital access and inducing R&D investment and exploration of improved production processes. The bigger markets also allow for international competition, thus allowing for the application of the best available technology. The government challenge to induce sufficient RD&D remains and with international markets the benefits and costs of national governments free-riding on international effort needs to be addressed. Finally, we discuss how international co-operation can be used to evolve the energy system in such a way that it can integrate new technologies at minimum cost

Definition of a Balancing Point for Electricity Transmission Contracts

Electricity transmission contracts allocate scarce resources, allow hedging against locational price differences and provide information to guide investment. Liquidity is increased if all transmission contracts are defined relative to one balancing point, then a set of two contracts can replicate any point to point contract. We propose an algorithm and apply it to the European electricity network to identify a well connected balancing point that exhibits minimal relative cross-price responses and hence reduces market power exercised by generation companies. Market level data which is difficult to obtain or model such as price levels in different regions or that is dependent on the time scale of interaction, as demand elasticity, is not required. The only critical input quantities are assumptions on future transmission constraint patterns

Learning curves and changing product attributes: the case of wind turbines

The heuristic concept of learning curves describes cost reductions as a function of cumulative production. A study of the Liberty shipbuilders suggested that product quality and production scale are other relevant factors that affect costs. Significant changes of attributes of a technology must be corrected when assessing the impact of learning-by-doing. We use an engineering-based model to capture the cost changes of wind turbines that can be attributed to changes in turbine size. We estimate the learning curve and turbine size parameters using more than 1500 price points from 1991 to 2003. The fit between model and empirical data confirms the concept

Market Power and Technological Bias: The Case of Electricity Generation

It is difficult to elminated all market power in electricity markets and it is therefore frequently suggested that some market power should be tolerated: extra revenues contribute to fixed cost recovery,facilitate investment and increase security of supply. This suggestion implicitly assumes all generation technologiesbenefit equally from market power. We assess a mixture of conventional and intermittent generation, eg coal plants and wind power. If all output is sold in the spot market, then intermittent generation benefits less frommarket power than conventional generation. Forward contracts or option contracts reduce the levelof market power but bias against intermittent generators persists

Auctions to gas transmission access: The British experience

Auctions to gas transmission access: The British experienc