Debunking the myth of shareholder ownership of companies: Some implications for corporate governance and financial reporting

The shareholder primacy model is dominant in Anglo-Saxon corporate governance and financial reporting even though it is considered to be dysfunctional and a source of crisis. The possibilities of reforms are routinely stymied with the claims that shareholders are the owners of large corporations and management should promote their interests. This paper seeks to debunk such claims. It shows that a corporation is a distinct legal person and cannot be owned by its shareholders. It argues that shareholders in contemporary corporations are owners of ?fictitious? capital which is very distinct from ?real? capital. The systemic pressures require the holders of fictitious capital to constantly buy/sell shares in pursuit of short-term gains. The paper further shows that in a globalised economy, the shareholding duration in major UK companies has shrunk and shareholders are more dispersed than ever before. They are not in any position to control or direct corporations for the benefit of other stakeholders and society generally. The paper calls for abandonment of the shareholder model of governance and calls for empowerment of stakeholders with a long-term interest in the wellbeing of corporations

Labour participation rates of the over 55s in Ireland A study for the Expert Group on Future Skills Needs and the National Competitiveness Council; final report

Available from British Library Document Supply Centre-DSC:m02/13791 / BLDSC - British Library Document Supply CentreSIGLEGBUnited Kingdo

The Impact of Audit Committee Existence and Audit Committee Meeting Frequency on the External Audit: Perceptions of Australian Auditors

This article examines the impact of audit committee existence, the frequency of audit committee meetings and the auditor's attendance at meetings on aspects of the external audit. Using an experimental design, we find that the audit committee, the frequency of committee meetings and the auditor's attendance at meetings are significantly associated with a reduction in perceived audit risk. The impact on audit efficiency and audit testing is perceived to be minimal. Manager and partner hours are greater when meetings are more frequent and the partner attends all meetings. The audit committee is expected to provide assistance in resolving conflicts with management and to lead to some improvement in overall audit quality. In neither case is this affected by meeting frequency or the auditor's attendance at meetings. Participants expect the existence of an audit committee to lead to an increase in audit fees, particularly when meetings are more frequent and the auditor is required to attend meetings. Reasons given for any fee increase relate to the additional preparation for and attendance at meetings