Alien Registration- Nanos, Sophie (Portland, Cumberland County)

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Alien Registration- Nanos, Mary (Portland, Cumberland County)

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Alien Registration- Nanos, Mary (Portland, Cumberland County)

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Alien Registration- Nanos, Sophia (South Portland, Cumberland County)

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Uncertainty triggers overreaction: evidence from corporate takeovers

Behavioural finance models suggest that under uncertainty, investors overweight their private information and overreact to it. We test this theoretical prediction in an M&A framework. We find that under high information uncertainty, when investors are more likely to possess firm-specific information, acquiring firms generate highly positive and significant gains following the announcement of private stock and private cash acquisitions (positive news) while the market heavily punishes public stock (negative news) deals. On the other hand, under conditions of low information uncertainty, when investors do not possess private information, the market reaction is complete (i.e. zero abnormal returns) irrespective of the type of acquisition. Overall, we provide empirical evidence that shows that information uncertainty plays a significant role in explaining short-run acquirer abnormal returns

The benefits of overvaluation: evidence from mergers and acquisitions

Theoretical and empirical evidence debates on whether acquirers can exploit their overvalued equity and create value by purchasing less overvalued or undervalued target firms. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Savor and Lu (2009) argue in favor of this, while Fu et al. (2013) and Akbulut (2013) provide evidence against. We revisit this issue and develop a quasi‐experimental design. The misvaluation effect for stock acquirers that are more overvalued than their targets is isolated and measured. Our findings offer direct evidence in favor of the Shleifer and Vishny (2003) market timing hypothesis

Basic aspects of St John Chrysostom's doctrine of justification according to his commentary on St Paul’s letter to the Romans

The primary aim of this thesis is to present the crucial Pauline doctrine of Justification through Christ as it has been understood and expounded by St John Chrysostom, one of the greatest exegetes of Holy Scripture in the early Church. Chrysostom's Commentary on Paul’s Letter to the Romans is the primary source and the presentation of the most basic aspects of the doctrine of justification in it is the method. The short introduction, relating to Chrysostom's text (ch.l) is followed in turn by: the presuppositions of Paul's doctrine of justification, located in original death and pattern of creation, i.e. in humanity's fall into death through sin, and its link with Christ as God the Creator (ch.2); the soteriological sense of justification, connected with Christ as man (new Adam) and giver of the justification by grace through faith as distinct from the justification in the law through works (ch.3); justification as restoration of humanity in the knowledge of God through Christ; justification as an act of faith as distinct from the acts of the Law (ch.5); justification as sacrifice involving Christ's redemptive sacrifice and the living sacrifice of the Christians (ch.6); the verification of justification through the resurrection (ch.7); justification as doxology, i.e. the worship of God by man in Christ (ch. 8); justification and the new morality of the life in the Spirit (ch. 9); justification as adoption of humanity by God in Christ (ch. 10); justification as punishment and recompense in Christ (ch. 11); justification as an indistructible grace and gift of God's love (ch. 12) and finally, the secular sense of justification (ch. 13).The rich doctrine emerging there from entails destruction of death, victory over sin, participation in God's life in and through Christ. Christ’s being and action remain the key to this doctrine

THE IMPACT OF MANAGERIAL OVERCONFIDENCE AND INVESTOR SENTIMENT ON BIDDERS’ ABNORMAL RETURNS

The main objective of this thesis is to investigate takeover gains for UK bidding firms and offer a behavioural approach to empirical analysis. The main issues and key findings of the three empirical chapters are summarised as follows. Chapter 3 empirically investigates the hubris hypothesis for corporate takeovers (Roll (1986)). This thesis examines whether overconfident managers destroy shareholder value (in public deals) or whether their actions generally lead to lower wealth effects (in private deals) relative to rational bidders. Bidders’ short and long-term performance is also examined by employing, for the first time in a UK study, three different measures of overconfidence namely Stock Options, Multiple Acquirers and Business Press proxies. The results indicate that managers infected by hubris fail to generate superior returns than those generated by rational bidders, for all three proxies of overconfidence after controlling for various bidder and deal characteristics. We therefore argue that the well-documented destructive effect upon shareholder wealth of managerial overconfidence is not sensitive to the measure used for this behavioural bias (i.e. overconfidence). The Hubris hypothesis assumes a rational market-irrational manager framework while Shleifer and Vishny (2003) offer rational manager-irrational market framework and suggest that takeovers are driven by overvalued markets. Chapter 4 empirically investigates the proposal of Baker et al. (2007) who claims that ‘the irrational manager and irrational investor stories can certainly coexist’. Findings show that rational managers who announce takeovers in high valuation periods enjoy the highest abnormal returns while overconfident managers who announce takeover bids in low valuation periods cannot hide the poor quality or possible overpayment of their deals ending up suffering the highest losses. Lastly, Chapter 5 offers a behavioural approach to explain short –run bidder gains. Neoclassical theories suggest that the market reaction following the announcement of a takeover bid reflects either synergy or revaluation gains. Chapter 5 suggests that acquirers’ abnormal returns reflect a market overreaction. Results suggest that under conditions of low information uncertainty when investors do not possess private information, the market reaction is complete (zero abnormal returns) for any type of acquisition. On the other hand, under conditions of high information uncertainty, investors overweight their private information and overreact to takeover announcements. Therefore, they generate highly positive and significant gains following the announcement of private stock and public cash deals (considered to be ‘good’ news), positive gains following private cash acquisitions (also defined as ‘good’ news) while investors heavily punish public stock deals (classified as ‘bad’ news