Bank privatization and productivity : evidence for Brazil

Over the past decade, the Brazilian banking industry has undergone major and deep transformations with several privatizations of state-owned banks, mergers and acquisitions, closing down of troubled banks, entry by foreign banks, and so on. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the impacts of these changes in banking on total factor productivity. The authors first obtain measures of bank level productivity by employing the techniques due to Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). They then relate such measures to a set of bank characteristics. Their main results indicate that state-owned banks are less productive than their private peers, and that privatization has increased productivity.

Credit channel without the LM curve

This paper extends Bernanke and Blinder (1988)'s macroeconomic model of credit channel to an environment where the monetary authority has control over a short-term interest rate. The comparative statics regarding changes in the market interest rate, in the required reserve ratio over bank deposits, and in the risk of public bonds are highlighted

Credit channel without the LM curve

This paper extends Bernanke and Blinder (1988)'s macroeconomic model of credit channel to an environment where the monetary authority has control over a short-term interest rate. The comparative statics regarding changes in the market interest rate, in the required reserve ratio over bank deposits, and in the risk of public bonds are highlighted

Competition in the Brazilian loan market: an empirical analysis

The aim of this paper is to review some of the existing tests for competition in Brazilian banking, as well as to propose an alternative. After the description of the institutional setting of the Brazilian Banking system on this period, the competition tests on the literature were reviewed, beginning with the test proposed by Panzar and Rosse (1987). The market does not seem to be in long-run equilibrium, implying only the market does not seem to find itself in collusive outcome. The next step was to try a new methodology, applied by Moreno, Martínez and Ruiz (2006) for the Spanish banking market. On this methodology, in which the assumption of equality of conduct parameters between firms and time periods is relaxed, the results indicate that, for some firms and in some time periods, a cooperative conduct in fact is present