Robot As Moral Agent: A Philosophical and Empirical Approach

平成29年7月29日 CogSci 2017 : London, Hilton Hotel Metropole, London, England, における発表資

Touching the World as It Is

The aim of the present paper is to suggest an alternative view to the conventional distinction between ontology and epistemology, thereby reconstituting the relationship between the cognitive self and the real world. More specifically, we will criticize the distinction by shedding light on a peculiar character of the body, which can provide a critical perspective against Cartesian dualism. Furthermore, we will give a sketchy description of the philosophy of touch, and propose the notion of skin-self, or self-manifesting self, as a radical alternative to the modern conception of self

Robot as Moral Agent: A Philosophical and Empirical Approach

What is necessary for robots to coexist with human beings? In order to do so, we suppose, robots must be moralagents. To be a moral agent is to bear its own responsibility which others cannot take for it. We will argue that such anirreplaceability consists in its having an inner world — one which others cannot directly experience, just as pleasure and pain.And personality of a moral agent, which is to be irreducible to a mere difference of traits or features of individuals, is firmlyrooted in such an inner world.We will support our theses by referring to our experiment in which humans and robots interact with each other doing acoordination task. This experiment will provide an empirical analysis of the human-robot relationship with regard to learningmechanism, moral judgement, and the ascription of the inner world