北海道における知的障がい者の就労支援に関する一考察

知的障がい者の就労について、北海道及び北海道教育委員会が進めている障が いのある人の就労支援の充実に向けた取組の状況を概観することに加えて、北海道内 の特別支援学校在籍者の約８割を占めている知的障がい特別支援学校の現状や就労支 援の取組について整理した。北海道において障がいある人の就労に大きな役割を果た してきた職親会の設立の経緯やなよろ地方職親会の障がい者雇用の状況やジョブコー チ養成研修の成果をまとめた。以上のことを踏まえて、知的障がい者の就労支援やキ ャリア教育の在り方について考察する

Ranks of ideals in inverse semigroups of difunctional binary relations

The set Dn of all difunctional relations on an n element set is an inverse semigroup under a variation of the usual composition operation. We solve an open problem of Kudryavtseva and Maltcev (Publ Math Debrecen 78(2):253–282, 2011), which asks: What is the rank (smallest size of a generating set) of Dn? Specifically, we show that the rank of Dn is B(n)+n, where B(n) is the nth Bell number. We also give the rank of an arbitrary ideal of Dn. Although Dn bears many similarities with families such as the full transformation semigroups and symmetric inverse semigroups (all contain the symmetric group and have a chain of J-classes), we note that the fast growth of rank(Dn) as a function of n is a property not shared with these other families

Monotonicity of optimal policies in a zero sum game: a flow control model

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how value iteration can be used in a zero-sum game to obtain structural results on the optimal (equilibrium) value and policy. This is done through the following example. We consider the problem of dynamic flow control of arriving customers into a finite buffer. The service rate may depend on the state of the system, may change in time and is unknown to the controller. The goal of the controller is to design a policy that guarantees the best performance under the worst case service conditions. The cost is composed of a holding cost, a cost for rejecting customers and a cost that depends on the quality of the service. We consider both discounted and expected average cost. The problem is studied in the framework of zero-sum Markov games where the server, called player 1, is assumed to play against the flow controller, called player 2. Each player is assumed to have the information of all previous actions of both players as well as the current and past states of the system. We show that there exists an optimal policy for both players which is stationary (that does not depend on the time). A value iteration algorithm is used to obtain monotonicity properties of the optimal policies. For the case that only two actions are available to one of the players, we show that his optimal policy is of a threshold type, and optimal policies exist for both players that may need randomization in at most one state

Neuere Entwicklungen der Stossspannungsmesstechnik II Vortraege

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