Yes, You Can Get a Job With That Major! Goal 5 Strategies for Facilitating, Assessing, and Demonstrating Psychology Students’ Professional Development

The Summit on the National Assessment of Psychology was held on June 2016 to chart a path for assessing student achievement of the goals of the undergraduate psychology major. Our subcommittee was charged with identifying evaluation strategies and tools for students’ professional development, which included applying psychology to various careers; engaging in effective self-regulation, project management, and teamwork; and developing lifelong professional skills. In this article, therefore, we not only review a wide range of assessment tools for facilitating and evaluating professional development in psychology, but we also discuss the larger importance of the learning goal both to students and to public perceptions of psychology

Sobrecarga de ferro transfusional em portadores de anemia falciforme: comparação entre ressonância magnética e ferritina sérica

OBJETIVO: Identificar variáveis preditoras de sobrecarga de ferro em portadores de anemia falciforme e correlacionar indicadores bioquímicos e imaginológicos. MATERIAiS E MÉTODOS: Foi realizado estudo transversal envolvendo 32 portadores de anemia falciforme, que foram submetidos a dosagem sérica de ferro, ferritina e a ressonância magnética do fígado. Foram realizadas cinco sequências gradiente-eco e uma spin-eco. A intensidade de sinal foi obtida em cada sequência pelas médias das regiões de interesse no fígado e musculatura paravertebral para obter a razão da intensidade de sinal (RIS) fígado/músculo. A partir da RIS foi obtida a concentração hepática estimada de ferro (CHEF) pela fórmula: e[5,808 - (0,877 × T2*) - (1,518 × PI)], onde T2* é a RIS na sequência com TE de 13 ms e PI é a RIS da sequência com ponderação intermediária. Os pacientes foram agrupados segundo o regime de transfusão de hemácias (regulares mensais versus esporádicas). RESULTADOS: Os grupos transfusionais foram comparados pelas variáveis clínico-laboratoriais, sendo significativas as diferenças entre RIS, CHEF e ferritina sérica: o grupo que recebeu transfusões regulares apresentou sobrecarga de ferro hepático mais intensa. CONCLUSÃO: A ressonância magnética foi ferramenta eficiente para avaliação de sobrecarga hepática de ferro em portadores de anemia falciforme

Comportamento ingestivo de ovinos alimentados com rações contendo quatro níveis de inclusão do farelo de mamona

Este trabalho foi desenvolvido com o objetivo de observar a influência de quatro níveis de substituição (0; 50; 75 ou 100%) do farelo de soja pelo farelo de mamona destoxificado em rações para ovinos mestiços 1/2 Morada Nova x 1/2 SPRD (sem padrão racial definido) sobre o seu comportamento ingestivo. O delineamento utilizado foi o inteiramente casualizado com quatro tratamentos e cinco repetições. Os ovinos eram machos, inteiros, com peso corporal 18,01 ± 1,41 kg e idade média de 7 meses. Foram avaliadas atividades contínuas (tempo de alimentação, ruminação, outras atividades e ócio) e pontuais (consumo de sal, ingestão de água, micção e defecação), como também a eficiência de alimentação (EAL), eficiência de ruminação (ERU), tempo de alimentação (TAL), tempo de ruminação (TRU), tempo de mastigação total (TMT), número de bolos ruminais (BOL), tempo de mastigações merícicas por bolo ruminal (MMtb) e número de mastigações merícicas por bolo ruminal (MMnb). As variáveis tempo de alimentação, ruminação, outras atividades, ócio, consumo de sal e ingestão de água foram afetadas (P<0,05), especialmente o MMnb, que foi inferior para os animais alimentados com as rações com 100% de substituição, possivelmente pelo seu menor teor de fibra (oriundo da forragem), sendo possível a substituição total do farelo de soja pelo farelo de mamona destoxificado

Manufacturer-Retailer Channel Interactions and Implications for Channel Power: An Empirical Investigation of Pricing in a Local Market

The issue of “power” in the marketing channels for consumer products has received considerable attention in both academic and practitioner journals as well as in the popular press. Our objective in this paper is to provide an empirical method to measure the power of channel members and to understand the reasons (demand factors, cost factors, nature of channel interactions) for this power. We confine our analysis to pricing power in channels. We use methods from the game-theory literature in marketing on channel interactions to obtain the theoretical framework for our empirical model. This literature provides us a definition of power—one that is based on the proportion (or percentage) of channel profits that accrue to each of the channel members. There can be a variety of possible channel interactions between manufacturers and retailers in channels. The theoretical literature has examined some of these games. For example, Choi (1991) examines how channel profits for manufacturers and retailer vary if channel interactions are either vertical Nash, or if they are Stackelberg leaderfollower with either the manufacturer or the retailer being the price leader. Each of these three channel interaction games has different implications for profits made by manufacturers and retailers, and consequently for the relative power of the channel members. In contrast to the previous literature that has focused largely on the above three channel interaction games, our model extends the game-theoretic literature by allowing for a continuum of possible channel interactions between manufacturers and a retailer. Furthermore, for a given product market, we empirically estimate from the data where the channel interactions lie in this continuum. More critically, we obtain measures of how channel profits are divided between manufacturers and the retailer in the product market, where a higher share of channel profit is associated with higher channel power. We then examine how channel power is related to demand conditions facing various brands and cost parameters of various manufacturers. In going from game-theory-based theoretical models of channel interactions to empirical estimation, we use the “new empirical industrial organization” framework (Bresnahan 1988). As part of this structural modeling framework, we build retail-level demand functions for the various brands (manufacturer and private label) in a given product category. Given these demand functions, we obtain optimal pricing rules for manufacturers and the retailer. In determining their optimal prices, manufacturers and the retailer account for how all the players in the channel choose their optimal prices. That is, we account for dependencies in decision making across channel members. These dependencies are characterized by a set of “conduct parameters,” which are estimated from market data. The conduct parameters enable us to identify the nature of channel interactions between manufacturers and the retailer (along the continuum mentioned previously). In addition to the demand and conduct parameters, manufacturers' marginal costs are also estimated in the model. These marginal cost estimates, along with the manufacturer prices and retail prices available in our dataset, enable us to compute the division of channel profits among the channel members. Hence, we are able to obtain insights into who has pricing power in the channel. In the empirical application of the model, we analyze a local market for two product categories: refrigerated juice and tuna. In both categories, there are three major brands. The difference between them is that the private label has an insignificant market share in the tuna category. Our main empirical results show that the usual games examined in the marketing literature do not hold for the given data. We also .nd that the retailer's market power is very significant in both these product categories, and that the estimated demand and cost parameters are consistent with the estimated pattern of conduct between the manufacturers and the retailer. Given the evidence from the trade press of intense manufacturer competition in these categories, as well as the “commodity” nature of these products, the result of retailer power appears intuitive.Channel Power, Private Labels, Competitive Games